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These three essays focus on various manifestations of risk: collective institutional investor risk,
individual retail investor risk, and risk generated by government debt.
In the first essay, we look at how institutional investor concentration can impact downside risk.
The U.S. equities market price process is largely driven by the information set and actions of large
institutional investors, not individual retail investors. Using quarterly 13-F holdings, we construct
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of institutional investor concentration as a measure of gran-
ularity. Our contributions are both empirical and theoretical. We provide a comprehensive study
of how granularity affects: (1) the cross-section of returns, (2) conditional variances across stocks
and (3) downside risk. We find that constructing a low-HHI minus high-HHI portfolio produces an
annualized return of 5.6%. Using an approach advocated by Koijen and Yogo, we document that
the cross-section of HHI portfolios can be explained by a conditional asset pricing model involving
heterogeneous investor demands driven by time-varying beliefs over asset characteristics. We doc-
ument the adverse impact that investor ownership concentration has on both conditional volatility,
and critically, a robust set of downside risk measures at both the portfolio and the firm level.
In the second essay, we study how individual retail investor risk could be mitigated via the robo-
advising industry. Artificial intelligence, or AI, enhancements are increasingly shaping our daily
lives. Financial decision-making is no exception to this. We introduce the notion of AI Alter Egos,
which are shadow robo-investors, and use a unique data set covering brokerage accounts for a large
cross-section of investors over a sample from January 2003 to March 2012, which includes the
2008 financial crisis, to assess the potential benefits of robo-investing. We have detailed investor
characteristics and records of all trades. Our data set consists of investors typically targeted for
iii
robo-advising. We explore robo-investing strategies commonly used in the industry, including
some involving advanced machine learning methods. The man versus machine comparison allows
us to shed light on possible benefits the emerging robo-advising industry may provide to certain
segments of the population, such as low income and/or low education investors.
In the third essay, we study how government debt can impact future growth via a specific risk
channel. Elevated levels of government debt raise concerns about their effects on long-term growth
prospects. Using the cross section of US stock returns, we show that (i) high-R&D firms are more
exposed to government debt and pay higher expected returns than low-R&D firms, and (ii) higher
levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio predict higher risk premiums for high-R&D firms. Furthermore,
rises in the cost of capital for innovation-intensive firms predict declines in subsequent productiv-
ity and economic growth. We propose a production-based asset pricing model with endogenous
innovation and fiscal policy shocks that can rationalize key aspects of the empirical evidence. Our
study highlights a novel and distinct risk channel shaping the link between government debt and
future growth.
iv
To my mom and dad.
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I want to thank my advisor Eric Ghysels for the invaluable advice, guidance,
and support over the years. It’s been an honor and privilege to get to learn from and work with
Eric. I’m deeply indebted to Max Croce for all of the opportunities, knowledge, and guidance
he’s provided. His intuition of how to approach economic problems is second to none. I’m very
fortunate and thankful to have been able to work with Lukas Schmid and Thien Nguyen, both of
whom are fantastic researchers. I’d also like to thank Hanwei Liu for being a great co-author. I’m
also very grateful for both Anusha Chari and Andrii Babii for serving on my committee and their
help. I’d like to thank all of the participants of the UNC Econometrics workshop for the many
opportunities to present and the valuable feedback and discussion that resulted. Finally, I want to
thank my parents for their unconditional love and support throughout the years.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
1 Granularity and (Downside) Risk in Equity Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Expected Returns, Volatility and Downside Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Conditional Means – Linear Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Conditional Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 Downside Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Downside Risk and Top Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.1 Portfolio-Level Downside Risk by Top Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.2 Firm-Level Downside Risk by Top Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.3 Evidence From Options Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.4 Risk By Investor Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4 A Heterogeneous Investor Demand-driven Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 Downside Risk in a Stylized Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.2 Breaking up Large Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.3 Market Share Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4.4 Motivating a Conditional Asset Pricing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Artificial Intelligence Alter Egos: Who Might Benefit from Robo-investing? . . . . . 35
vii
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 A Large Panel of Individual Brokerage Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 Robo-Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.1 AI Alter Egos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.2 Machine Learning Expected Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3.3 Global ETF Robo-investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.1 Are more sophisticated models better? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.2 Who gains from robo-advise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.3 How does robo-advising perform during major financial crisis? . . . . . . . 53
2.4.4 AI Alter Egos versus Passive Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4.5 Are the spreads due to market or behavioral factors? . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.6 AI Enhancements to Passive Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Government Debt and the Returns to Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.1 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.2 Time-series asset pricing tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.3 Government debt, R&D, and growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3 An asset-pricing model with public debt and innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3.1 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3.2 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.3.3 Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
viii
3.3.4 Equilibrium and asset prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.5 Aggregate productivity growth and fiscal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Quantitative analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4.2 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.3 Findings: debt and innovation returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.4.4 Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.5 Cross-sectional asset pricing tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.5.1 Conditional model with time-varying betas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.1 HHI Portfolio Analysis Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.1.1 Portfolio Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.1.2 HHI Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.1.3 Low-Minus-High (LMH) Portfolio Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.1.4 Equally-Weighted Linear Factor Model Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Pre-Crisis Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.2.1 Downside Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.2.2 Downside Risk with Decomposed HHI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.3 Value-Weighted Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.4 Top Players - Dynamic Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.5 HHI Decomposed By Investor Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.6 Reduced Form Model Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.1 Data - details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
ix
B.1.1 Portfolios and Individual Investor Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
B.1.2 Sample of stocks and ETFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B.1.3 Sample of investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.1.4 Behavioral Biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.1.5 Individual investor returns adjusted for cash holding . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
C Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
C.1 Additional statistics and tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
C.2 Tax rate dependence on the debt-to-output ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
C.3 Empirical specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
C.3.1 Parameterized β regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
C.3.2 TFP construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
C.3.3 Look-ahead bias correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
C.3.4 Stambaugh bias correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C.3.5 Characteristic-adjusted returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C.3.6 Monte Carlo evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
x
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Annualized HHI Low-High Portfolio Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Linear Factor Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 HHI Portfolios Unconditional Linear Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Conditional Volatility Regressions – Quarterly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Conditional Volatility Regressions – Monthly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.6 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.7 Top Institutions Holding Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.8 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.9 Firm-Level Risk on Investor Concentration Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.10 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI: Simulated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.11 Impact of Uncertainty on Conditional Betas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.12 Conditional Asset Pricing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Out-of-Sample MSE Across Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2 AI Alter Ego Return Spreads - All Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 Ranked Variables Based on Relative `2 Contribution Across Stocks . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 AI Alter Egos Return Spreads - Education, Risk Aversion and Income . . . . . . . 66
2.5 Returns Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 AI Alter Ego Return Spreads vis-à-vis benchmark ETFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.7 Disposition Effect and AI Alter Ego Return Spreads - Median regression . . . . . 69
2.8 Return Spreads Global ETF Robo-investors minus Realized Cash-Adjusted . . . . 70
3.1 Portfolio Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2 DGDP and Predictability of Returns to Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3 DGDP and Parameterized Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
xi
3.4 Predicting Changes in Investment with ∆DGDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 DGDP and Growth Predictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6 Benchmark Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.7 Model Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.8 Predictive Regressions: DGDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.9 Conditional Macro Factors Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A.1 Portfolio HHI Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.2 Portfolio HHI Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.3 Annualized Portfolio Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.4 Liquidity-Risk Adjusted Excess Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.5 Conditional Mean Linear Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.6 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI: Pre-crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.7 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly HHI - Pre-crisis . . . . . . . . . 124
A.8 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis . . . . . . . 125
A.9 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis . . 126
A.10 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI - First Month Pre-crisis . . . . . . . . 127
A.11 Annualized HHI Low-High Portfolio Returns - VW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.12 Annualized Portfolio Returns – VW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.13 Liquidity-Risk Adjusted Excess Returns – VW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.14 Conditional Mean Linear Factor Models - VW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.15 Conditional Volatility Regressions – Quarterly – VW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.16 Conditional Volatility Regressions – Monthly – VW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.17 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI, Value-Weighted . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.18 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI, Value-Weighted . . . . 133
A.19 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI: Pre-crisis, Value-Weighted . . . . . . 134
xii
A.20 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly HHI - Pre-crisis, Value-Weighted 134
A.21 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis, Value-Weighted
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.22 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis,
Value-Weighted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.23 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI - Quarterly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.24 Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI - Quarterly . . . . . . . 138
A.25 Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI - First Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.26 Composition of HHI Portfolios by Investor Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.27 Conditional Volatility by HHI Decomposition by Investor Type . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.28 Conditional Volatility by HHI Decomposition by Investor Classification . . . . . . 141
B.1 Types of Assets in the Data Base and Prevalence of Trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
B.2 Illustrative Examples of Cash Flows and Return Computations . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.3 International Coverage of Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.4 Stock Distribution Across Industry Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.5 Statistics About ETFs Underlying Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.6 ETFs Top 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.7 Cross-sectional Statistics for Asset Prices, Monthly Returns and Risk Factors . . . 149
B.8 Investor Characteristics Joint Percentages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.9 Cross-Sectional Statistics for Investors’ Age, Monthly Trading Activity and Portfolio151
B.10 Statistics for ETFs usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.11 Summary Statistics Disposition Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B.12 Summary Statistics Monthly Trading Frequency Stocks and ETFs . . . . . . . . . 154
B.13 Returns Monthly Rebalancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.14 Returns Monthly Rebalancing - Education-Sorted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.15 Returns Monthly Rebalancing - Risk Aversion-Sorted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
xiii
B.16 Returns Monthly Rebalancing - Income-Sorted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.17 AI Spreads Monthly Rebalancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.18 AI Spreads Equities & ETFs Monthly Rebalancing - Education-Sorted . . . . . . . 162
B.19 AI Spreads Equities & ETFs Monthly Rebalancing - Risk Aversion-Sorted . . . . . 163
B.20 AI Spreads Equities & ETFs Monthly Rebalancing - Income-Sorted . . . . . . . . 164
B.21 Returns Quarterly Rebalancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
B.22 AI Spreads Quarterly Rebalancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.23 AI Spreads Equities & ETFs Quarterly Rebalancing - Education-Sorted . . . . . . 167
B.24 AI Spreads Equities & ETFs Quarterly Rebalancing - Risk Aversion-Sorted . . . . 168
B.25 AI Spreads Equities & ETFs Quarterly Rebalancing - Income-Sorted . . . . . . . . 169
B.26 Summary Statistics Returns - Equities & ETFs - Pre NBER Crisis . . . . . . . . . 170
B.27 AI Spreads - Equities & ETFs - Pre NBER Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
B.28 Summary Statistics Returns - Equities & ETFs - During NBER Crisis . . . . . . . 172
B.29 AI Spreads - Equities & ETFs - During NBER Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
B.30 Summary Statistics Returns - Equities & ETFs - Post NBER Crisis . . . . . . . . . 174
B.31 AI Spreads - Equities & ETFs - Post NBER Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
B.32 Hypothesis Tests Median . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B.33 Disposition Effect and Alter Ego Spreads - Quantile Regressions . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.34 Disposition Effect and Alter Ego Spreads vis-à-vis S&P 500 ETF - Quantile Re-
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CHAPTER 1
GRANULARITY AND (DOWNSIDE) RISK IN EQUITY MARKETS
(JOINT WITH ERIC GHYSELS AND HANWEI LIU)
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. equities market price process is largely driven by the information sets and actions of
large institutional investors, not individual retail investors. As the majority of equity trading vol-
ume has moved toward electronic exchanges and higher frequency trading platforms, the influence
of a few can have an out-sized influence on the many. This influence may be largely asymmetric
in nature, with the degree of institutional impact unevenly distributed among traded names and
therefore generating a cross-sectional distribution of risk. We aim to systematically study how
institutional investor concentration impacts the conditional distribution of stock returns.
Our analysis touches on the notion of granularity. Gabaix (2011) finds that idiosyncratic move-
ments in the production of the largest 100 firms explain about one third of the variations in output
and Solow residual, suggesting that the granular composition of the economy matters. Carvalho
and Gabaix (2013) take this a step further and argue that the so-called “great moderation”, a sig-
nificant fall in the volatility of GDP that began in the 1980s, is mostly due to a change in the
fluctuations of the output of the biggest firms in the U.S. Both papers pertain to the structure of the
economy. Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013) relate customer-supplier connectedness to
firm stock market volatility.
Our paper is not about the granularity of the economy, or how it might explain economic
fluctuations or firm-specific volatility. Yet, we borrow the ideas of granularity and apply them to
institutional investor stock holdings and how it affects asset pricing – in particular the cross-section
of stock returns. In our analysis granularity encapsulates both the concentration of the equity
market investor base and how influential the investors are both individually and more broadly as a
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part of a dynamic network.
A number of papers have studied the impact of institutional investors on asset prices, including
Shleifer (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Barberis,
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005), among others. More recently, Ben-David, Franzoni, Moussawi,
and Sedunov (2016) also note that the U.S. asset management industry has become increasingly
concentrated and study the fact that large institutions are not equivalent to a collection of smaller
independent entities. They study the impact of large institutional ownership on stock volatility and
find that their presence increases price instability.
We use quarterly 13-F holdings reported by institutional investors and focus on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) as the measure of granularity and provide a comprehensive study of how
it affects: (1) the cross-section of returns, (2) conditional variances across stocks and (3) downside
risk. We find that forming equally weighted portfolios based on HHI and constructing a low-
HHI minus high-HHI portfolio produces an annualized return of 5.6%, and a 6.2% liquidity risk-
adjusted return. In other words, stocks with significantly concentrated investor bases command an
insurance premium. What might explain this? Is it related to liquidity, i.e. investor concentration
and liquidity go hand in hand? We find that the first PC of a HHI low minus high portfolio has a
small negative correlation with the excess return on the market portfolio, and only weak positive
correlation with the SMB portfolio or the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003a) liquidity factor. When we
estimate various factor models, such as the Fama-French three factor model augmented with the
aforementioned liquidity factor, we find that the aforementioned HHI premium remains largely un-
explained. The evidence regarding the cross-section of expected returns based on value-weighted
portfolios is, in contrast, much weaker. However, the findings regarding conditional variance and
downside risk, to which we turn next, are robust at the portfolio level - equally- or value-weighted
- as well as the individual firm level.
Ben-David et al. (2016) document that large institutional ownership has a significant impact
on individual stock volatility. Their analysis involves quarterly realized volatilities for the cross-
section of individual stocks. We take a slightly different route and estimate an ARCH-type volatil-
ity model at the quarterly frequency for high-HHI and low-HHI portfolios. Overall we conclude
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from our analysis that the findings of Ben-David et al. (2016) do appear to prevail at the portfolio
return level. In addition to the impact of ownership concentration on conditional volatility at the
portfolio level, we find extremely strong evidence of its impact on downside risk. We also exam-
ine what happens to our findings if we separate the holdings of the largest institutions from the
remaining institutions. This separation reveals the distinct role played by the former. Finally, we
also conduct our analysis at the firm level, reinforcing our results at the portfolio level.
We adopt the reduced form framework of Koijen and Yogo (2019), who develop an asset pric-
ing model with rich heterogeneity in asset demand across investors, designed to match institutional
holdings. In their model the equilibrium price vector is uniquely determined by market clearing
for each asset. The appeal of their model is the demand-driven reduced form nature of equilibrium
asset pricing. We do not model what might be the deeper causes of uneven institutional investor
concentration across stocks. Perhaps asymmetry of information is the main cause, as high-HHI ex-
pected returns could more cleanly encode long-run consumption growth, as their investor network
may have a more refined information set. Or perhaps it is heterogeneity of beliefs that generates
the uneven concentration across assets. Or it might be heterogeneity of preferences. Using the
Koijen and Yogo (2019) demand-driven asset pricing approach, we endow various investors with
an investment mandate based on asset size and a fundamental characteristic. We then demonstrate
through a simulated economy, using empirically plausible parameters, that investors who make
portfolio allocation decisions based in part on the size of an asset and fundamental characteristics
endogenously produce an expected return premium that can be spanned by loadings on HHI. We
replicate a granularity premium as observed in the data. Importantly, we document that downside
risk for our simulated high-HHI portfolios is exasperated as HHI increases, aligning with what we
discover in the data. We perform two counterfactual experiments, both with respect to the impact
of increasing HHI on the downside risk for the high HHI asset. In the first experiment we simulate
economies where one of the investors is broken-up, either uniformly random or weighted towards
the investors with greater wealth, and find that in the disaggregated environment the impact of
HHI on downside risk for the high HHI asset is substantially lower. In the second experiment we
introduce an implicit cost of owning more than 5% market share in any given asset, simulating
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an informational cost with having to disclose a large ownership position. In this scenario we also
find that imposing this cost significantly mollifies the impact of increasing HHI on the downside
risk for the high HHI asset. We caution that this is not a statement about welfare. Rather these
relatively simple mechanisms for regulating investors either through crudely redistributing an in-
vestor’s capital or directly restricting asset ownership with a tangible cost placed on market share,
both serve to ease the impact of HHI on downside risk for those assets already experiencing higher
levels of investor concentration.
We then use this reduced form model to motivate a conditional asset pricing model that explains
the cross-sectional return dispersion we observe in the HHI portfolios, and provides a mechanism
for discussing the high HHI portfolio’s insurance premium. When investors’ beliefs about the
importance of a characteristic change (where importance relates to the characteristic’s power in
predictability – its strength in forecasting future cash flows or future risk premia), and this char-
acteristic is a critical element of an investor’s asset demand functions, then an asset’s risk factor
loadings change according to the relative concentration of faith investors have in a characteristic
and how this particular characteristic co-moves with certain risk factors. In particular, low HHI
stocks are comprised of investors that may have diffuse beliefs about characteristics (very different
demand functions), and consequently there could be a wide variety of characteristics that drive the
demand for that particular stock. On the contrary, high HHI stocks are comprised of investors who
have concentrated beliefs in certain shared characteristics that they believe have strong forecasting
potential. In bad times, those low HHI stocks that have a wide belief distribution over the impor-
tance of their characteristics, are more susceptible to systematic uncertainty driving their exposure
to certain risk factors. These stocks command a premium for being exposed to this risk chan-
nel in which systematic uncertainty operates. Investors with strong convictions over certain asset
characteristics are relatively more immune to this channel, and therefore provide a valuable hedge
against this uncertainty risk. The hedge is not without its own cost though, in particular the very
characteristic that is being used to form the hedge portfolio is the characteristic that can exaggerate
its downside risk. We show that this approximating conditional asset pricing model describes the
HHI portfolios well relative to standard unconditional factor models.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the data and empirical results.
Section 1.3 highlights the potential impact of the largest asset managers on the market granularity
results. Section 1.4 introduces a simulated reduced form model capable of mimicking the empirical
findings and discuss the motivating conditional asset pricing model. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Expected Returns, Volatility and Downside Risk
We start with a comprehensive empirical study of investor concentration and its impact on the
cross-section of expected returns, individual stock volatility and downside risk. To that end we
study the quarterly 13-F holdings reported by institutional investors. We obtain institutional 13-F
filings from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database. This database provides owner-
ship information of institutional investment managers with assets under management of over $100
million in Section 13(f) securities. These securities, per SEC stipulations, generally include equity
securities that trade on an exchange, certain equity options and warrants, shares of closed-end in-
vestment companies, and certain convertible debt securities. We also collect quarterly individual
stock returns and accounting information from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively. The sample
period is from 1980Q1 to 2014Q4. In addition, we collect CRSP daily stock return data for the
same period and monthly Fama-French 3 factor return data are obtained through Kenneth French’s
website. The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003a) tradable liquidity factors are obtained through WRDS
also at the monthly frequency. We transform these monthly return factors into quarterly data. A
more detailed analysis of the data appears in the Appendix A.1.
A casual overview of the market composition reveals that, during the 140 quarters or 35-year
time period of our sample, there was an upward trend in both the number of 13-F institutional
investors and their aggregate dollar holdings. The reported number of institutional investors is 467
in 1980Q1, and increases to 3,750 in 2014Q4. The dollar amount held by the 13-F institutions
increased from $321 billion in 1980Q1 to $17.4 trillion in 2014Q4 with several substantial drops
in the early 2000s and during the global financial crisis (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A.1).
While we witnessed a notable expansion in the institutional investor universe, we would like
to examine if the market has become more concentrated. For that purpose, we identify the group
of institutional investors with the largest holdings each quarter. We treat the largest 3, 5, 7, or 10
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managers as one entity, and describe their associated holding characteristics vis-à-vis the universe
of all 13-F institutional investor filings.1 The analysis is conducted on a quarterly basis and Figure
1.1 plots the share of holdings by the largest 3, 5, 7 and 10 institutional investors. We observe that
by the end of 2014, the 10 largest institutional investors make up 31.11% of all 13-F institution
holdings. The proportion is 17.45%, 22.11%, and 26.12% for the top 3, 5, and 7 institutions, re-
spectively. These are remarkably different from the market shares at the beginning of 1980, which
are 8.31%, 11.50%, 14.28%, and 18.11% respectively for the 3, 5, 7, and 10 largest institutional
investors.
FIG. 1.1: Quarterly Top Institutional Investor Market Shares
To proceed with our analysis on market granularity we start by calculating the market-wide





1Market share of an individual institution is the ratio of its dollar holdings to the aggregate amount reported by the
13-F filing institutions.
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where sit is the market share of institution i during quarter t, and Nt is the total number of institu-
tional investors during quarter t. Figure 1.2, which displays the quarterly aggregate HHI measures,
reveals that market concentration was rising steadily until the financial crisis. The market became
less concentrated during the financial crisis, but has surpassed its previous level of concentration
once the crisis ended. Note that due to the large number of existing institutions, the magnitude of
the HHI index remains small.
FIG. 1.2: Quarterly Aggregate HHI
To form portfolios we compute a similar HHI measure that depicts the dispersion of institu-
tional ownerships at the individual stock level. Namely, for each listed security e, we catalog the
investment managers that are long in the stock. We record the fractions of these holding sizes





2, e = 1, . . . , Et (1.2)
where seit is the market share of institution i for stock e at time t and N
e
t is the total number of
institutional investors during quarter t holding e = 1, . . . , Et, where the latter is the total of equities
in quarter t. For instance, the HHI of a stock is equal to 1 if it is held by only one investment
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manager at the time of the 13-F filings. Alternatively, 100 institutional investors each possessing
an equal amount of a stock generates an HHI value of 0.01. The latter signifies a more diverse
profile of stock ownership.
The cross-section of stocks is sortable by ownership concentration Het (see Appendix A.1.1
for details and portfolio summary statistics). We start with equally-weighted portfolios and report
descriptive statistics of the low minus high (LMH) HHI portfolios in Table 1.1. These portfolios
are long in broad ownership stocks and short in stocks held by few institutional investors. The
excess returns are presented in annualized percentages. The LMH portfolios delivers on average a
5.6% annualized excess return, significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. The median return
is higher at 7.8% although the distribution is negatively skewed and has a standard deviation of
roughly 11%.2
TABLE 1.1: Annualized HHI Low-High Portfolio Returns
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skew Kurt. 25 % 75 %
5.57 7.76 11.04 -5.99 57.33 -0.75 14.25
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of annualized percentage returns from the Low-Minus-High
(LMH) portfolio we constructed. Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
In Appendix A.3 we explore the value-weighted HHI portfolios. The results reported in Table
A.11 reveal that the HHI LMH spread is not as impressive with value-weighted portfolios. It has
a mean of 76 basis points and is not significant. Hence, the findings reported in Table 1.1 are not
robust in terms of a value- versus equally-weighted portfolio scheme. In contrast, almost all of the
findings reported in the remainder of the paper - as will be discussed in detail - are robust to the
choice of portfolio weighting scheme. In addition, we will also report findings based on individual
stocks, by-passing the portfolio formation step.
2In Appendix A.1.3 we also calculate a liquidity-risk adjusted excess returns. The LMH portfolio returns are quite
similar to those reported in Table 1.1. This suggests that liquidity is not a critical component – although this claim is
revisited more thoroughly in the next subsection.
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1.2.1 Conditional Means – Linear Factor Models
How much are HHI portfolio returns explained by standard asset pricing factors? To answer
this question we consider a number of factor model specifications, where Ft will denote the fac-
tor(s). In particular, we consider: (a) the Fama-French 3 Factor model (Rm−Rf, SMB, HML),
(b) Fama-French 3 Factor + Pastor-Stambaugh tradable liquidity (the latter denoted LIQ) and
finally (c) Fama-French 3 Factors, Pastor-Stambaugh tradable liquidity and the first principle com-
ponent of [HHI]i,t, denoted PC − HHI. We start with the correlation across the factors being
TABLE 1.2: Linear Factor Correlations
Rm-Rf SMB HML Liq HHI
Rm-Rf 1.00 -
SMB 0.46 1.00
HML -0.20 -0.01 1.00
Liq -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
HHI -0.07 0.20 0.08 0.18 1.00
Notes: This table shows correlations between (1) Fama-French 3 factors, i.e. market risk, size, and book-to-
market, (2) Pastor-Stambaugh tradable liquidity, and (3) first principle component of HHI. Quarterly sample
starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
considered, which appear in Table 1.2. Of particular interest is the first PC-HHI. It has a small neg-
ative correlation with the excess return on the market portfolio, and maximal correlation of only
20% with the SMB portfolio. This means that the breadth of institutional ownership is somewhat
related to the small cap premium, but that relationship is weak. The same applies to the liquidity
factor, with second largest correlation of 18%. The main take-away is that the tradable liquidity
factor and the first principle component of HHI are not highly correlated.
Next, we estimate linear factor models of the following form using GMM for the 5 HHI-sorted
portfolios at the quarterly frequency from 1980Q1-2014Q4 (i = 1, ..., 5, t = 1, ..., 139):
Ri,t = αi + F
′
tβi + εi,t (1.3)
E[Ri,t] = λ
′βi + ei
The summary results for equally-weighted HHI portfolios are reported in Table 1.3. Loadings
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and prices of risk for the HHI portfolios appear in Table A.5 in Appendix A.1.4.3 Companion
results for value-weighted portfolios appear in Table A.14 in Appendix A.3. Table 1.3 shows that
that none of the proposed factor models sufficiently describe the cross-section of equally-weighted
HHI portfolio returns, as evidenced by the rejection of the Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) test
and over-identification J-tests. Moreover, the HHI LMH α is of similar magnitude to its annualized
unconditional average of 5.6%. Overall these results also hold to a lesser degree for value-weighted
HHI portfolios. Standard unconditional linear factor models do not adequately the cross-section
formed on HHI.
TABLE 1.3: HHI Portfolios Unconditional Linear Factor Models
CAPM FF3 FF3+Liq q-Factor
HHI LMH α 4.91∗∗∗ 5.51∗∗∗ 6.03∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗
(1.92) (1.86) (1.89) (2.58)
GRS p-value (%) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
J-stat p-value (%) 4.68 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
Notes: This table shows the HHI LMH portfolio α (annualized percentage) as well as the p-values for the Gibbons et al.
(1989) test (GRS) and GMM J-statistic. The tests respectively come from a time-series and 2-step GMM estimation of
the following unconditional linear factor models using the HHI-sorted portfolios: CAPM, Fama-French three-factor
(FF3), Fama-French three-factor and Pastor-Stambaugh tradable liquidity factor (FF3+Liq), and the Hou-Xue-Zhang
q-factor (Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015b)). Our quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Newey and
West (1987a) standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
1.2.2 Conditional Volatility
It was noted that Ben-David et al. (2016) study whether large institutional ownership has a
significant impact on individual stock volatility. They conjecture as a potential channel for this
effect that large institutions generate higher price impact than smaller institutions. They provide
empirical supporting evidence and argue that the effect of large institutions on volatility is unlikely
to be related to improved price discovery, because the stocks owned by large institutions exhibit
stronger price inefficiency.
We take a slightly different route and estimate GJR-GARCH(1,1) models at the quarterly fre-
quency for the high-HHI and low-HHI portfolios. In particular, we estimate the following model:
3We also implemented the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure, which yields very similar results. We
get almost identical beta estimates and the prices of risk are fairly close. Detailed results are available upon request.
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i,t−1 + c1I(εi,t−1 < 0)ε
2
i,t−1. Results for equally-
weighted portfolios are reported in the main body of the paper and Appendix A.3 has the value-
weighted portfolio findings.








Conditional Annualized Volatility in %
High HHI
Low HHI
FIG. 1.3: Conditional Volatility High versus Low HHI Portfolio
The estimated conditional volatilities are plotted in Figure 1.3. We observe a clear level shift
in the volatilities of the two respective portfolios, suggesting that there is a potential difference
in both the average level of volatility as well as the volatility of volatility. The volatility of the
high-HHI portfolio is substantially higher, sometimes three to four times the level of annualized
volatility of the low-HHI portfolio.4 How much is this due to say small firm effects or other factors
affecting the overall level of volatility?
To investigate this further we regress the estimated conditional volatilities on each portfolio’s
4Value-weighted portfolios feature lower portfolio volatilities, but the wedge between high and low HHI portfolios
remains.
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TABLE 1.4: Conditional Volatility Regressions – Quarterly
Constant σ̂2i,t−1 HHI LIQ SMB R
2
1 (high HHI)−0.0033 0.4453∗∗∗ 0.0054∗ 0.2158
(0.0028) (0.1571) (0.0030)
5 (low HHI) 0.0011∗∗ 0.4128∗∗∗−0.0079 0.1750
(0.0005) (0.0575) (0.0100)
1 (high HHI)−0.0035 0.4450∗∗∗ 0.0056 −0.0013 0.2162
(0.0031) (0.1408) (0.0034) (0.0075)
5 (low HHI) 0.0011∗∗ 0.4222∗∗∗−0.0079 −0.0010 0.1800
(0.0005) (0.0705) (0.0097) (0.0016)
1 (high HHI)−0.0063∗∗ 0.5029∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗ −0.0023 −0.0256∗∗∗ 0.3221
(0.0032) (0.1394) (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0066)
5 (low HHI) 0.0010∗∗ 0.5198∗∗∗−0.0070 −0.0013 −0.0062∗∗∗ 0.2954
(0.0005) (0.0724) (0.0095) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Notes: This table shows estimation results for the regressions in (A.4). Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1
and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey and West (1987a) standard errors appear in parentheses.
HHI value, namely for i = 1 and 5 we estimate the following:
σ̂2i,t = bi,0 + bi,1σ̂
2
i,t−1 + bi,2HHIi,t + vi,t (1.4)
σ̂2i,t = bi,0 + bi,1σ̂
2
i,t−1 + bi,2HHIi,t + bi,3Liqt + vi,t
σ̂2i,t = bi,0 + bi,1σ̂
2
i,t−1 + bi,2HHIi,t + bi,3Liqt + bi,4SMBt + vi,t
where σ̂2i,t are fitted conditional volatilities from the GJR-GARCH(1,1) estimation.
5 The results
appear in Table 1.4. We find that for high-HHI portfolios, increasing investor concentration is as-
sociated with higher conditional volatilty, even after controlling for liquidity and size. Conversely,
the impact of HHI is statistically insignificant across all specifications for the low-HHI portfolio. In
short, marginal increases in investor concentration are associated with higher conditional volatiltiy
for stocks with high investor concentration. In other words, the impact of HHI on conditional
volatility is asymmetric with respect to the level of HHI (and the findings reported in Table A.15
show this is also true for value-weighted portfolios).
5The lagged dependent variable, being an estimated proxy, may be a cause of concern as it produces a bias for bi,1
and the other parameters. Some experimentation with instrumental variables reveals that the concern is inconsequential
for our hypothesis of interest.
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In addition, we estimate GJR-GARCH(1,1) models at the monthly frequency and retain these
monthly conditional volatility estimates for the first month in each calendar quarter (January, April,
July, and October). We do this to sharpen our focus on the potential impact of HHI immediately
following its filing each quarter. We then estimate the same regression specifications and find
that the impact of HHI on conditional volatility is similar. Increasing investor concentration is
associated with higher conditional volatility in high-HHI portfolios. In addition the point estimates
on HHI for the high-HHI portfolios are slightly larger than the quarterly specification, an indication
that the impact of HHI each period may dissipate towards the end of the quarter. Equally-weighted
portfolio results appear in Table 1.5 whereas value-weighted ones appear in Table A.16. Overall
we find that the results of Ben-David et al. (2016) are sufficiently strong to prevail at the portfolio
return level.
TABLE 1.5: Conditional Volatility Regressions – Monthly
Constant σ̂2i,t−1 HHI LIQ SMB R
2
1 (high HHI)−0.0060 0.4189∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗ 0.2106
(0.0043) (0.1308) (0.0048)
5 (low HHI) 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.1234 −0.0409 0.0246
(0.0017) (0.1137) (0.0353)
1 (high HHI)−0.0062 0.4170∗∗∗ 0.0098∗ −0.0017 0.2107
(0.0045) (0.1317) (0.0050) (0.0073)
5 (low HHI) 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.1314 −0.0438 0.0067 0.0326
(0.0018) (0.1118) (0.0359) (0.0047)
1 (high HHI)−0.0065 0.4147∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0093 0.2136
(0.0045) (0.1342) (0.0051) (0.0074) (0.0073)
5 (low HHI) 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.1587 −0.0391 0.0062 0.0123 0.0487
(0.0017) (0.1038) (0.0345) (0.0048) (0.0107)
Notes: This table shows estimation results for the regressions in (A.4). Conditional volatilities are produced
for the first mont in each calendar quarter. Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Newey
and West (1987a) standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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1.2.3 Downside Risk
Arguably the strongest impact of institutional investor concentration appears to be in downside
risk.6
We start with estimating conditional quantiles. The model we rely on to characterize down-
side risk is the conditional autoregressive value at risk (CAViaR) model introduced by Engle and
Manganelli (2004). The functional form is
qt(θ) = β1 + β2qt−1(θ) + β3|rt−1|+ εt,θ, (1.5)
where qt(θ) denotes the conditional quantile associated with probability level θ. We look at θ =
.05, i.e. the left 5% tail. We compute quantiles for each of the HHI portfolios, and the results for
the highest HHI and the lowest HHI portfolio appear in Figure 1.6. We clearly see that the high-
HHI portfolio has a more pronounced left tail - with values as low as -15%. In fact, the high-HHI
quantiles are remarkably lower than the ones from the low-HHI portfolio at almost all times. The
spread between the high-HHI and low-HHI conditional percentiles is typically on the order of 4 to
5 %.7 We project the estimated quantiles again on the same variables, namely for i = 1 and 5 we
run the following regressions:
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1HHIi,t−1 + vi,t (1.6)
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1HHIi,t−1 + bi,2Liqt−1 + vi,t
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1HHIi,t−1 + bi,2Liqt−1 + bi,3SMBt−1 + vi,t
The results appear in Table 1.6. We find overwhelming evidence that downside risk is driven
by the HHI measure in the high but not the low portfolio. This means that stocks with only a
6Since downside risk is much affected by the recent financial crisis, we also report for the purpose of robustness in
a separate Appendix section A.2 results for a pre-crisis sample. Those results indicate that our findings are not driven
by the financial crisis.
7Figure A.4, covering value-weighted portfolios, features different patterns for the quantiles but a similar spread
between high- and low-HHI portfolios.
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FIG. 1.4: Conditional Quantile Estimates HHI Portfolios 5% Left Tail
TABLE 1.6: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI
Constant HHI LIQ SMB R2
1 (high HHI) 0.0622 * -0.1614 *** 0.2039
(0.0262) (0.0272)
5 (low HHI) -0.0480 *** 0.1214 0.0014
(0.0131) (0.2785)
1 (high HHI) 0.0630 * -0.1624 *** 0.0045 0.2042
(0.0265) (0.0276) (0.0217)
5 (low HHI) -0.0474 *** 0.1177 -0.0237 0.0063
(0.0131) (0.2789) (0.0286)
1 (high HHI) 0.0680 * -0.1678 *** 0.0060 0.0361 0.2138
(0.0267) (0.0279) (0.0217) (0.0279)
5 (low HHI) -0.0475 *** 0.1183 -0.0236 0.0032 0.0064
(0.0132) (0.2800) (0.0288) (0.0371)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.6). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Newey and West (1987a) standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and
three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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FIG. 1.5: Conditional Quantile Estimates HHI Portfolios 5% Left Tail - GARCH(1, 1)
Filtered
few institutional investors feature an incremental downside risk. Note also how the R2 of the
regressions increase for all the high-HHI quantiles, meaning that HHI explains a substantial part
of the variation in downside risk.8
To account for volatility when addressing downside risk, we filter the returns through a stan-
dard GARCH(1, 1) and a GJR-GARCH(1, 1) model separately. These two scenarios reflect a fair
representation of both symmetric and asymmetric GARCH models. We then proceed to use the
filtered return series to re-estimate the 5% conditional quantiles, having controlled for conditional
volatility. It remains that the high-HHI portfolio is subject to a higher degree of downside risk, as
indicated by the left tails of portfolio returns. This can be shown from Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6,
and our findings hold in both cases.
8For the value-weighted portfolios we report similar findings in Table A.17.
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FIG. 1.6. Conditional Quantile Estimates HHI Portfolios 5% Left Tail - GJR-GARCH(1, 1) Fil-
tered
1.3 Downside Risk and Top Players
What happens to our findings if we separate the largest asset managers each quarter from the
rest? Do our findings reported in the previous section still hold? This question is of interest because
of several reasons.
A first reason is that we can view such an exercise as a robustness check, verifying that our
results are not simply driven by a single or a few large institutional investors. Second, there have
been discussions about whether giant U.S. money managers should be viewed as systemically im-
portant financial institutions (so called SIFIs) and be subjected to increased regulatory supervision.
For example, according to financial press articles (see e.g. Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2015) both
BlackRock and Fidelity have insisted to international regulators that they do not pose threats to
the financial system should they collapse. It was reported that they sent letters to the Financial
Stability Board in Basel, Switzerland, outlining why Fidelity and BlackRock disagree with efforts
to identify money managers that could be subject to stricter oversight because of the risks they
pose. In this section, we will examine the impact of top-3, top-5, and top-10 institutional investors.
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It is important to note that these groups of institutional investors are heterogeneous throughout our
sample, as none has appeared consistently as a top player.
1.3.1 Portfolio-Level Downside Risk by Top Players
In light of the findings reported in the previous section and related newspaper articles, we are
interested in the impact that the top institutions potentially may have on the entire market. We
rank the institutions each quarter by their dollar holdings, and study the top 3, top 5, and top 10
institutions as combined entities. Throughout the sample period, the majority of the holdings of
the largest institutions are characterized by a low market concentration ratio. The proportion of
aggregate holdings that belong to the lowest-HHI portfolio 5 is on average around 90%, and the
ratio remains within a fairly stable range based on results reported in Table 1.7.
TABLE 1.7: Top Institutions Holding Decomposition
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5
Top 3
Dollar Holdings (mean %) 0.21 0.38 1.37 7.61 90.42
(max %) 5.75 1.83 3.97 14.91 96.43
(min %) 0 0.02 0.24 3.06 80.81
Number of Stocks (mean %) 3 9 19 31 38
Top 5
Dollar Holdings (mean %) 0.35 0.45 1.37 7.73 90.10
(max %) 4.35 1.60 4.59 12.91 95.24
(min %) 0 0.02 0.24 3.54 82.83
Number of Stocks (mean %) 3 10 20 31 36
Top 10
Dollar Holdings (mean %) 0.30 0.48 1.55 7.73 89.94
(max %) 2.76 1.32 4.48 13.61 95.15
(min %) 0 0.02 0.28 3.76 84.77
Number of Stocks (mean %) 4 11 22 30 32
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of percentage holdings in each portfolio for the largest 3, 5, and
10 institutions. The proportions are measured with respect to dollar amount and number of stocks. Quarterly
sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
We examine downside risk using a variation of equation (1.6). Specifically, we perform the
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regressions below:
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1HHI(k)i,t−1 + bi,2HHI(−k)i,t−1 + vi,t (1.7)
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1HHI(k)i,t−1 + bi,2HHI(−k)i,t−1 + bi,3Liqt−1 + vi,t
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1HHI(k)i,t−1 + bi,2HHI(−k)i,t−1 + bi,3Liqt−1 + bi,4SMBt−1 + vi,t
where k = 3, 5, 10. The following decomposition identity holds for all k and all portfolios:







Through this approach we can isolate the effect of concentration on downside risk in the holdings
of the top institutions. In general, the largest institutions contribute more to the concentration in
low-HHI portfolios. This is consistent with the empirical fact that these institutions are more likely
to hold equities with lower degrees of concentration as part of their portfolios.
We consolidate portfolios 1 and 2 into a high-HHI group and portfolios 4 and 5 into a low-HHI
group and report results for the combined portfolios. The results appear in Table 1.8 which features
three panel for respectively the top 3, 5 and 10 institutional investors as a separate entity in the HHI
calculations.
There is much similarity between the average impact of top 3, 5 and 10 HHI on the high-
HHI’s portfolio’s conditional quantiles. In fact the coefficients are quite stable across the three
panels. The slope of HHI(k)i,t versus that of HHI(−k)i,t is roughly 33% higher in magnitude
in absolute terms meaning that the top institutional investors have a larger (negative) impact on
downside risk. Another interesting phenomenon that transpires from the same table is that the top
investors have a positive impact on the downside risk of the low-HHI portfolio, while the remaining
investors still have a negative impact. The coefficients on HHI(k) for the low-HHI portfolio are
significantly positive and tend to be larger in magnitude than the ones on HHI(-k), which in contrast
are significantly negative. This means that top investors make widely held stocks safer assets even
when we control of SMB and liquidity. Overall, the low-HHI portfolio tends to be impacted more
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TABLE 1.8: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI 0.0059 -0.1374 ** -0.0978 *** 0.3508 0.368
(0.0071) (0.0465) (0.0081)
Low HHI -0.0459 *** 1.3270 ** -0.1863 *** 0.0802 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.4116) (0.0386)
High HHI 0.0062 -0.1428 ** -0.0975 *** -0.0252 0.3532 0.3064
(0.0071) (0.0468) (0.0081) (0.0250)
Low HHI -0.0455 *** 1.2884 ** -0.1834 *** -0.0160 0.0821 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.4151) (0.0388) (0.0214)
High HHI 0.0064 -0.1421 ** -0.0980 *** -0.0244 0.0261 0.3547 0.3209
(0.0072) (0.0468) (0.0081) (0.0251) (0.0321)
Low HHI -0.0456 *** 1.3010 ** -0.1837 *** -0.0161 -0.0074 0.0823 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.4185) (0.0389) (0.0215) (0.0276)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant HHI5 HHI−5 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI 0.0059 -0.1338 ** -0.0977 *** 0.3509 0.359
(0.0071) (0.0418) (0.0081)
Low HHI -0.0514 *** 1.6716 *** -0.2315 *** 0.1135 0∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.3718) (0.0402)
High HHI 0.0063 -0.1384 ** -0.0973 *** -0.0252 0.3533 0.3001
(0.0071) (0.0420) (0.0081) (0.0250)
Low HHI -0.0511 *** 1.6441 ** -0.2291 *** -0.0108 0.1144 0∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.3760) (0.0405) (0.0211)
High HHI 0.0064 -0.1368 ** -0.0978 *** -0.0243 0.0251 0.3547 0.3261
(0.0072) (0.0421) (0.0081) (0.0251) (0.0322)
Low HHI -0.0511 *** 1.6493 ** -0.2291 *** -0.0109 -0.0054 0.1145 0∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.3776) (0.0406) (0.0211) (0.0270)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI 0.0058 -0.1268 *** -0.0969 *** 0.3514 0.3007
(0.0069) (0.0306) (0.0079)
Low HHI -0.0506 *** 1.1625 *** -0.2686 *** 0.0849 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.3448) (0.0533)
High HHI 0.0059 -0.1278 ** -0.0964 *** -0.0235 0.3535 0.2767
(0.0069) (0.0306) (0.0079) (0.0249)
Low HHI -0.0502 *** 1.1337 ** -0.2640 *** -0.0170 0.0870 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.3469) (0.0537) (0.0213)
High HHI 0.0059 -0.1260 *** -0.0968 *** -0.0227 0.0237 0.3548 0.3174
(0.0070) (0.0308) (0.0080) (0.0249) (0.0323)
Low HHI -0.0502 *** 1.1350 ** -0.2641 *** -0.0170 -0.0019 0.0870 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.3480) (0.0538) (0.0214) (0.0274)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.7). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10. 20
by the holdings of the top institutions.
In Appendix A.4 we also consider (1) quarterly dynamic quantile regression models and (2)
quantile regression models of the type reported in Table 1.5. Neither modifications alter the con-
clusions - in fact they reinforce the findings reported here. The same holds for the pre-crisis sample
results reported in Appendix A.2. Hence, our top player results are not driven by the extraordinary
events which took place during the stock market rout following the subprime mortgage crisis - an
observation relevant regarding the work by Massa, Schumacher, and Wang (2015) whose event
study focuses on an important merger in the midst of the financial crisis. Finally, results regarding
value-weighted portfolios, reported in Appendix A.3, do not support as much the differential im-
pact of top players, at least not for the high-HHI portfolios. Instead, top institutional investors do
impact negatively (instead of positively) the low-HHI value-weighted return portfolios and they do
so in a disproportionate fashion (see Table A.18 for further details). Ironically, when we look at
the pre-crisis sample (see Table A.20) we see again that the downside risk for high-HHI portfolios
is adversely (and statistically significantly) affected by the top 3, 5 and 10 institutional investors,
similar to the findings reported with equally-weighted return portfolios.
1.3.2 Firm-Level Downside Risk by Top Players
We investigate downside risk also through the analysis of firm-level fixed effects regressions of
various risk measures on the decomposition of HHI. This is similar to the analysis done by Ben-
David et al. (2016) who analyze firm conditional volatility in a panel data setting, but we focus
exclusively on a broader set of downside risk measures. We first decompose each HHI measure for
the firm into HHI attributed to the top 3 investors (HHI(3)) and total HHI less the HHI attributed to
the top 3 investors (HHI(−3)). At the firm level we construct a variety of quarterly risk measures:
realized quantiles (1% and 5% levels), downside variance, and risk-neutral variance estimates -
where the latter is discussed in the next subsection. Given our reliance on options data discussed
in the next subsection, our sample period for all risk measures is from 1996Q1-2013Q4. Downside




i,j1(ri,j < 0) given daily returns for
stock i on day j.
Once we compute the set of quarterly risk measures at the firm level, we estimate the following
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regression with both firm– and time– fixed effects (respectively FEi and TEt) in order to analyze
the impact of investor concentration from the top 3 investors.
Riski,t = βi,0 + βi,1Riski,t−1 + βi,2HHI(3)i,t−1 + βi,3HHI(−3)i,t−1 (1.8)
+ βi,4 ln(MrktCap)i,t−1 + βi,5BMi,t−1 + FEi + TEt + εi,t
We present results in Table 1.9 Panel A. We find that an increase in investor concentration for
the top 3 investors is associated with a statistically significant increase in conditional risk across
all of our risk measures. Investor concentration excluding the top 3 investors is also associated
with a statistically significant - but substantially smaller compared to the top 3 - increase in risk,
except for the risk-neutral variance measure. For the latter the impact is only significant for the
top 3, but not for the remaining institutions. Finally, while the book-to-market ratio of a firm is not
significantly associated with conditional risk, we do find that larger cap companies display lower
conditional risk on average.
We also compute the quarterly risk measures using monthly risk measures for months January,
April, July, and October to correspond to calendar quarters ending in March, June, September, and
December respectively. This is done as a robustness check on whether the impact of investor con-
centration on conditional risk is immediate and transient during a quarter. We find that our results
(Table 1.9 Panel B) are similar whether we use quarterly conditional risk measures constructed
using only data from the first month of the quarter or data from the entire three months of the
quarter.
We also look at this model but using HHI decomposed into the top 5 and the top 10 investors.
Notably we find that our results become statistically insignificant when we expand the top investor
universe. This reinforces the idea that increasing investor concentration is especially impactful on
risk when concentrated into the top influential investors.
1.3.3 Evidence From Options Markets
We compute risk-neutral variances from a large panel of options data and follow the methodol-
ogy in Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels (2013). We obtain options data from Optionmetrics through
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TABLE 1.9: Firm-Level Risk on Investor Concentration Regressions
Riski,t Measure
RQ(0.05)i,t RQ(0.01)i,t DownV ari,t RN − V ari,t
Panel A: Full Quarter
Riski,t−1 0.0539
∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0064) (0.0093) (0.0072)
HHI(3)i,t−1 −0.0649∗∗∗ −0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.4846∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0263) (0.0009) (0.1062)
HHI(−3)i,t−1 −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.0163∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0339
(0.0041) (0.0080) (0.0002) (0.0421)
ln(MrktCap)i,t−1 0.0035
∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0570∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0063)
BMi,t−1 −0.0014 −0.0026 0.0001 0.0030
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0001) (0.0192)
Panel B: 1st Month of Quarter
Riski,t−1 0.3968
∗∗∗ 0.3066∗∗∗ 0.3520∗∗∗ 0.2840∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0221) (0.0165)
HHI(3)i,t−1 −0.0326∗∗∗ −0.0495∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.3965∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0215) (0.0009) (0.1003)
HHI(−3)i,t−1 −0.0086∗∗ −0.0074 0.0003 0.1124∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0086) (0.0003) (0.0414)
ln(MrktCap)i,t−1 0.0010
∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0459∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0044)
BMi,t−1 −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0129)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.8). Quarterly sample starts in
1996Q1 and ends in 2013Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey and West (1987a) standard errors appear
in parentheses.
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Wharton Research Data Services. We restrict our cross-section of firms to be those that we have
both investor concentration data through the 13-F filings as well as stock return data (CRSP) and
relevant accounting data (COMPUSTAT). Our sample period of daily options data is from 1996-
2013. We follow exactly the methodology in Conrad et al. (2013) to clean the options data and
create risk-neutral variance measures at both a monthly and quarterly frequency. We revisit equa-
tion (1.8) using risk neutral variances. The findings appear in the last column of Table 1.9 where we
study risk neutral variance. The evidence is largely in line with the results using cash market risk
measures. This suggests that the effect of HHI also appears in the pricing of derivative contracts.
This being said, however, we also ran the same type of regressions with risk neutral skewness mea-
sure and did not find a statistically significant relationship of HHI(3)i,t−1 on skewness extracted
from option markets (detailed results are not reported here).
1.3.4 Risk By Investor Characteristics
We extend our analysis to include manager-specific information at the stock level, and investi-
gate whether decomposing HHI along investor characteristics has an impact on downside risk. We
use Brian Bushee’s institutional investor classification data to add institutional type and classifi-
cation at the by-stock/by-year level.9 As in the our analysis of the impact of top institutions, we








j,t. See Appendix A.5 for
details on data construction, summary statistics, and analysis details. We present results there for
conditional volatility regressions in Tables A.27 and A.28, but the main takeaway holds across our
different risk measures – no specific HHI by-type or by-classification measure has a statistically
significant impact on risk. We conclude that neither an investor’s type nor classification has a
significant bearing on HHI’s impact on risk.
1.4 A Heterogeneous Investor Demand-driven Model
We adopt the framework in Koijen and Yogo (2019), hereafter (KY), to simulate an economy
where investor asset demands are functions of an asset’s own-market capitalization as well as an
9Data located at: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html
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exogenous characteristic. Their reduced form approach is convenient for describing an approxi-
mate mean-variance portfolio choice problem where returns have a factor structure and an asset’s
characteristics are sufficient to describe an asset’s factor loadings. Moreover this approach allows
us to directly model investor heterogeneity. In order to illustrate how investor concentration can
affect downside risk, we consider investors who care primarily about the size of company as well
as an exogenous fundamental characteristic that follows a factor structure. We also allow each
investor’s loading on this characteristic to vary over time according to another factor structure.
This provides us a framework to model how the distribution of this fundamental characteristic’s
importance varies over time. Critically, we also restrict the investment space of one of our in-
vestors, which is akin to allowing a particular asset to exhibit a static characteristic (industry, for
instance) and for this investor to care deeply about avoiding this characteristic. Finally, we rele-
gate investors’ other beliefs to unobserved latent shocks, which we model as normally distributed
random variables that vary over time but are common for all assets within an investors demand
function.
1.4.1 Downside Risk in a Stylized Economy
We simplify the environment as much as possible and consider a finite horizon model (T =
500) with 5 investors (I = 5) and 3 assets (N = 3). Investor wealth is denoted Ai,t. We assume
each asset has a constant share count and that the number of shares is the same for each asset
(normalize S = 1). Consequently, Size is defined endogenously as:
Sizet(n) ≡ Pt(n)St(n) = Pt(n)S = Pt(n) (1.9)
In our setup, investors care to different degrees about the importance of an asset’s fundamental
characteristic on their investment decisions. Specifically the weight that investor i places on asset
n at time t is:
δi,t(n) = β0,ipt(n) + βi,txt(n) + εi,t, εi,t
iid∼ N(0, σ2). (1.10)
where pt(n) is the log-price (log- market capitalization), xt(n) is the exogenous fundamental char-
acteristic, and εi,t represents investor’s latent demand shocks.
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We let the exogenous characteristic evolve according to a factor structure that follows an AR(1):
xt(n) = a(n)yt + wt(n), wt(n)
iid∼ N(0, σ2w) (1.11)
yt = ρyyt−1 + ut, ut
iid∼ N(0, σ2u) (1.12)
The investors care about this characteristic according to the following system:
βi,t = αi + γizt + εβ,i,t, εβ,i,t
iid∼ N(0, σ2β) (1.13)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εz,t, εz,t
iid∼ N(0, σ2z) (1.14)
We adhere to Assumption 1 in KY in assuring that asset demand is downward sloping, and
further simplify it by assuming it is the same across investors: β0,i = β0 ≤ 1.
We assume that one of the investors places zero weight on a particular asset, effectively having
a restricted investment space of two assets. One can think of this investor consistently caring about
a static characteristic of an asset, and that one of the assets has this characteristic. For example,
this investor may be restricted from investing in a particular industry.


































We solve for each asset’s market clearing price (Pt(n)) using an algorithm similar to that used by
KY. Details can be found in Appendix A.6.
We calibrate our model at a quarterly frequency and compute model moments at an annual fre-
quency to qualitatively match those selected moments in the data. Our initial calibration produces
cross-sectional HHI spread, and corresponding average return spread qualitatively consistent with
the data – positive return spread for the Low-minus-High–HHI (LMH) portfolio.
We then simulate a long time-series from the calibrated model and use it to investigate the
conditional downside risk we observe in the data for high-HHI portfolios. Namely we consider the
conditional quantile regression in equation (1.20).
qi,t(.05) = γ0 + γ1HHIi,t + εi,t (1.20)
Critically, the high-HHI portfolio’s downside conditional quantile responds negatively to an
increase in investor concentration. Table 1.10 shows that the coefficient on HHI we observe in the
model closely matches both the sign and magnitude we find in the data.
Overall this reduced form model illustrates how an asset’s ownership concentration can con-
tribute to its downside risk in an environment with heterogeneous investor demands for common
fundamental characteristics.
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Notes: Newey and West (1987a) standard errors appear in parentheses.
1.4.2 Breaking up Large Investors
We use our calibrated model to run counterfactual experiments on the impact of randomly
breaking up one of the investors into two equal sized smaller entities with the same investor de-
mands (disaggregated economy). The main question of this experiment is: will the impact of in-
creasing investor concentration on conditional downside risk for the high-HHI asset be less under
the average broken-up economy? We use the following method to investigate this:
• Per repetition j = 1, ..., J , randomly choose one of theN investors and create a new investor
with the exact same demand function parameters as the chosen investor.
• Divide the randomly chosen investor’s wealth into half and redistribute this to the new in-
vestor at time 0.
• Endow the new investor with the same latent shocks that the randomly chosen investor draws.
• Simulate from this economy for T periods
• Compute conditional quantiles and estimate the conditional downside risk regression on HHI
for the high-HHI asset in this economy
• Store γj1
• Go to the next repetition




1 to γ1 under our baseline calibration. We find that in the
disaggregated economy, γ̄1 is 51% lower on average in magnitude than γ1. We view this as an
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indication of the granularity effect on downside risk; a larger investor has a distinct impact on the
economy relative to this investor being comprised of equivalently smaller entities. The economy
is starting from a position where stocks have a more diverse investor base, and so an increasing
investor concentration has a muted effect on downside risk.
We also consider a modification of this strategy that observes the investors wealth for an initial
k periods, and then chooses an investor to break-up at the k+ 1 period based on a wealth-weighted
random draw - wealthier investors have a higher chance of being chosen. We let the initial wealth-
observation window be 10% of the T periods. Again we find that the disaggregated economy
lowers the magnitude of the impact of HHI on downside risk by a comparable amount of 43%.
1.4.3 Market Share Restrictions
We now consider a different policy intervention based on observable market shares rather than
investor wealth, again with the same main question in mind: will imposing an implicit cost on
owning greater than a 5% market share in any given asset affect the impact of HHI on downside risk
for high HHI assets? This can be viewed as an informational cost of disclosing a large ownership
position. In the context of our model we do this by modifying the demand functions to include a
common penalty (βshare < 0) for high levels of market share in any given asset:
δi,t(n) = β0,ipt(n) + βi,txt(n) + βshare1[mi,t(n) ≥ 0.05] + εi,t, εi,t
iid∼ N(0, σ2). (1.21)
The additional market share indicator is on average binding across investors and assets in 43%
of the periods. We then run a panel of long simulations and record per repetition the impact of HHI
on downside risk for the high HHI asset. Averaging across repetitions, we find that the impact of
HHI on downside risk of the high HHI asset is 77% lower in the environment where we impose
the punitive market share costs relative to the baseline. Initially we set βshare = −1, but also
investigate the sensitivity of this parameter. For example decreasing βshare to −0.1 results in the
impact of HHI on high HHI’s downside risk falling to 61% lower than the baseline. In general, we
find that locally increasing the magnitude of the market share penalty results in a greater attenuation
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of the impact of HHI on downside risk for the high HHI asset.
1.4.4 Motivating a Conditional Asset Pricing Model
The structure of our theoretical model motivates a conditional asset pricing model that we
can investigate in the data. When investors’ beliefs about the importance of a characteristic change
(where importance relates to the characteristic’s power in predictability – its strength in forecasting
future cash flows or future risk premia), and this characteristic is a critical element of an investor’s
asset demand function, then an assets’ betas change according to the relative faith investors have in
a characteristic and how this particular characteristic co-moves with certain risk factors. In partic-
ular, low HHI stocks are comprised of investors that may have diffuse beliefs about characteristics
(very different demand functions), and consequently there could be a wide variety of characteris-
tics that drive the demand for that particular stock. On the contrary, high HHI stocks are comprised
of investors who have concentrated beliefs in certain shared characteristics that they believe have
strong forecasting potential. In bad times, those low HHI stocks that have a wide belief distribution
over the importance of their characteristics are more susceptible to systematic uncertainty driving
their exposure to certain risk factors. These stocks command a premium for being exposed to this
risk channel in which systematic uncertainty operates. Stocks owned by investors with strong con-
victions over certain unique asset characteristics are relatively more immune to this channel, and
therefore provide a hedge against this uncertainty risk. The conditional asset pricing model that
our theoretical framework motivates is:
Ri,t+1 = αi + β
′
i,t+1Ft+1 + εi,t+1 (1.22)
βi,t+1,j = γi,0,j + γi,1,jGt + γi,2,jσt(βi,t+1,mrkt)
+ γi,3,jσt(βi,t+1,mrkt)Gt + vi,t+1,j, j = 1, ..., k (1.23)
Et[Ri,t+1] = Et[βi,t+1]
′λ (1.24)
where Ft represents a set of k systematic risk factors and Gt represents a broad measure of eco-
nomic uncertainty. We operationalize this by using the uncertainty measures created in Jurado,
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) as a proxy for macroeconomic and financial uncertainty (hereafter JLN),
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FIG. 1.7: Rolling Window β Estimates of Market Excess Return
Notes: This plot shows the estimated fitted loadings for the market excess return when using 50 period
rolling windows. NBER recession periods are shaded. Data is from 1980Q1 to 2014Q4.
and a stock’s conditional volatility with respect to its loading on the market factor (σt(βi,t+1,mrkt))
as a measure of a stock’s beta volatility.10 We also use the CBOE volatility index (VIX) as another
choice for a measure of financial uncertainty.
We start by documenting time-variation in the risk factor loadings by doing standard rolling
window time-series regressions of equation (1.22). We let Ft represent the market excess return
for this exercise. Figure 1.7 plots the low and high HHI portfolios’ time-series estimates of the
loading on the market excess return. Both of the portfolios’ betas increase across the most recent
two recessions, with a sharp increase for the high HHI portfolio during the financial crisis. There is
also a dramatic drop in 2001Q1 for the high HHI portfolio. It is clear that there is substantial time
variation in the estimates. We then estimate the following equations (1.25) and (1.26) for both the
low and high HHI portfolios with respect to the market excess return and present results in Table
10Data located at: https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes
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1.11, where β̂i,t+1 is the conditional beta on the market excess return. We use the set of loading
estimates as inputs into GJR-GARCH(1,1) models to estimate the conditional volatility of the
change in loadings. We find that measures of uncertainty have statistically significant next-period
forecasting ability for the level of the market loading for high HHI stocks. In particular, higher
levels of systematic uncertainty lead to a lower conditional beta for high HHI stocks. In addition for
the low HHI portfolio, high levels of uncertainty are associated with higher conditional volatility
of the change in risk factor loading. These results hold for both the JLN measure of uncertainty as
well as for the VIX index. We also account for the large observable drop in the high HHI’s loading
in 1Q2001 by including a level indicator in (1.25). This modification does not change the statistical
significance that higher uncertainty lowers the conditional beta for the high HHI portfolio.
β̂i,t+1 = ai,0 + ai,1Gt + vi,t+1 (1.25)
σ̂t(∆β̂i,t+1) = bi,0 + bi,1Gt−1 + wi,t (1.26)
Finally we formally estimate the conditional asset pricing presented in equations (1.22) through
(1.24) and present the results in Table 1.12. The HHI LMH α is now statistically insignificant, and
decreases by over 42% and 53% from the competing unconditional models when using the JLN
and VIX measures of uncertainty, respectively. This conditional asset pricing model also prices
the cross-section of HHI portfolios well, as evidenced by our inability to reject the null hypothesis
at conventional levels that the pricing errors are different than zero. We note that inference on the
cross-sectional fit is performed conditioning on the estimation of the conditional volatility of the
loadings. Including the conditional volatility estimation error only would serve to accentuate our
inability to reject the null hypothesis of zero pricing errors.
1.5 Conclusion
The number, size, and influence of institutional investors has increased dramatically over the
past thirty years. In order to study the impact that institutional investors may have on asset prices,
we project the composition and holdings of institutional investors down to an investor granularity
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TABLE 1.11: Impact of Uncertainty on Conditional Betas
JLN VIX
High Low High Low
β̂i,t+1
Uncertainty −0.233∗∗ −0.097 −0.200∗ −0.051
(0.105) (0.166) (0.106) (0.111)
R2 0.054 0.009 0.040 0.003




Uncertainty −0.034 0.472∗∗∗ −0.017 0.423∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.095) (0.108) (0.098)
R2 0.001 0.224 0.000 0.179
Notes: This table shows the estimates for equations 1.25 and 1.26 for the low and high HHI portfolios. All
variables are standardized. We use both the Jurado et al. (2015) (JLN) and the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)
as measures of uncertainty. Uncertainty (1) and R2(1) are associated with modified regressions accounting
for the observable drop in the level of the market beta in 2001Q1. Newey and West (1987a) standard
errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
TABLE 1.12: Conditional Asset Pricing Model
JNS VIX
HHI LMH α 2.84 2.33
(3.09) (3.82)
p-value αi = 0,∀i 0.60 0.72
MAE 2.08 2.01
Notes: This table shows the GMM estimates from the conditional asset pricing model in Equations 1.22 to
1.24. HHI LMH α and mean absolute error (MAE) are in annualized percentages. Our test assets include
the HHI-sorted portfolios with data constructed from 1980Q1 to 2014Q3. JNS and VIX correspond to the
Jurado et al. (2015) and the CBOE volatility index, respectively. We perform a test of the null hypothesis
H0 : αi = 0, ∀i. Newey and West (1987a) standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
characteristic (HHI) at the asset level. Our analysis indicates that investor granularity is an im-
portant characteristic in the cross-section of asset returns. A self-financing trading strategy that
goes long low HHI stocks and short high HHI stocks delivers an average return spread that is not
fully explained by common financial or liquidity factors in an unconditional setting. Moreover
stocks with a high investor concentration tend to exhibit conditional volatility and downside risk
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that is more susceptible to increases in that investor concentration. To motivate these findings, we
create a simple reduced form model with investor demand heterogeneity with regards to an assets’
fundamental characteristics. This model corroborates the impact of the investor concentration on
downside risk that we observe in the data. We use this model to perform counterfactuals and docu-
ment that disaggregating investors lowers the impact of investor concentration on downside risk, as
does directly imposing an implicit cost to investors for holding larger market shares in a particular
asset. We then use our theoretical framework to motivate a conditional asset pricing model that
approximates the cross-sectional return dispersion we observe across HHI portfolios. We allow for
low HHI stocks to have higher beta risk – to be more susceptible to the impact of financial uncer-
tainty on the conditional volatility of a stock’s exposure to common risk factors. High HHI stocks
provide insurance against this beta risk, but carry an idiosyncratic cost – higher idiosyncratic risk
in the form of stock-specific downside risk that is exasperated by the very characteristic used to
insure against the priced beta risk. Overall, we find that investor concentration has implications for
asset pricing beyond headline importance – stocks with high investor concentration may provide
a valuable hedge against a particular systematic conditional risk, but carry idiosyncratic downside
risk component that is exasperated by this same characteristic.
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CHAPTER 2
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ALTER EGOS: WHO MIGHT BENEFIT FROM ROBO-INVESTING?
(JOINT WITH CATHERINE D’HONDT, RUDY DE WINNE, AND ERIC GHYSELS)
2.1 Introduction
To assess the benefits of robo-investing we use a unique data set covering brokerage accounts
for a large cross-section of 22,972 individual investors covering a sample from January 2003 to
March 2012, and therefore includes the 2008 financial crisis. We have records of all trades, and
in addition have detailed information about each individual investor’s characteristics such as age,
gender, education, annual net income, and most importantly, risk aversion assessed on the basis of
responses to survey questions. Although we work with Belgian individual investors, most of their
trading activities pertain to foreign stocks (86% are non-Belgian and roughly a quarter are US).
Hence, our analysis pertains to international portfolio selection of stocks and ETFs.
To the best of our knowledge there has not been any assessment of the potential benefits of
robo-investing over a long period of time for a heterogeneous panel of individual investors. We ex-
plore robo-investing strategies commonly used in the industry, including some involving advanced
machine learning methods. The man versus machine comparison allows us to shed light on poten-
tial benefits the emerging robo-advizing industry may provide to certain targeted segments of the
population, such as low income and/or investors with relatively little financial literacy.1
Our sample has a number of appealing features to study robo-investing. Many investment
brokerage firms are now targeting individuals with modest savings as it is generally believed that
1In the US, robo-advisor start-ups saw an eight-fold increase in their AUM in recent years on the back of some
retirement savings shifting to robo-advisor accounts. Cost advantages have been creating significant momentum for
the industry. In addition, the success of passive investment strategies in recent years has also been beneficial. It is
therefore fair to say that robo-advisors are posing a challenge to traditional financial advisory services. One expects
that some robo-advisory start-ups will probably end up in partnerships or be the subject of takeovers by established
asset management firms or banks in the coming years. Moreover, the traditional asset managers themselves are also
adopting robo-investing strategies. In that respect, robo-advising will become more mainstream.
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smaller investors don’t get the investment advice they need. In fact, 71% or almost 90 million
American families have investment account balances worth less than $100,000. The growth of
automated investment advisory services is filling a need for such investors. Our data set consists
of individual investors typically targeted by robo-advising. In terms of annual net income, approx-
imately 70% of the investors in our sample declare an income between 20,000 and 75,000 euros.
The mean portfolio value in our sample is 29,244 euros and the average investor is about 48 years
old.
Note that our paper does not directly address the effect on wealth management of adopting
robo-advising, as studied by for example D’Acunto, Prabhala, and Rossi (2019). On the one hand,
our data is richer in terms of details regarding the characteristics - such as income, education,
gender, risk aversion, trading habits - for each individual investor. On the other hand, we study
a sample where robo-advising was not adopted by the brokerage firm whose trading data we ex-
amine. Instead, we introduce the idea of shadow robo-investors to assess the potential benefits of
robo-advising. Namely, we study various robo-investors that shadow the individuals in our data
set and the novelty of our approach is that we know what the investors have done in reality versus
what a robo-investor would have done instead. In that sense our analysis is a real-time experiment
with real data.
Robo-investors are limited to the set of stocks and ETFs in each individual investor’s history
of trading - using a rolling 2-year sample.2 This constraint ties each robot to a specific investor in
our sample via their trading history. Note that the robo-investors use all the stocks/ETFs individual
investor i held in the past two years, but may have sold in the meantime. Hence, the rationale is
that the investor knows about the stocks/ETFs held by the shadow robo-investor. We call these
shadow robo-investors Artificial Intelligence Alter Egos, or AI Alter Egos.3
The notion of AI Alter Egos is not unique to finance, although we might be the first to coin the
2The majority of trading occurs in either equity or ETFs as described in detail in the Appendix.
3Since the robo-investor schemes go beyond machine learning, as they involve portfolio allocation rules, we use
the more general term of artificial intelligence. In our case the AI pertains a set of computer-driven self-learning rules
which determine portfolio allocations.
36
term. To illustrate, lets look at machine learning (ML) advances in other fields, such as literature
and music. Today, a ML text mining algorithm can analyze the writings of a famous author and
create entirely new literature in the style of the writer it was exposed to and trained on. The same
can be done with music. For example, Franz Schubert started his Unfinished Symphony in B minor
in 1882, but wrote only two complete movements, though he lived another six years. Now, deep-
learning ML has produced a completed version of the entire symphony. We can characterize this
as Schubert’s AI Alter Ego composing a new score. Would Schubert have done better than his AI
Alter Ego? We prefer to leave that debate to the musicologists, but it is fair to say it would probably
be hard to address the question. Fortunately, it is much easier to apply the notion of AI Alter Egos
in a setting where comparing the outcomes of human and AI alternatives is more straightforward
such as in financial investments.
Robo-investors generally perform asset allocation with mean-variance (MV) analysis or a vari-
ant of it. Unfortunately, some robo-investors do not disclose information on how they estimate
variances and correlations, but from what is known in the public domain it is clear that they pri-
marily rely on historical data to form these estimates. For example, industry leader (in terms of
AUM) Betterment uses the Black-Litterman model, which requires users to specify a variance co-
variance matrix for all asset classes which is estimated using historical data combined with the
Ledoit-Wolf shrinkage to reduce estimation error.4 Wealthfront generates standard deviation esti-
mates by considering each asset class’s long-term and short-term historical standard deviation and
the expected volatility of each asset class as implied by pricing in options markets.5 Schwab Intel-
ligent Portfolios also do a variation of the MV approach.6 We consider three investment strategies
- all inspired by current industry practice. Two are based on a Markowitz (1952) mean-variance
scheme and a third is based on DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) involving the 1/Nit scheme
4More details appear on the Betterment Website, see for example http://support.betterment.com/customer/portal/
articles/1295723-why-is-betterment-changing-the-portfolio.
5See Wealthfront Investment Methodology White Paper, available at https://research.wealthfront.com/whitepapers/
investment-methodology/
6Further details appear in https://intelligent.schwab.com/public/intelligent/insights/whitepapers/asset-allocation.
html.
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where Nit is the number of stocks held by investor i over a 2-year trailing sample up to time t.
The two MV strategies differ in terms of the sophistication regarding the conditional mean and
variance estimates. The first involves two-year rolling sample estimates for both the mean and
variance. For the second we rev up the robot engines and replace the rolling sample estimators
by respectively expected return predictions using machine learning algorithms and sophisticated
conditional covariance estimators. More specifically for the conditional mean we use Elastic-Net,
Random Forest, Neural Network, and model ensemble estimators. For the conditional covariance
matrix - looking at a total of 683 stocks and 393 ETFs - we use the Engle, Ledoit, and Wolf (2019)
nonlinear shrinkage method derived from random matrix theory to correct in-sample biases of sam-
ple eigenvalues. Finally, it is important to note that robo-investors have the option to hold cash, i.e.
decide to avoid market risk exposure. No short selling is allowed, however.
We study three rebalancing schemes: once a year, quarterly and monthly. In the main body of
the paper we focus exclusively on the quarterly rebalancing scheme. Note that robo-investors buy
and hold at fixed sampling frequencies - end of quarter in the lead example. This is in contrast to
the individual investors in our sample who execute their trades at any point in time.
Finally, we also explore AI enhancements that are global, i.e. unlike the AI Alter Ego not tied
to a specific investor. The Alter Ego scheme can be viewed as a bespoke portfolio management
approach, which is at one extreme of the spectrum, while passive investment are on the other end.
We examine here what can be viewed as a middle ground, i.e. a robo-investor actively managing a
portfolio involving a small set of targeted portfolios.
Overall our findings are as follows. The AI Alter Ego robo-investors involving equal weighting
or rolling sample mean and variance estimates perform poorly and are of little value to any of our
investors.7 In contrast the machine learning MV AI Alter Egos result in significant investment
portfolio performance improvements for certain types of investors. In particular, low income and/or
low education investors typically benefit greatly from following the robo-investor strategies. These
7Note that among the existing robo-investor practices there are number which proclaim using MV allocations and
most likely use some type of rolling sample scheme - although most white papers are rather vague on the actual
implementation.
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results confirm the claims made by practitioners in the industry regarding the promises the use of
AI hold for the future of the FinTech industry. More intriguing, and somewhat unexpected are
our results pertaining to the performance during the financial crisis. Robo-investors outperform a
large swath of investors. In fact, the median robo-investor moves into cash (because of negative
expected returns using AI) whereas individuals feature behavioral biases, such as the disposition
effect (cfr. Odean (1998)) with unfortunate consequences during the onset of the financial crisis.
The AI Alter Ego gains are largely realized during the financial crisis and were primarily due to
the moving to cash. When we examine a generic AI driven robo-investor using a small set of ETFs
we find that such strategy supercedes and dominates all other investment strategies. While there
are significant losses during the crisis, the Global ETF investor dwarfs any of the other strategies
and always exceeds any of the others considered - and by implication outperforms its constituent
ETFs, i.e. outperforms passive investment.
As a by-product of our analysis, we also identify which machine learning methods perform
well. While deep learning is often the best across a large cross-section of stocks, a close second-
best is a much simpler linear prediction model with elastic net penalty based on the same set
of predictor, namely those suggested by Welch and Goyal (2007), which consist of a mixture of
firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. Put differently, the gains from non-linear models is
marginal at best.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we describe the brokerage data, with some of
the details appearing in Appendix B.1.8 Section 2.3 describes the various robo-investor schemes.
Section 2.4 reports the empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2 A Large Panel of Individual Brokerage Accounts
Our primary data set comes from a large Belgian online brokerage firm and consists of the trad-
ing accounts of 22,972 individual investors. This unique data spans about 10 years from January
2003 to March 2012, and therefore includes the 2008 financial crisis. We have detailed informa-
tion about each trade, such as the instrument, the time-stamp, the trade direction, the executed
8Further details also appear in the Online Appendix.
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quantity, the trade price, and explicit transaction costs. The details of the data are described in
Appendix B.1. We focus on common stock investments as well as ETFs and exclude other finan-
cial instruments.9 Trading of ETFs, mutual funds, options and warrants is more prevalent with
high income/education investors. Trading of bonds is overall insignificant. Because we examine
robo-advisors which are mean-variance investors we focus exclusively on stocks and ETFs which
best fit the portfolio allocation model. For high income/education investors in particular this means
we leave out to a certain degree other assets which we have available. After applying some filters
described in the Appendix, we end up with a sample of 1,590,199 (stocks) + 60,344 (ETFs) =
1,650,543 trades (and more than 13 billion euros traded in stocks and close to 1 billion euros in
ETFs) over the 111-month period covering 683 stocks and 393 ETFs or 70% of all the investors’
trading activity.
Using the trading data we build end-of-month portfolios for each investor and use historical
market data to compute monthly portfolio market values. We also compute both monthly and
daily returns. Combining end-of-month portfolio market values with the corresponding monthly
aggregate cash-flows, we calculate for each investor 110 (i.e. from February 2003 to March 2012)
monthly portfolio gross and net returns (the latter net of transaction costs). In addition, using
estimates for individual investor cash holdings at the end of each month (see Appendix B.1.5 for
further details), we compute the weight of cash in the end-of-month portfolio, which enables us to
calculate monthly individual portfolio returns adjusted for cash holdings. Since our robo-investors
have the option to hold cash, individual investor returns adjusted for cash should deliver more
meaningful comparisons.
Investors are included as robo-investor candidates if they satisfy the return criteria - sufficient
time periods and returns with no extraordinary outliers - and minimum trade restrictions (see Ap-
pendix B.1 for further details). In particular, we drop investors with more than 106 missing values
9In Appendix B.1 we document that 6,741 investors also traded options and warrants with an aggregate number
of 602,833 trades and 6,665 investors traded mutual funds with an aggregate number of 260,120 trades. Only a few
investors (i.e. 1,813) traded bonds with an aggregate number of 5,999 trades.
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in their return series (i.e. at least 4 months of returns are needed to keep an investor) and drop out-
liers as well. This decreases the sample to 20,622 investors (down from 22,972). To simplify the
analysis we do not take into account transaction costs (which are available for each trade) neither
for the individual investment accounts nor for the robo-investor ones. Since robo-investors trade
less than the average/median investor, namely only once a quarter in the lead example, this should
yield conservative estimates of the robo-investing gains.
Our data set also includes an extensive set of individual investor characteristics, such as age,
gender, education, annual net income and a risk aversion measure based on surveys (described in
Appendix section B.1.1). Although we work with Belgian individual investors, most of their trad-
ing activities involve foreign stocks (mainly the US and bordering countries France and Germany
- see Appendix Table B.3 for details). The majority of stocks pertain to the technology sector
(16.93%), financials (15.91%), and industrials (14.01%).
As noted in the Introduction, our data set consists of individual investors typically targeted
by robo-advising. We have about 70% of the investors in our sample who declare an annual net
income between 20,000 and 75,000 euros. Only a minority (3.36%) earns more than 150,000
euros per year.10 The average investor is about 48 years old and executes monthly 2.76 trades
across 2.05 different stocks for a volume of 18,237 euros. Consistent with the literature, investors
in our sample are under-diversified; the average (median) investor holds a five-stock (three-stock)
portfolio. The average end-of-month portfolio value is about 28,003 euros (with a median value
of about 7,552 euros). As for risk aversion, the majority of investors seem to be risk tolerant since
65.33% of them declare a medium risk aversion and 27.88% of them even a low risk aversion.
In terms of performance, our investors earn an average monthly gross return of 0.42% on stocks
and ETFs (median return of 0.13% - see Table B.9 in the Appendix), with a volatility of 10.04%.
This high average volatility of individual portfolio gross returns is not surprising given our sample
period includes turbulent market conditions.11
10The income measure reported in our data is recorded once, when the investor completed the MiFID tests. The
classification may therefore be noisy over the 10 year sample period, particularly for the early entries.
11As detailed in the Appendix, to calculate portfolio returns, we opt for an approximation of the Modified Dietz
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2.3 Robo-Investors
The robo-investors are limited to the set of stocks and ETFs in each individual investor’s history
of trading - using a rolling 2-year sample. This constraint ties each robot to a specific investor in
our sample via their trading history. We call these shadow robo-investors Artificial Intelligence
Alter Egos. Robo-investors have the option to hold cash, i.e. decide to avoid market risk exposure,
but no short-selling occurs in our sample nor is it allowed for in the design of the robots. The
two-year window is arguably somewhat arbitrary. Our results hold for longer windows. Shorter
windows are less appealing given the trading frequency of many investors, with only a median of
2 trades per month (see Table B.9 in the Appendix). The portfolio allocations of robo-investors
occur at fixed intervals, either monthly, quarterly or annually. In the main body of the paper we
focus exclusively on the quarterly results.12
2.3.1 AI Alter Egos
We construct three types of AI Alter Ego robo-investors. As we already noted, each setting
only uses stocks and ETFs held by an individual investor over the past two years, not the entire
universe of stocks. The table below provides two illustrative examples. When we refer to t, we
mean end of the year, or quarter or month, depending on the case being considered.
Initial Trading t - 1 Trading t Investor Robo-investor
holdings holdings potential holdings
Stocks 1 & 2 Sells all of 2 Buys stock 3 Stocks 1 & 3 Stocks 1, 2 & 3
Stock 1 Sells all of 1 Buys ETF 4 ETF 4 Stock 1 & ETF 4
The first line portrays an investor holding two stocks - say 1 and 2 - at time t - 2 (column called
Method, aiming at delivering a return close to the money-weighted rate of return (e.g., Shestopaloff and Shestopaloff
(2007)).
12In the Online Appendix, the monthly and detailed quarterly results are reported. The annual results are available
on request. In the computations of returns we ignore transaction costs. Since our focus is quarterly trading frequencies
this is a reasonable abstraction. The monthly robo-investor results are arguably more suspect of being overstated
because transaction costs are not accounted for.
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Initial holdings). At the end of t - 1, the investors sells all holdings of stock 2 and at the end of
the subsequent period t buys stock 3. Hence, at the end of t she/he holds stocks 1 and 3. The
robo-investor has stocks 1, 2 and 3 to form a portfolio. The second case is similar, but the investor
only holds stock 1, sells all of it in t - 1 and buys ETF 4 in t. The robo-investors has two assets to
select from. It is important to stress that the robo-investor may hold cash, i.e. decide not to put all
the money in the stock market. This will be important as will become clear when discussing the
empirical results.
To proceed, we need to introduce some notation. Let Sit be the set of stocks/ETFs investor i
held over a two-year period up to time t. The above illustrative examples clarified that this does not
mean that the investor holds these stocks/ETFs at the end of year/quarter/month t. It only means
that the investor held these stocks/ETFs in the recent two-year history. We denote by Ti the duration
of time (months/quarters/years whichever applies) investor i appears in the sample. Moreover, we
denote byNit = #Sit, the number of stocks/ETFs in the set. We only consider investors withNit ≥
2 ∀ t = 1, . . . , Ti. This ensures that the investment opportunity set contains a minimally sufficient
set of stocks/ETFs for the robo-investors. This leaves us with 20,622 investors who satisfy this
criteria and are included in our analysis.
The robo-investors buy at the end of t and hold until end of t + 1, i.e. for a month, quarter or
full year.13 We then compute holding period returns for the robo-investor, raei,t+1, and compute the
alter-ego-less-investor’s realized return spread as rsi,t = r
ae
i,t − ri,t.
The first type shadows each individual investor in our sample using the DeMiguel et al. (2007)
equal weighting rule, the second and third rely on a mean-variance Markowitz (1952) strategy with
a short-sale constraint. The difference between the second and third variations is the sophistication
of expected return and risk estimators. In the second approach a simple rolling sample estimator
is involved for expected returns and the linear shrinkage estimator of Ledoit and Wolf (2004)
for second conditional moments. In the third case, machine learning and conditional covariance
13In between rebalancing periods, the portfolio weights adjust according to the performance of an individual asset
relative to the performance of the portfolio as a whole. In particular when t + 1 is not a rebalancing period, wi,t+1 =
wi,t(1 + ri,t+1)/[
∑N
i=1 wi,t(1 + ri,t+1)]
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estimators are used. More specifically for the conditional mean we use Elastic-Net, Random Forest,
Neural Network, and model ensemble estimators. For the conditional covariance matrix we use
the Engle et al. (2019) nonlinear shrinkage method derived from random matrix theory to correct
in-sample biases of sample eigenvalues.
2.3.1.0.1 Equal Weights We endow the robo-investor with a DeMiguel et al. (2007) 1/Ni,t
strategy. In particular, for each individual i, the Alter Ego buys and holds at time t all the stocks in
the set Sit with equal allocations 1/Nit. Henceforth we will refer to this as the EW portfolio rule.
2.3.1.0.2 Rolling Sample Markowitz The mean-variance optimal portfolio is constructed as
the maximum Sharpe ratio subject to the short-sale constraint and the individual’s investment op-
portunity set. Investor i selects from the set Sit of stocks. Critical to the optimal portfolios are
estimates of conditional expected returns (µit) and the conditional covariance matrix of returns












s.t. wi,t ≥ 0, (2.2)
where γ is often interpreted as a risk aversion parameter which we set equal to one as it maxi-








t−j , where r
d
t is an Nit× 1 vector of daily returns and k is the number of days in the two-
year historical sample. For covariance, we also use rolling sample estimator with linear shrinkage
as in Ledoit and Wolf (2004) based on daily returns over the same time span. These estimates form
our naive benchmark.
2.3.1.0.3 Machine learning and Shrinkage Continuing with the Markowitz allocation scheme,
we explore whether increasing the complexity of the rolling sample estimators translates into im-
proved robo-investor performance. We assume that each investor’s Alter Ego robo-investor has
access to a common set of models that replace the rolling sample schemes. For expected return
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predictions we use machine learning algorithms applied to each of the 1076 assets (683 stocks
and 393 ETFs) and the Alter Ego robo-investor picks the prediction pertaining to the stocks in
the sets Sit. More specifically for the conditional mean estimates we use Elastic-Net (Zou and
Hastie (2005)), Random Forest (Breiman (2001)), Neural Network (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshi-
rani 2016, Chap. 11), and model ensemble estimators (Friedman et al. 2016, Chap. 16). For the
conditional covariance matrix - looking at a total of 1076 assets - we use the Engle et al. (2019)
nonlinear shrinkage method derived from random matrix theory to correct in-sample biases of
sample eigenvalues.
2.3.2 Machine Learning Expected Returns
What we have in mind is a situation where the robo-investors rely on a modeling department
within the brokerage house to provide them with estimates of conditional means and conditional
covariances for the entire universe of stocks/ETFs and supplying the Alter Ego investor associated
with each individual investor with the estimates µit and Σ
i
t for the stocks in the set Sit. The modelers
estimate a wide class of models and use out-of-sample performance metrics to determine the most
appropriate panel of conditional means and conditional covariances to supply to the robo-investors.
Our goal here is to provide a simple approximation to the comprehensive conditional modeling
process that such a brokerage research group would undertake. In terms of expected returns models
our analysis shares some of the methods also considered by Gu, Kelly, and Xiu (2018).
For the purpose of our analysis, let ri,t− = (ri,t, · · · , ri,t−k+1)′ be the k × 1 vector of own-
lagged stock returns for stock i. We have N = 1076 stocks/ETFs to consider and T = 110
monthly periods. We use 70% of the data for training, 20% of the data as a validation sample
(for hyperparameter tuning), and 10% of the sample for testing out-of-sample performance. To
maximize the use of our unique data set, we start building our models using returns data from
January 1993 to December 2002 - namely a 10-year sample prior to the start of our individual
investor data.
We augment the panel of monthly stock/ETF returns with the five Fama-French monthly factors
(Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA) as well as their momentum factor (see Ken French website for
definitions), and Welch and Goyal (2007) predictors: div. price ratio, div. yield, earnings price
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ratio, div. payout ratio, stock variance, BM DJ stocks, net equity expansion, TBill, long-term
yield, term spread, default yield spread, inflation (see their paper for definitions). We understand
that a true data engineering group would likely create a much larger and more robust set of data
sources. Our goal is not to replicate the true data-source generating process, but to provide a simple
approximation to the set of all useful signals for prediction. Let xt represent an M × 1 vector of
these predictors.
In each model class we estimate individual models for each stock/ETF separately, rather than
pooling across stocks/ETFs, in order to allow as much heterogeneity as possible in model parame-
ter estimates. The common modeling objective is to estimate Et[ri,t+1], where Et[ri,t+1] = fi(zi,t).
The modelers therefore employ different approaches to estimate fi(), and also work to curate the
best possible set of covariates zi,t.
We separate our conditional mean models into (1) linear and (2) nonlinear model sets. Within
the linear models, we consider OLS and elastic-net models. For nonlinear models we consider ran-
dom forests of regression trees and shallow feed-forward neural networks. Hence, we consider two
popular nonparametric and parametric machine learning models designed to introduce nonlinear
interactions between covariates: random forests of regression trees (nonparametric) and artificial
neural networks (parametric). Finally we consider a simple model ensemble across all models.
2.3.2.0.1 Linear Models The linear models we estimate for each stock i across time periods
t = k, . . . , T − 1 are of the form:
ri,t+1 = βi,0 + βi,rri,t + βi,xxt + εi,t+1 (2.3)
In addition to estimating this model with OLS, we fit sets of linear models per stock i using Elastic
















where β = (βi,0βi,rβi,x)′
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2.3.2.0.2 Nonlinear Models We consider two popular nonparametric and parametric machine
learning models designed to introduce nonlinear interactions between covariates: random forests
of regression trees (nonparametric) and artificial neural networks (parametric). We employ the
algorithm of (Breiman (2001)) to estimate random forest models and we use stochastic gradient
descent to minimize an `2 objective function with regularization terms in order to train the neural
networks. In both cases our estimation techniques are standard. Again we estimate the model on
the training data and optimize all respective tuning parameters on the validation set.
2.3.2.0.3 Random Forest A random forest is a combination of individual regression trees. It
is a bootstrapping method that seeks to avoid both overfitting and decrease correlation among trees
by using random subsets of predictors at each branch of a given tree. Each tree can be classified as
having K terminal nodes (called “leaves”) with a depth of L. The prediction of a given tree then




βk1{zi,t ∈ Pk(L)} (2.5)
where Pk(L) is the k-th partition that has at most L different branches that it considers. A set of
branches for a given partition can be represented as a product of indicators for sequential branches.
For a given partition, then β̂k is the average of the returns for all members of that given partition.
A standard greedy search algorithm is used to maximize the information gained at each split.
The recursive binary splitting algorithm continues until a set of stopping criterion are met, which
typically rely on the maximal additional information gained from a split being less than a threshold,
or a max number of leaves and/or depth of a tree being reached.
For the random forest models, the key tuning parameters are the number of bootstraped trees,
the depth of each tree, and the random subset of predictors that are considered at each potential
split within a tree. The random forest prediction is then the bootstrapped average at any prediction
point across trees.
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2.3.2.0.4 Neural Network Our neural network architecture is two hidden layers with 10 neu-
rons per layer, sigmoid transfer functions in the input and hidden layers, and a linear transfer func-
tion in the output layer. We use stochastic gradient descent to minimize an `2 objective function
with regularization terms in order to train the neural networks. In both cases our estimation tech-
niques are standard. Again we estimate the model on the training data and optimize all respective
tuning parameters on the validation set.
Finally we consider a model ensemble of the above linear and nonlinear estimators, restricting
ourselves to an equal-weighting scheme across predicted expected returns as to limit introducing
additional estimation uncertainty.
Figure 2.1 displays a set of 10 bar plot clusters. Each displays end-of-year (last quarter) snap-
shots of forecasting performance. The 10 rolling samples displayed, each pertaining to a 10-year
sample of return data to estimate, validate and forecast returns. For each of the 10 rolling sam-
ples the relative performance of the competing models (only looking at equities) is displayed. The
out-of-sample performance is measured in terms of MSE and the height of each bar represents the
percentage a particular model has the lowest MSE in predicting the cross-section of returns for all
the stocks in the sample. For each cluster the height of the bars add up to 100% and each repre-
sents the fraction a particular class of models provides the best return prediction for the 683 in the
cross-section. We note that neural network models represent the most successful class of models,
typically being the best for between 40 and 50 percent of the assets in the cross-section. Often a
close second is the class of Elastic Net models. All other methods are less successful, although
there is quite some variation across time.
The results displayed in Figure 2.1 may leave the impression that neural network models are
dominant. Let us turn our attention to Figure 2.2 which sheds perhaps a different light on this
result. It provides a collection of four histograms documenting for a particular 10-year rolling
sample, the 1994-2004 period, the cross-section of out-of-sample MSE’s. The models are OLS,
Elastic Net (EN), Random Forest (RF), and Neural Net (NN). The out-of-sample (OOS) perfor-
mance is measured in terms of MSE. Eyeballing the four histograms we see that OLS is clearly
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worse than EN (Elastic Net), RF (random forest) and NN (neural network), but the differences
among the three ML methods is not as clear. The cross-section of MSE’s appears indeed similar.
Further evidence of this appears in Table 2.1 which reports the average MSE and MAE of out of
sample forecasts across all assets and rolling sample schemes. It shows that the elastic-net and
neural net models deliver the lowest out-of-sample MSE when aggregating performance across
stocks/ETFs. However, the differences between EN and NN are very small, indicating that while
NN perhaps provides the best predictions, EN is typically a close second and arguably much easier
to implement. Moreover, the EN is a linear model, whereas the NN is nonlinear. The presence of
nonlinearities does not seem to substantially pay off.
All the models/estimators have dimensions on where they could be refined, but ultimately the
modeling group delivers a set of conditional mean estimates by stock/ETFs to the robo-investors.
Each of these chosen conditional mean estimates come from the model with the lowest out-of-
sample MSE. A common model need not be chosen across stocks/ETFs, and indeed we can see
that even in a few cases, OLS with all covariates included is the model with the best out-of-sample
performance. The final panel of (Êt[ri,t+1])i,t is used in the robo-investors’ optimal portfolio prob-
lems.
2.3.3 Global ETF Robo-investors
The Alter Ego scheme can be viewed as a bespoke portfolio management approach, which is
at one extreme of the spectrum, while passive investments are on the other end. We also consider
what can be viewed as a middle ground, i.e. a robo-investor actively managing a portfolio involving
a small set of targeted portfolios.
The robo-investor we consider invests in three ETFs, or holds cash. They are: (a) US index
- S&P 500 SPDR ETF (SPY), (b) Belgium index - iShares MSCI Belgium ETF (EWK) and (c)
European index - iShares MSCI Eurozone ETF (EZU). These three ETFs focus on the bulk of
geographical coverage of equities in our sample (see Appendix Table B.3). The robo-investor uses
a MV/ML/Nonlinear scheme using these three ETFs. We call this robo-investor a Global ETF
Robo-investor as it is no longer attached to any specific individual.
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2.4 Empirical Results
The empirical results focus on answering a number of questions: (a) are more sophisticated
models better, (b) who gains from robo-advice, (c) how does robo-investing perform during a
major financial crisis, (d) how do AI Alter Egos compare to passive investment schemes and (e) are
spreads due to behavioral biases? Finally we also study how AI can improve on passive investment
and which investors would benefit from this. A subsection is devoted to answering each of these
questions. In the main body of the paper we report a summary set of results pertaining to quarterly
rebalancing. In the Online Appendix, the monthly and detailed quarterly results are reported.
2.4.1 Are more sophisticated models better?
In Table 2.2 we report for all investors in our sample the median, first (Q1) and third quar-
tiles (Q3) of the cross-sectional distribution of return spreads rsi,t = r
ae
i,t - ri,t, considering only
equity holdings (left panel) or the entire universe of 683 stocks and 393 ETFs (right panel). The
AI Alter Ego schemes are: (a) MV with Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance, (b) Machine Learning
(ML) Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods displayed in Table 2.1, (c) ML Mean/Nonlinear
Smoothed Variance, and finally the equally weighted (EW) portfolio scheme. For (c), we provide
spreads using either individual investor realized returns or realized returns adjusted for cash hold-
ing. Neither rolling sample mean nor equally weighted portfolios have positive median spreads.
Hence, the median shadow robo-investor performs worse than the humans. The highest median
spread is obtained from the ML Mean/Rolling Variance, namely 2.93% per year (equities only)
and 3.37% for the universe of stocks and ETFs. Using the nonlinear smoothing approach to covari-
ance estimation slightly reduces the median return by 15 basis points or even 41 basis points when
ETFs are included. Even when considering individual investor returns adjusted for cash holding,
this approach delivers lower but still positive median spreads, i.e. 1.89% per year (equities only)
and 2.27% for both stocks and ETFs. While there is a large cross-sectional heterogeneity, judging
by the inter-quartile range, we also observe a right shift in the entire distribution. The first quartiles
for MV Rolling Mean and EW are 3 percent lower, whereas Q3 is 5 percent lower compared to
either type of MV ML. Figure B.1 provides further evidence of our findings. The six plots display
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’man versus machine’ scatter plots of returns (top three plots) and portfolio risk measured via real-
ized variances (lower three plots). The x-axis is the average returns of individual investors over the
life-span of their portfolio holdings in our sample, and the y-axis is the corresponding shadow AI
performance. For the top three plots, all dots above the 45 degree line correspond to robo-investor
improvements. The gray shaded area represents robo-investor improvements and overall positive
returns. For the lower three plots, all dots below the 45 degree line represent less risk taking by the
robo-investor. For the top three subplots (a) - (c) we see a clear upward shift in the cloud of dots
as we move from (a) to (b) and very little movement from (b) to (c). This corresponds to the better
performance of ML/Rolling Variance robo-investor schemes highlighted in Table 2.2. When we
examine the lower set of plots we see that most robo-investors feature lower portfolio return fluctu-
ations, since the majority of dots lie below the 45 degree line. Contrary to the return results, we see
that the ML based robo-investors feature more variance risk. All the results reported so far pertain
to quarterly portfolio rebalancing. In the Online Appendix, we provide detailed evidence showing
that the findings extend to monthly rebalancing. The annual rebalancing yield qualitatively the
same findings as well.
Overall, the results clearly show that the ML expected return scheme is superior to any of
the two relatively naive and simple robo-investing schemes. Hence, the answer is clearly that more
sophisticated models are better. In the remainder of this section we will therefore focus exclusively
on the MV ML/Rolling Variance robo-investor AI Alter Egos.
2.4.2 Who gains from robo-advise?
Continuing with quarterly rebalancing and MV ML/Rolling Variance robo-investors, in Table
2.4 we report the median, Q1, Q3 as well as confidence interval for the median of the cross-
sectional distributions of the spreads between AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns, consid-
ering the entire universe of 683 stocks and 393 ETFs.14 Panel A covers individual investor realized
14 To construct confidence intervals for aggregate summary statistics we do the following. We first randomly sample
individuals according to an individual bootstrap method whereby each investor is assumed independent of each other
investor, and sample the entire time-series path of each investor to maintain the dependence structure. For each
bootstrap repetition we compute the relevant statistic per individual and aggregate the per-individual statistics over all
of the sampled investors. Let {θ̃r}Rr=1 be the constructed statistic over R bootstrap repetition, and let θ̂ be the point
estimate of interest. Let θ̃(α/2) and θ̃(1−α/2) represent the α/2 and 1 − α/2 percentiles of the bootstrap statistic. We
51
returns while Panel B refers to realized returns adjusted for cash holding. Summary statistics
are computed for separate samples with low/high education, low/high risk aversion and low/high
income classification for investors.
Let us start with high and low risk aversion in Panel A (realized returns). High risk averse
median individual investors stand to gain 5.14 percent from robo-investor shadow Alter Egos.
Their low risk aversion counterparts only gain 3.29. Both clearly benefit, since the confidence
intervals for either type of investor indicates that the median spreads are significantly different from
zero. In addition, the 95% confidence interval for the difference in medians is [0.5546, 3.1111], and
therefore excludes zero. Hence, the median high risk averse investor gains statistically significantly
more from robo-investing than the median low risk averse investor does. A similar pattern emerges
for high/low income, with the median low income investor gaining roughly two-thirds more (4.13
percent versus 2.76) than the high income median investor. Low and high education differences
are not as pronounced, with a wedge of 63 basis points. The inference indicates, however, that the
high/low median spread for income and education are not statistically significant. Needless to say
that a spread between median 2.76 (high income) and 4.13 (low income) percent return per year is
economically quite substantial.
The results appearing in Panel B, which account for investor cash holdings, are slightly dif-
ferent. The difference in medians between high and low risk averse investors is lower (42 basis
points) and no longer significant. As far as income is concerned, the median low income investor
is still gaining more from robo-investing than the median high income investor does (2.92% versus
1.65%). By contrast with what we observe in Panel A, such a spread of 1.27 percent is now statisti-
cally significant and is still economically substantial. Similarly, low and high education differences
are also statistically significant for cash-adjusted realized returns. They reveal that low education
investors gain more than high education investors, with a wedge of 1.14 percent.
then construct pivotal 1− α confidence intervals according to [2θ̂ − θ̃(1−α/2), 2θ̂ − θ̃(α/2)].
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2.4.3 How does robo-advising perform during major financial crisis?
In Table 2.5 we report the Alter Ego return spreads for stocks/ETFs as they relate to the fi-
nancial crisis and Great Recession financial. The subsamples are benchmarked using the NBER
chronology identifying the crisis period as 12/2007 - 6/2009.15 The focus is again on the MV
ML/Rolling Variance AI Alter Ego scheme. For each of the subsamples we compute the median,
Q1 and Q3 realized returns along with the same statistics for the AI Alter Ego returns. Note that,
since the median of a spread is not the difference in median returns, we are not inferring something
directly related to the spreads reported in prior tables. We focus on the returns instead in order
to highlight a very important finding. Prior to the crisis we note that the median investor had an
annual return of 9.26%, almost double the return of the median AI Alter Ego (4.17%). We also
note though that the inter-quartile spread for investors is twice as large as the same statistic for
robo-investors using ML. For individual investors the Q1-Q3 spans from -4.70 to 20.98 percent,
whereas the AI Alter Egos feature a better Q1 of minus two percent, and a lower Q3 of almost
eleven percent. The comparison is however less dramatic when considering individual investor
realized returns adjusted for cash holding. The median investor earned an annual cash-adjusted re-
turn of 6.35% and the corresponding inter-quartile spread is unsurprisingly narrower (from -0.93 to
13.57 percent). While accounting for cash holdings, investors still outperform the MV ML/Rolling
Variance AI Alter Ego scheme, but to a lesser extend.
During the crisis things take a dramatic turn. The median robo-investor has zero return - mean-
ing the median AI Alter Ego holds cash. In contrast, for individual investors the median is a loss,
i.e. -29% or -16.42% when investor cash holdings are included. With or without cash holdings,
the Q3 investor still has a negative annual return (either -3.59% or -0.82%), compared with 23.81
percent return for Q3 of the AI Alter Egos.
After the crisis, things reverse to the pattern observed prior to the crisis - namely the median
investor does better than the median AI Alter Ego. As noted before, when ignoring investor cash
15We also examined the more specifically targeted Belgian crisis dates related to the severe difficulties of the coun-
try’s financial sector. The results are broadly speaking similar and not reported here.
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holdings, we have a much wider inter-quartile range for individual investors, even more than double
the dispersion among robo-investors. These differences are less striking for individual investor
realized returns adjusted for cash.
A more striking picture emerges when we turn our attention to Panel (a) of Figure 2.4. The
five lines correspond to (1) cash-adjusted realized cumulative returns of median investor, (2) me-
dian AI Alter Ego returns using MV Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance scheme (3) median AI Alter
Ego returns using MV ML/Rolling Variance scheme (4) median AI Alter Ego returns using MV
ML/Nonlinear Variance and finally (5) the median EW robo-investor. One word of caution: these
medians do not represent the same investor or AI Alter Ego through time, so this is not the per-
formance of a specific individual or robot. Each line starts out with one unit of investment at the
beginning of the sample and the median returns are compounded subsequently. Prior to the cri-
sis, the median investor reaches roughly 1.5. This means that the initial capital is increased by
50% over a five year span from 2002 until 2007. By the time the devastation of the crisis took
its toll, the median investor is under water by about 15 percent and finally ends up with a meager
10 percent return over a 10-year period. It is remarkable that even the EW robo-investor, whom
we know from prior analysis is neither sophisticated nor particularly successful, achieves a higher
return at the end of the sample. The best overall performance is obtained from the MV ML/Rolling
Variance median robo-investor (again not shadowing always the same investor across time) with a
60 percent overall return. This median robo-investor has a relatively slow start but already slightly
over-performs prior to the crisis. In addition, it features small losses during the tumultuous market
conditions. Note also that the MV ML/Nonlinear Variance AI Alter Ego is almost identical to the
ML/Rolling Variance scheme. Finally, the MV Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance scheme tracks the
ML performance very closely until the financial crisis.
To shed further light on this we turn our attention to Table 2.3 displaying the ranking of the
regressors based on their `2 contribution across stocks for the Elastic Net regressions defined in
equations (2.3) - (2.4). We focus on the EN regressions as they provide a fairly simple regression-
based interpretation. In addition, it is often the best or nearly the best prediction model. The ranks
are computed for 10-year rolling samples starting with 93-03 and ending with 02-12. Of particular
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interest is the crisis period spanning across the 96-06 through 99-09 samples. The top ranked
predictor in all but the last of rolling samples is dfy namely the default yield spread. Another
top-ranked series during the crisis is lty or the long term yield. Looking across all samples we
also see svar stock variance, ntis net equity expansion and infl inflation. Interestingly, the usual
Fama-French regressors rarely appear among the top-ranked regressors. This should not perhaps
come as a surprise, since the Fama-French factors are meant to price the cross-section of returns.
Finally, in Figure 2.5 we provide a time series plot of the fraction with negative expected
returns among the cross-section of stocks, according to the best machine learning model. Early
in the sample we see that typically between 20 and 30% of the stocks featured negative expected
returns. The fraction shoots up above 50% in 2008 and goes as high as 60%. As a result, the
majority of stocks featured negative expected returns, which explains why the AI Alter Egos have
a propensity to move out of the market.
2.4.4 AI Alter Egos versus Passive Investments
How do AI Alter Egos measure up against passive investment strategies, in particular buying
and holding a market-wide ETF? To address this question we turn our attention to Table 2.6. We
report summary statistics for spreads with respect to two ETFs. One tracks the S&P 500 index and
the other is the iShares MSCI Belgium ETF. Neither is ideal, but we did not find an index available
throughout the entire sample period that mimics the basket of stocks held by the investors in the
brokerage data set.16 Unfortunately, the results reported in Table 2.6 depend on which ETF is
selected. In the right panel displays the results for stocks+ETFs returns minus the benchmark ETF
spreads, either S&P 500 or Belgian and in the left panel AI Alter Ego MV/ML/Nonlinear against
the same benchmarks. Each panel contains the median, first and third quartile of the spreads. The
full sample results appear in the top part of Table 2.6. Subsamples stratified according to NBER
crisis dates appear in the lower part. The median investor has a spread of -8.50% against the S&P
500, meaning the median investor vastly under-performs the benchmark. For the Belgian ETF the
results are not as dramatic, since the median investor does better with a positive spread of 1.37%.
16According to the results reported in Table B.3 investors hold 26% of US stocks and 14% of Belgian stocks.
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There is wide cross-sectional variation, although the third quartile for the US market index is only
2% (while 12% for the Belgian index). The AI Alter Ego spreads are better in both cases, although
the US benchmark still yields a negative spread of -6.18%. Against the Belgian ETF, the AI Alter
Ego has a positive median spread of almost 4 percent.
When we look at the pre-crisis sample we note that the median investor and AI Alter Ego
have returns below the two benchmarks, more so for the Belgian ETF than its US counterpart.
It is also worthwhile noting that the median AI Alter Ego performs worse. The crisis period is
a totally different story. The AI Alter Egos median investors vastly outperform the benchmark
by respectively 18.32% (SPDR) and 48.31%. Moreover, the median investor does better than the
Belgian ETF by a substantial margin of 21.24% but is 8.78% below the S&P 500 ETF. In both
cases we see significant improvements from the Alter Ego schemes. Post-crisis things return back
to the pre-crisis situation.
2.4.5 Are the spreads due to market or behavioral factors?
Are the sharp findings regarding the crisis related to well documented behavioral biases? In
the Appendix section B.1.4 we report that the investors in our sample feature the behavioral biases
studied in the literature. Regarding the crisis results, we would like to focus on two key ones: (1)
the disposition effect (DE) - selling winners too soon, holding on to losers too long - as in Odean
(1998) for each investor and (2) trading frequency.
In Table 2.7 we document the results of cross-sectional median regressions, where the AI Alter
Ego spreads from the MV ML/Rolling Variance robo-investors are a function of DE (left column)
as well as DE combined with trading frequencies. We report the AI Alter Ego return spreads (with
and without adjustment for investor cash holdings) as well as the spreads vis-à-vis the S&P 500
ETF. The DE has a positive impact on the spreads, albeit not always statistically significant when
combined with trading frequency indicator regressors. When we add dummies for the 2nd through
4th quartile of trading frequency we note that the DE spreads are affected in a statistically signif-
icant way, monotonically deteriorating for spreads and increasing for spreads vis-à-vis the S&P
500 ETF. This means that investors who trade a lot tend to have larger AI spreads against the ETF
benchmark (in unreported results it is also the case for the Belgian ETF). Conversely, frequent
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traders tend to have less benefits from AI Alter Egos (and DE is insignificant when combined with
trading frequency). Overall, the results indicate that behavioral biases explain to a certain degree
the cross-section of AI Alter Ego spreads. Particularly, spreads against a passive investment strat-
egy increase with trading frequency and disposition effect. Additional results involving controls
for investor characteristics appear in Tables B.33 and B.34 of the Online Appendix. Besides adding
controls, we also consider quantile regressions for 5%, 10% 20%, 80%, 90% and 95%. Overall
the findings remain, particularly for the right tail of the distribution. The DE is significant for the
median and extreme right tail when looking at AI Alter Ego spreads with respect to the benchmark
ETF.
2.4.6 AI Enhancements to Passive Investment
In this last subsection we explore AI enhancements that are global, i.e. the Global ETF Robo-
investors. The results so far left the impression that most of the AI Alter Ego gains were realized
during the financial crisis and were primarily due to the moving to cash. We therefore turn our
attention to Panel (b) of Figure 2.4 which is to be compared with the plots appearing in Panel
(a). Indeed, Panel (b) contains those very same cumulative returns as in Panel (a) - although on
a different scale to allow comparison with the one series added, the performance of the Global
ETF Robo-investor. The results in Panel (b) of Figure 2.4 project a different light on the findings
reported so far as it shows that the Global ETF Robo-investor supercedes and dominates all other
investment strategies. While there are significant losses during the crisis, despite the option to
move to cash, the Global ETF Robo-investor almost triples the initial investment, dwarfing any of
the other strategies and always exceeds any of the others considered.17
Next, we examine the return spreads between the Global ETF Robo-investor versus the realized
cash-adjusted returns. These results for the full sample as well as the pre-, during and post-crisis
subsamples appear in Table 2.8. We observe that the median spread is almost 3% per year with a
very wide range from -15.89 (25q) to 16.65 (75q). Before and during the crisis the Global ETF
robo-investor outperforms even more with median spreads of respectively 5.38% and 1.44%. Only
17It is also worth parenthetically noting that, as displayed in Appendix Figure B.3, the Global ETF robo-investor
outperforms its constituents, i.e. outperforms passive investment.
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post-crisis do we see an underperformance in terms of median, but again with a wide range.
This brings us to the final analysis. We estimate logistic regressions in order to determine which
type of investor is more likely to benefit from the Global ETF Robo-investor. We skip the details
of the parameter estimates, which are available from the authors upon request. The results pertain
to the likelihood of an individual investor’s Alter Ego MV/ML/Nonlinear beating the Global ETF
Robo-investor. We find that the former is more favorable for higher educated, or high income, or
higher trading frequency investors. Conversely, the Global ETF Robo-investor is on average better
than the Alter Ego one for investors with high risk aversion.
2.5 Conclusions
Artificial intelligence enhancements are increasingly shaping our daily lives. Financial decision-
making is no exception to this. We introduce the notion of AI Alter Egos, machine-driven decision
makers which shadow a particular individual, and apply it in the area of robo-investing using a
brokerage accounts data set rich in both cross-sectional and time series features.
The purpose of our analysis is to assess the highly touted benefits of robo-advising. Through the
AI Alter Ego scheme we address a number of questions: (a) are more sophisticated models better,
(b) who gains from robo-advise, (c) how does robo-investing perform during a major financial
crisis, (d) how do AI Alter Egos compare to passive investment schemes and (e) are spreads due to
behavioral biases? Overall, we find that investors displaying certain characteristics - in particular
low education and low income - stand to gain significantly. Moreover, machine learning methods
provide important portfolio return improvements. AI Alter Ego spreads are related to behavioral
biases - in particular the disposition effect and trading frequency. During the financial crisis, robo-
investors have a greater propensity to cash out of the market, which contributes to their overall
return superiority.
Compared to passive ETF investment, we find that the evidence is mixed, although during the
financial crisis AI Alter Egos were vastly better than the passive strategy. Finally, we explore
AI enhancements that are global, i.e. unlike the AI Alter Ego not tied to a specific investor. The
results show that the Global ETF Robo-investors dominates all other investment strategies and
outperforms its constituents, i.e. outperforms passive investment.
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FIG. 2.1. Bar charts for 10-year rolling samples are displayed, where we only display yearly snapshots. The first
covers the sample Jan 1993 - Jan 2003 and the last Jan 2002 - Jan 2012. For each of the 10 rolling samples the relative
performance of the competing models (only looking at equities) is displayed. The bars add up to 100% for each of the
10 rolling samples. The out-of-sample (OOS) performance is measured in terms of MSE and the height of each bar
represents the percentage a particular model has the lowest MSE in predicting the cross-section of returns for all the
stocks in the sample. The models are OLS, Elastic Net (EN), Random Forest (RF), Neural Net (NN) and Ensemble
(Comb). We use 70% of the data for training, 20% of the data as a validation sample (for hyperparameter tuning), and


























FIG. 2.2. The models are OLS, Elastic Net (EN), Random Forest (RF), and Neural Net (NN). The out-of-sample
(OOS) performance is measured in terms of MSE. Histograms pertain to MSE for 1994-2004 subsample pertaining
to the cross-section of returns. We use 70% of the data for training, 20% of the data as a validation sample (for
hyperparameter tuning), and 10% of the sample for testing OOS performance. The histograms pertain to the cross-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIG. 2.5. Time series plot of the fraction among the cross-section of stocks with negative expected returns, according
to the best machine learning model - see Figure 2.1 for details.
TABLE 2.1: Out-of-Sample MSE Across Stocks
Cross-Sectional MSE
OLS EN RF NN Comb
Mean 0.0207 0.0104 0.0114 0.0100 0.0101
Median 0.0147 0.0072 0.0081 0.0066 0.0070
Notes: Cross-sectional average and median MSE’s on the out-of-sample testing data for: OLS, Elastic-Net (EN),
Random Forest (RF), Neural Network (NN), and ensemble (Comb).
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TABLE 2.2: AI Alter Ego Return Spreads - All Investors
Equities only Equities + ETF
Median Q1 Q3 Median Q1 Q3
Mean Variance
Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance -0.08 -13.60 12.84 0.58 -12.72 13.16
ML Mean/Rolling Variance 2.93 -10.66 17.41 3.37 -10.19 17.20
ML Mean/NL Smoothed Variance 2.78 -10.72 17.13 2.96 -10.49 17.09
ML Mean/NL Smoothed Variance (cash) 1.89 -6.47 12.36 2.27 -6.19 12.49
Equally Weighted
-0.67 -13.88 11.96 -0.54 -13.68 11.98
Notes: Entries are median, first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles of the cross-sectional distributions of the spreads between
AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns, rsi,t = r
ae
i,t - ri,t, for three Mean Variance (MV) types of robo-investors
and one equally weighted (EW) considering only equity holdings (left panel) or the entire universe of 683 stocks and
393 ETFs (right panel). The AI Alter Ego schemes are: (a) MV with Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance, (b) Machine
Learning (ML) Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods displayed in Table 2.1, (c) ML Mean/Nonlinear Smoothed
Variance, and finally the equally weighted portfolio scheme. For (c), spreads are computed using either individual
investor realized returns or individual investor realized returns adjusted for cash holding (cash) – see Appendix B.1.5




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2.4: AI Alter Egos Return Spreads - Education, Risk Aversion and Income
Return Spreads CI Median
Median Q1 Q3 C(2.5%) C(97.5%)
Panel A : Realized returns
Education
Low 2.83 -10.47 16.79 1.18 4.22
High 3.46 -10.15 17.26 3.01 3.85
Confidence interval difference in medians: [-0.5989, 2.1723]
Risk Aversion
Low 3.29 -10.86 17.43 2.39 4.38
High 5.14 -9.12 17.28 3.63 6.36
Confidence interval difference in medians: [0.5546, 3.1111]
Income
Low 4.13 -10.00 17.57 3.01 5.20
High 2.76 -11.70 15.01 0.82 4.91
Confidence interval difference in medians: [-3.1016, 0.6014]
Panel B : Realized returns - cash adjusted
Education
Low 3.17 -4.78 12.54 2.35 3.94
High 2.03 -5.23 10.75 1.80 2.40
Confidence interval difference in medians: [-1.7511, -0.3788]
Risk Aversion
Low 2.56 -5.21 12.03 2.24 3.01
High 2.14 -5.26 10.26 1.35 2.78
Confidence interval difference in medians: [-1.1906, 0.2726]
Income
Low 2.92 -4.86 12.51 2.40 3.59
High 1.65 -4.58 8.71 0.92 2.82
Confidence interval difference in medians: [-2.1572, -0.2615]
Notes: Entries are median, first and third quartiles, as well as confidence interval for the median of the cross-sectional
distributions of the spreads between AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns, considering the entire universe of 683
stocks and 393 ETFs. The AI Alter Ego scheme is Mean Variance (MV) with Machine Learning (ML) Mean/Rolling
Variance - using the methods displayed in Table 2.1. Summary statistics are computed for separate samples with
low/high education, low/high risk aversion and low/high income classification for investors. 95% confidence intervals
for differences in medians are computed as described in footnote 14. The spreads are in percentages per year. Panel
A deals with the spreads between AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns while Panel B refers to the spreads
between AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns adjusted for cash holding.
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TABLE 2.5: Returns Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis
Median Q1 Q3
Pre
Realized 9.26 -4.70 20.98
Realized (cash adjusted) 6.35 -0.93 13.57
MV ML 4.17 -2.00 10.70
During
Realized -29.04 -45.87 -3.59
Realized (cash adjusted) -16.42 -30.89 -0.82
MV ML 0.00 -13.81 23.81
Post
Realized 5.64 -6.47 15.30
Realized (cash adjusted) 3.79 -1.26 9.80
MV ML 2.05 -1.76 8.42
Notes: The subsamples are benchmarked based on the NBER Crisis Time Period 12/2007 - 6/2009. The Pre-crisis
sample starts in 2002 and ends 11/2007, the post-crisis sample covers 7/2008 until end of sample, 2012. MV ML refers
to the AI Alter Ego scheme is Mean Variance with Machine Learning Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods
displayed in Table 2.1. The returns are in percentages per year.
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TABLE 2.6: AI Alter Ego Return Spreads vis-à-vis benchmark ETFs
Realized Stocks+ETFs AI Alter Ego
minus ETF minus ETF
Median 25q 75q Median 25q 75q
Full sample
S&P 500 ETF -8.50 -21.05 2.00 -6.18 -13.99 1.32
Belgian ETF 1.37 -9.90 12.00 3.93 -4.89 13.10
Pre-Crisis
S&P 500 ETF -2.22 -16.02 9.18 -7.20 -13.88 -0.41
Belgian ETF -9.57 -21.28 1.45 -14.58 -21.33 -7.02
During Crisis
S&P 500 ETF -8.78 -27.02 12.48 18.32 -1.75 39.32
Belgian ETF 21.24 1.23 40.35 48.31 25.60 71.02
Post-Crisis
S&P 500 ETF -11.37 -23.16 -1.78 -14.97 -19.62 -8.43
Belgian ETF -1.48 -12.59 8.26 -4.82 -9.85 2.36
Notes: The AI Alter Ego scheme is the ML Mean/Nonlinear Smoothed Variance - using the methods displayed in
Table 2.1. The spreads are in percentage per year. The subsamples are benchmarked based on the NBER Crisis Time
Period 12/2007 - 6/2009. The Pre-crisis sample starts in 2002 and ends 11/2007, the post-crisis sample covers 7/2008





























































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2.8: Return Spreads Global ETF Robo-investors minus Realized Cash-Adjusted
Median 25q 75q
Full sample 2.97 -15.89 16.65
Pre-Crisis 5.38 -14.09 13.87
During 1.44 -37.02 41.93
Post-Crisis -1.51 -13.63 17.28
Notes: The subsamples are benchmarked based on the NBER Crisis Time Period 12/2007 - 6/2009. The Pre-crisis
sample starts in 2002 and ends 11/2007, the post-crisis sample covers 7/2008 until end of sample, 2012. The robo-
investor we consider invests in three ETFs, or holds cash. These ETFs are: (a) US index - S&P 500 SPDR ETF
(SPY), (b) Belgium index - iShares MSCI Belgium ETF (EWK) and (c) European index - iShares MSCI Eurozone
ETF (EZU). These three ETFs focus on the bulk of geographical coverage of equity investments in our sample. The
robo-investor uses a MV/ML/Nonlinear scheme using these three ETFs. We call this a Global ETF Robo-investor as
it is no longer attached to any specific individual.
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CHAPTER 3
GOVERNMENT DEBT AND THE RETURNS TO INNOVATION
(JOINT WITH M. MAX CROCE, THIEN NGUYEN, AND LUKAS SCHMID)
3.1 Introduction
Fiscal stabilization policies implemented in response to the recent Great Recession have led
to a surge in government debt across the globe. A common concern is that the budget consolida-
tion processes required by this debt will come at the cost of dimmer long-run growth prospects.
Such concerns are based on expectations of either higher future tax pressure or raises in average
inflation through attempts to inflate debt away, as well as on the political uncertainty surround-
ing the restoration of a balanced budget. While these adverse effects of debt and fiscal policy on
economic growth are well grounded in economic theory, the empirical evidence in their support
from cross-country tests has been weak or ambiguous, perhaps because of short samples and small
cross-sections.
In this paper, we propose a different perspective based on a large cross section of US firms. We
highlight a novel and distinct mechanism shaping the link between public debt and future growth,
namely a risk channel. More specifically, we identify innovations to government indebtedness as
a risk factor priced in both the cross section and the time series of stock returns. By affecting their
cost of capital, movements in government debt impact firms’ investment and, critically, innovation
decisions. Empirically, we test these links on the entire cross-section of US stock returns, and
we interpret and quantify them through the lens of a production-based asset pricing model with
endogenous innovation and growth.
Our analysis starts from the empirical observation that an increase in the government debt-to-
GDP ratio, DGDP for short, significantly predicts higher future aggregate stock returns at long
horizons (between four to 20 quarters), even after we control for standard predictors such as the
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price-dividend ratio and market volatility. In other words, investors perceive episodes of high
government debt as bad times. This finding suggests that news to government debt is a risk factor
priced in the cross section of stock returns, as investors are hesitant to incur losses on stocks in
times of rising debt. Indeed, we find that about one-third of the well-shown premium of R&D-
intensive stocks over less innovative stocks—hereafter, the return on what we call the HML-R&D
portfolio—can be attributed to exposure to fiscal variables. In the time series, we show that this
premium rises when government debt increases. That is, our asset pricing tests suggest that rises
in government debt increase the cost of capital, especially for innovative firms.
Critically, we show that movements in the cost of capital of innovative firms in response
to surges in government debt predict slowdowns in innovative activity and declines in growth
prospects at longer horizons. For example, an increase in the expected excess return of the HML-
R&D portfolio forecasts a significant decline in output and productivity growth over a horizon of
20 quarters. This is because rises in DGDP are accompanied by subsequent declines in corpo-
rate investment and R&D. At the same time, a reallocation toward investment in physical capital
occurs, as innovation is depressed relatively more. Our mechanism thus complements the work
of Belo, Gala, and Li (2013) and Belo and Yu (2013), who examine the effects of government
investment and spending on asset prices.
To interpret our findings and provide guidance on further empirical tests, we develop a quan-
titative model of a stochastic production economy in which endogenous innovation drives growth
prospects, and the Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Specifically, we focus on an economy
with two capital stocks, one of which is comprised of intangible innovations (for a complemen-
tary approach with more firm heterogeneity, see Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko 2010,
2012). The government finances expenditures by issuing debt and levying distortionary taxes on
corporate profits according to fiscal rules that determine the extent of fiscal stabilization through
tax smoothing (i.e., the persistence and the volatility of the tax rate). Movements in government
debt drive the dynamics of tax rates, which affect corporate investment and innovation, and thus
equilibrium growth.
72
We find that the model quantitatively rationalizes our empirical evidence on return predictabil-
ity well when we allow for shocks to productivity, government expenditures, and government
financing. Financing shocks alter the government’s stance regarding deficit spending. In our gen-
eral equilibrium setting, all of these three shocks are reflected in the stochastic discount factor and
hence give rise to a three-factor asset pricing model. More specifically, we show that our general
equilibrium model predicts nearly constant negative market prices of debt policy and government
expenditure risks, and exposures of returns to fundamental shocks that are nearly affine inDGDP .
As a result, the reduced form of our equilibrium model is a three-factor model with conditional be-
tas that can be expressed as a linear function of DGDP . In our setting, a rising DGDP level
elevates the exposure of returns to the underlying risks and forces firms to cope with a higher cost
of capital.
Our model also predicts that excess returns on HML-R&D are forecastable by DGDP because
the sensitivity of the cost of capital of innovative firms with respect to DGDP is higher than that
of low R&D-intensity firms. The mechanism behind this result can be explained as follows. As
DGDP increases, uncertainty about future tax rates rises endogenously and trickles down to all
quantities in general equilibrium. Since the value of innovative firms is crucially driven by the
present value of volatile monopolistic rents, R&D firms are more exposed to spikes in cash flow
uncertainty than nonR&D firms.
From the perspective of the representative household, such elevated exposure triggers a real-
location of investment toward tangible capital. With adjustment costs, the market value of low
R&D-intensity firms falls less, so they emerge as a hedge through this reallocation. This channel
is stronger when the economy has higher values of DGDP .
As a result, less innovative firms are unconditionally less risky than R&D-intensive firms (e.g.,
our model-implied HML-R&D is positive as in the data) and relatively safer in high debt episodes
(e.g., the model-implied HML-R&D grows with DGDP ). Within the context of the model, this
premium predominantly reflects elevated exposure to debt policy shocks. We view these shocks
as arising from the budget negotiation process or from shifts in the political composition of the
administration. Our model thus highlights the role of political risk in the determination of risk
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premiums, in the spirit of Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi (2016) and Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013).
We provide further evidence supporting our cost of capital mechanism by running standard
cross-sectional asset pricing tests based on the conditional three-factor model implied by our pro-
duction economy. This cross-sectional estimation is based on both R&D-sorted test assets as well
as the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market double-sorted portfolios. Our estimation results
confirm significantly negative risk prices for fiscal risks, implying that sudden rises in DGDP are
indeed bad states for investors.
Moreover, in line with our model predictions, the expected excess return on HML-R&D is in-
creasing in DGDP so that high-R&D firms are more exposed to government debt and pay higher
expected returns than low-R&D firms. Notably, these results hold even after controlling for stan-
dard financial risk factors, confirming a distinct role for fiscal factors both in the cross-section of
innovation-sorted returns and for aggregate investment and growth.
3.1.1 Related literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, our study highlights the role of
political risk in determining the cost of capital across innovation-sorted firms. In this regard, our
analysis is related to the growing literature on policy uncertainty and asset markets (see, among
others, Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi 2016; Pastor and Veronesi 2012, 2013; Fernandez-Villaverde,
Guerrn-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramrez 2015; Bloom 2009; Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016;
Manela and Moreira 2017; Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko 2010, 2012; Gomes, Kot-
likoff, and Viceira 2011; Glover, Gomes, and Yaron 2010; Sialm 2006; Sialm (2009); and Croce,
Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid 2012). Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2008) and Lustig, Berndt, and Yel-
tekin (2012) examine the nature of fiscal risks. In contrast to these studies, we examine the role of
uncertainty about the fiscal stance in both the cross section and the time series of stock returns. Our
results on the link between government borrowing and the cost of equity of innovation-intensive
firms complement those by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) in the corporate bonds market and
those by Demirci, Huang, and Sialm (2016) on corporate capital structures.
Our empirical asset pricing tests are in the spirit of recent and classic work emphasizing re-
turn predictability in the cross section and the time series. A nonexhaustive list of classic papers
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on cross-sectional return predictability includes Fama and French (1992), Cochrane (1996), and
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003b). These papers establish a number of important tradable and macroe-
conomic factors priced in the cross section of stock returns. Recent work by Hou, Xue, and Zhang
(2015a,c), Fama and French (2015), Belo, Bazdresch, and Lin (2014) and Lin (2012) adds novel
factors related to corporate policies to that list, such as investment, R&D, hiring, and profitability
factors. We contribute to this literature by introducing a novel macroeconomic risk factor (DGDP )
that predicts returns in both the cross section and the time series.
Time-series predictability has been explored by Campbell and Shiller (1988), Cochrane (2008),
Lettau and Ludvigson (2005), and Koijen, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), among others.
We show the relevance of DGDP in this regard. In independent recent work, Bai (2016) and
Liu (2016) empirically confirm that the government DGDP ratio significantly predicts aggregate
stock returns over longer horizons. In addition, we show that our DGDP factor predicts not only
aggregate stock returns but also spreads between innovation-sorted portfolios in the time series and
cross section. Furthermore, we explicitly link fiscal uncertainty, innovation, and growth, adding
new insights to the findings of Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea
(1997), and Mendoza and Tesar (1998).
Methodologically, our theoretical work builds on recent papers by Comin and Gertler (2006),
Comin, Gertler, and Santacreu (2009), Kung and Schmid (2015), Corhay, Kung, and Schmid
(2015), and Gavazzoni and Santacreu (2015). Following on the seminal work of Romer (1990)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), these papers integrate innovation-based endogenous growth
models into the workhorse real business cycle model of macroeconomics. In contrast, our paper
focuses on the role of government debt and taxation on investment, growth, and returns. In this
sense, our paper is related to that of Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012), who introduce fiscal
policy into a simple stochastic endogenous growth model.
More broadly, our paper shares its focus with the growing literature on asset pricing in general
equilibrium models with production. We adopt recursive preferences, in the more recent spirit of
Tallarini (2000), Campanale, Castro, and Clementi (2010), Kuehn (2008, 2009), Kaltenbrunner
and Lochstoer (2010), as they all explore the relevance of priced endogenous consumption news
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shocks. Gourio (2012, 2013) examines disaster risks, a dimension that we consider relevant for
future analysis on fiscal policy but is not part of our current analysis.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide motivating empirical evidence
linking movements in the government debt–to–GDP ratio to time-series patterns in stock returns.
We develop a model to rationalize these findings in Section 3. We calibrate the model in Section
4 and provide novel predictions on the cross-sectional determinants of stock returns. We provide
direct cross-sectional tests in the data in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical analysis
In this section, we provide novel empirical evidence on the link between government debt,
R&D-sorted stock returns, and growth. We begin by describing our data sources and then discuss
the results from our empirical asset-pricing tests.
3.2.1 Data sources
Our empirical analysis links macroeconomic data with information on stock returns and firm-
level fundamental accounting data. We use stock return data from CRSP and fundamental account-
ing data from Compustat to construct a combined panel at a quarterly frequency from 1975:Q1–
2013:Q4. Our sample choice reflects the introduction of new accounting standards regarding the
expensing of R&D costs by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 1975. For each
calendar year, we construct stock return portfolios by sorting firms based on their R&D intensity.
Our benchmark measure of intensity is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets, as reported in
Compustat. Our results also obtain when we measure intensity as the ratio of R&D to capital
expenditures (Capex), as in Lin (2012). Further results can be found in Table C.14 in the appendix.
We group firms into portfolios based on approximately even market capitalization. We consider
both quintile and decile portfolios. We build our portfolios on the basis of market capitalization to
ensure that the extreme portfolios are not driven by illiquid stocks. In our baseline case, the extreme
portfolios constitute at least 10% of the total market capitalization. Equivalently, when forming
portfolios, we choose our breakpoints so as to guarantee that both the top and the bottom R&D
portfolio captures at least, and as closely to, 10% of overall market capitalization as possible. This
leaves us with an intermediate range of stocks comprising approximately 80% of overall stock
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market capitalization, which we either evenly distribute across the remaining eight portfolios or
consolidate in a portfolio that we denote as “Middle.” Table C.1 in the appendix gives a flavor of
the industry composition of these portfolios. Our results are consistent with prior studies in the
literature. We proceed analogously in case of quintile portfolios. In Table C.2 in the appendix, we
show that our main results also hold when we choose the extreme portfolios to consist of either the
top or bottom 20% of firms.
We form these portfolios once for each year based on the previous year’s R&D intensity and
record both the equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) return performance for the subse-
quent year. More specifically, letting indices i, j, and t represent portfolio i, stock j, and calendar
year t, respectively, we reassess the weights of each portfolio at the quarterly frequency. As a re-
sult, equal-weighted returns are constructed using the weighting scheme wj,i,t = 1/Ni,t, whereNi,t




for h = 0, 1, 2, 3, where Vj,i,t is the market capitalization of firm j
in portfolio i in period t.
Summary statistics of our extreme portfolios are reported in Table 3.1. Consistent with prior
findings, our R&D-intensive firms feature higher average excess returns, lower financial leverage,
and lower sales-to-assets ratios than low-R&D-intensity firms. In the appendix, Table C.3, we
report the corresponding results when we restrict our sample to firms with positive R&D, as often
customary in empirical work on firm-level innovation (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001).
In this case, our results arguably are even stronger, as the excess return spread on innovative firms
almost doubles. Similarly, as shown in Table C.4, our results are equally strong when we form
portfolios based on number of firms instead of market capitalization.
In our time series analysis, we use aggregate market returns from Kenneth French’s website.
For robustness, we also use the aggregate price-dividend ratio, obtained from Robert Shillers web-
site, as well as market volatility. Quarterly market volatility is defined as the sum of squared
monthly returns for a given quarter.
Our quarterly macroeconomic data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. All mea-
sures are seasonally adjusted. In what follows, we refer to the quarterly ratio of US debt relative
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TABLE 3.1: Portfolio summary statistics
The table shows summary statistics for two R&D-sorted portfolios and the implied HML-R&D
portfolio. Returns are equal-weighted and presented in annualized percentages. The average mar-
ket capital share, R&D/assets, sales/assets, and leverage are presented in percentages. R&D/assets
is defined as annual research & development expenses divided by total assets and is used as our
benchmark measure of R&D intensity. Our two extreme portfolios cover at least 10% of market
capitalization. Sales/assets is defined as annual net sales divided by total assets. Book leverage is
defined as 1 – tot. equity/tot. assets. Our quarterly sample starts in 1975:Q1 and ends in 2013:Q4.
Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Low High HML-R&D
Portfolio returns
Mean 22.07∗∗∗ 29.90∗∗∗ 7.84∗∗
(3.53) (4.43) (2.89)
Standard deviation 24.38 30.61 19.99
Sample size (number of quarters) 156 156 156
Portfolio characteristics
Market capital share 10.06 11.19 21.25
R&D/Assets 0.14 85.80 42.96
Sales/Assets 3.11 0.13 1.62
Leverage 62 45 53
Average number of firms 586 632
to lagged GDP, as DGDP (DGDPt = Debtt/GDPt−1). GDP is real gross domestic product per
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, Series ID: GDPC96), and DGDP serves as our main
empirical measure for government’s indebtedness. Our timing convention isolates innovations to
debt from contemporaneous shocks to output that might drive a mechanical contemporaneous link
between the debt-to-GDP ratio and risk premiums. A similar specification has been used in Barro
and Redlick (2011).
Fig. 3.1 gives a graphical account of the evolution of DGDP over a long sample starting in
1790. ClearlyDGDP has undergone long swings over time, peaking after World War II and reach-
ing similarly elevated levels again after the recent great recession. In line with this observation,
we find a high annual autocorrelation of 0.98. The postwar mean of DGDP is around 60% with a
standard deviation of around 18%. Additional statistics for the other macroeconomic variables are
discussed in section 3.4, where we assess the quantitative predictions of our model (see Table 3.7).
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FIG. 3.1. US annual DGDP. The figure shows the ratio between public debt and lagged GDP
(DGDP ) in the US from 1790–2013. The first autocorrelation of this variable is denoted as
ACF (1) and reported in the top left box. In the subsample 1975–2013, the autocorrelation is
0.99.
3.2.2 Time-series asset pricing tests
Our motivating empirical evidence comes from standard predictive regressions of the form
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return on a particular port-
folio.
3.2.2.1 Market
We start by noting that, consistent with the concurrent findings of Bai (2016) and Liu (2016),
government debt predicts aggregate market returns significantly with a positive sign. For example,
when we take Rt→t+J to be the excess return on the market portfolio, we find β4DGDP and β
8
DGDP
to be 0.24 and 0.40, with standard errors of 0.08 and 0.12, respectively. We also find that these pre-
dictability results hold at shorter horizons, but they are statistically weaker. This finding suggests
that times of high government indebtedness correspond to times of high aggregate risk premiums
and are thus viewed as bad states of the world from the perspective of investors.
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3.2.2.2 HML-R&D
Given our interest in links between government debt and innovation, we now turn to predictive
return regressions for our cross section of portfolios sorted on firms’ innovation intensity. We start
by examining our extreme portfolios, namely the bottom ten (Low-R&D) and top ten (High-R&D)
portfolios, and a portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-
R&D). Table 3.2 shows our results for both equal- (upper panel) and value-weighted (lower panel)
returns.
Intriguingly, DGDP is not only an important predictor for market excess returns but also for
the cost of capital of innovation-intensive firms. Indeed we find that high levels of government
debt also forecast higher expected returns for our HML-R&D portfolio. In other words, the cost
of capital for innovative firms is especially sensitive to rises in government debt. These findings
are robust across all forecast horizons for value-weighted returns and become more significant for
longer horizons in the case of equal-weighted returns.
In Appendix A, we report many detailed robustness checks that suggest that our baseline em-
pirical results hold in many other settings and can be interpreted as conservative. In particular, our
results are robust to varying the number of lags in the Newey-West adjusted standard errors (Table
C.5) and to the inclusion of further predictive variables in a multivariate setting (see our discussion
of table C.6).1 In particular, our results are robust to inclusion of standard predictors such as the
price-dividend ratio, market volatility, and the collective predictive power of a host of variables in
the panel of Welch and Goyal (2008). Thus, we hereby identify DGDP as a distinct predictor that
is meaningful both statistically and economically.
3.2.2.3 Robustness checks
In addition, we note that previous work has uncovered strong links between returns on R&D
sorted portfolios and firms’ financing constraints (Li 2011). To account for the possibility that our
results are driven by the presence of financial constraints, we follow Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)
and adjust our returns for commonly used indices for financial constraints, such as the KZ index
1In the baseline case, we set the number of lags to four.
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TABLE 3.2: DGDP and predictability of returns to innovation
The table shows results from the following predictive regression:
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return, and DGDP denotes
the debt-to-output ratio. We report results for our bottom ten (Low-R&D) and top ten (High-R&D)
portfolios, and a portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-
R&D). In the top (bottom) panel, returns are equal-weighted (value-weighted). Innovation intensity
is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Our quarterly sample is 1975:Q1–
2013:Q4. Estimated coefficients have been adjusted with the Stambaugh bias correction. Bootstrap
standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20
Equal-weighted
Low-R&D 0.11∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.83
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.58)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08
High-R&D 0.16∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.93)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.39
HML-R&D 0.05 0.09 0.21∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.61)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.43
Value-weighted
Low-R&D 0.10∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.66
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.81)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01
High-R&D 0.22∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) (1.30)
R2 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.30 0.36
HML-R&D 0.12∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.85)
R2 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.48
Market
Market 0.07∗ 0.12∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.32
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.78)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
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(Kaplan and Zingales 1997) and the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce 2010), as well as leverage. In
Table C.7, we show that our predictability results are robust to those adjustments as well.
In Table C.8, we use the growth rate of the debt-to-output ratio, ∆DGDP , as a return predictor
and show that it does not have predictive power for the HML-R&D portfolio and market excess
returns. This is in line with the predictions of the model that we develop in the next section in which
risk premiums are driven by the level of government debt-to-output. Given the high persistence
of DGDP in the data, we assess the potential for spurious inference in our predictive regressions
by performing a Monte Carlo analysis with simulated data under the null of no predictability. As
shown in Appendix C.3.6, we fail to reject this null hypothesis.
In our baseline regressions, we consider all firms, including those that do not report any R&D
expenditures. When we restrict our samples to positive R&D firms, our predictability results con-
tinue to be significant, regardless of whether we use equal-weighted returns (see Tables C.9 and
C.10) or value-weighted returns (see Tables C.11 and C.12).
For robustness, we also form equally weighted portfolios and compute their returns assuming
that no further rebalancing of the holdings takes place for the next four quarters. For the sake of
completeness, we consider both the case in which dividends are reinvested and the case in which
dividends are not reinvested. The latter case corresponds to keeping fixed the number of shares
in our portfolios throughout the year. In Table C.13 of the appendix, we show that our main
predictability results hold also in these settings over the two-year and five-year horizons.
3.2.2.4 Entire cross section
After illustrating our stark results based on the HML-R&D portfolio, we now show that our
findings extend to the entire cross-section of R&D sorted portfolios. To keep the inference sharp,
rather than showing predictive regressions for each portfolio separately, we implement a parsimo-
nious parameteric procedure that allows to jointly estimate the dependence of expected returns on
DGDP across all portfolios and horizons. More specifically, for both decile and quintile portfo-
lios, we decompose the coefficient βJDGDP defined in the following regressions,
Ri,t→t+J = βi,0 + β
J
i,DGDPDGDPt + εi,t+J , (3.1)
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as follows
βJi,DGDP = β(J)[1 + γ(rdi − r̄d)], (3.2)
where rdi is the time-series average of the R&D intensity of portfolio i, r̄d is the overall av-
erage of R&D intensity, and β(J) is a horizon-specific coefficient. We then jointly estimate
θ = (β(1), β(2), β(4), β(8), β(20), γ) in a GMM setting with the appropriate orthogonality re-
strictions implied by Eq. (3.1). This procedure allows us to decompose the predictive power of
DGDP into a horizon specific component, β(J), and a cross-sectional R&D-sensitive compo-
nent, γ. This approach easily accommodates additional predictive variables beyond DGDP in a
multivariate setting (see Appendix C.3.1 for additional econometric details).
We report our results in Table 3.3 for both decile and quintile portfolios, equal- and value-
weighted returns, with and without additional controls. We find that the β(J) coefficients are all
highly statistically significant and increasing with horizon. Moreover, the coefficient γ, which
governs the extent of predictability across portfolios with different R&D intensity, is estimated to
be highly significant and positive in all specifications. This outcome reinforces the observation that
portfolios with higher R&D intensity are more sensitive to movements in DGDP .
Fig. 3.2 illustrates these patterns graphically. It displays the horizon specific βDGDP across
R&D intensity sorted portfolios, from simple unrestricted predictive regressions (dashed lines) as
well as from the parameterized approach (solid lines) for the univariate approach. We note that
the parameterized and the unrestricted estimates are rather close, thereby validating our procedure.
Moreover, the figure clearly shows that the predictive coefficients are monotonically increasing in
the portfolios R&D intensities for any given horizons.
To summarize, our asset pricing tests show that innovative firms earn a time-varying premium
that rises with government indebtedness. In other words, the cost of capital for innovative firms in-
creases with government debt and more so for more innovative firms. To the extent that innovative
firms are engines of growth, rises in government debt can have implications for the real economy
through its impact on their cost of capital. We examine this intuition in the next section.
83
TABLE 3.3: DGDP and parameterized regressions
We report our estimates for the parameters reported in Eq. (3.1)–(3.2). Our quarterly sample
is 1975:Q1–2013:Q4. “Benchmark portfolios” refers to our decile portfolios. “Five portfolios”
refers to our quintile portfolios. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. In our
multivariate regressions, we control for both the aggregate price-dividends ratio and integrated
market volatility. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Benchmark portfolios Five portfolios
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW
γ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
β(1) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
β(2) 0.2∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
β(4) 0.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06)
β(8) 0.61∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08)
β(20) 1.64∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15)
3.2.3 Government debt, R&D, and growth
In this section, we provide evidence on the effects of government debt on real economic activity
both in the cross section of R&D intensity-sorted firms and in the aggregate.
3.2.3.1 DGDP and investment
We note that in the context of the endogenous growth model that we use in the next section,
medium-term growth is linked to short-horizon fluctuations in investment expenditure. In this class
of models, short-run fluctuations in innovation-oriented investments produce permanent effects on
production levels and very long-lasting swings in future measured total factor productivity (TFP )
growth (see, among others, Comin and Gertler 2006). Given this consideration, we link quarterly
and semi-annual innovations to DGDP to the corresponding changes to the I/R&D ratio, where
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FIG. 3.2. Fitted parameterized DGDP coefficients. This figure shows fitted βJi,DGDP coefficients
as defined in Eq. (3.1) for our decile portfolios. The dashed lines refer to unrestricted OLS co-
efficients (see Table 3.2). The solid lines indicate the estimates implied by the paramtetric form
defined in Eq. (3.2) (see Table 3.3).
we use I to denote fixed tangible investment.2 Specifically, we link DGDP growth to investment
growth, R&D growth, as well as the difference between investment and R&D growth. We work
with the changes of these variables, as opposed to their levels, to address potential concerns about
spurious regression results. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the equilibrium model
that we develop in section 3.3.
We present our main results in Table 3.4. A novelty of our analysis is that it exploits variations
at both the aggregate level (Panel A) and among firms grouped in portfolios according to their R&D
intensity (Panel B). At a firm level, we use capital expenditure data from Compustat to measure
physical investment. We do the same with R&D expenditures. All series are deflated using the
GDP deflator.
Our first result is that an increase in government debt is associated with a decline in firms’
2Real fixed tangible investment is derived from nominal gross private domestic investment (BEA account code
A006RC1) less R&D expenditures (BEA account code Y694RC1Q027SBEA) and is deflated using the GDP deflator.
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investment both in R&D and in fixed assets. This obtains both at the aggregate (Panel A) and at the
firm (Panel B) level, and with and without accounting for common controls. Critically, the drop
in aggregate R&D investment dominates the reduction in aggregate capital expenditure (Panel A,
rightmost columns).3
Micro-data provide more details on the source of the reallocation (Panel B). Specifically, given
that in our baseline specification we include firms with no R&D expenditures, the reallocation nat-
urally goes in the opposite direction for low-R&D firms. Firms with high-R&D intensity instead
promote a strong reallocation away from R&D when DGDP increases. The corresponding sig-
nificantly positive coefficient θADGDP for ∆I − ∆R&D is central to our analysis. Indeed, in the
theoretical part of this manuscript we show that this reallocation channel can explain the empirical
link between HML-R&D and DGDP .



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We note that our aggregate results do not hold only in a univariate setting but also obtain
after controlling for productivity and government expenditure changes, i.e., two key exogenous
variables in the context of the model that we introduce in the next section.4 Through the lens
of our model, an adjustment in DGDP uncorrelated to productivity and government expenditure
news can be interpreted as a pure shock to public financing, i.e., to the mix of taxation and deficits.
When working with firm data aggregated to a portfolio level, we also control for measured Tobin’s
Q, a standard proxy for growth opportunities, as well as profitability. Equivalently, our channel is
economically and statistically relevant, even after we account for key firm characteristics used to
predict investment growth.
3.2.3.2 DGDP and growth
It takes time for R&D investment to generate innovation and to be reflected in observable
productivity and GDP growth. For this reason, to assess the impact of government debt on future
growth, we focus on forecasting both measured TFP and output growth over longer horizons and
report the results in Table 3.5. We detail our construction of measured TFP in Appendix C.3.2.5
In Panel A, we report our findings from simple univariate regressions. Across all possible
horizons, the debt-to-GDP ratio forecasts both output and TFP growth with a negative coefficient.
These coefficients are statistically significant starting from a six-month horizon and become highly
statistically significant at horizons from two to five years. While the significance is appealing, the
R2s of these specifications is low. This result should not be surprising, given that strong adverse
effects of government debt and fiscal variables on aggregate growth have been hard to identify in
the data (see, for example, Easterly and Rebelo 1993, or Jaimovich and Rebelo 2017 for a recent
discussion). The next panels of Table 3.5 present novel empirical evidence of the existence of a
negative link between government debt and growth through a risk-based mechanism.
In Panels B and C, we link future growth rates to movements in the expected cost of capital
specific to R&D-intensive firms, as measured by our forecasts of HLM-R&D. Since this portfolio
4To avoid endogeneity issues, our control is quarterly utilization-adjusted productivity as in Fernald (2012).
5Measured TFP is obtained as the Solow residual of the aggregate production function of our model; see Eq. (3.24).
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TABLE 3.5: DGDP and growth predictability





1 ·DGDPt + wt+J ,
where Y is either ∆GDP or ∆TFP , and where ∆Yt→t+J denotes J-period cumulative variable










+ cJ2 · ε̂t+J + vt+J ,






DGDP ·DGDPt + βJPD · PDt + βJMV ·MVt + εt+J .
Portfolios are formed based on innovation intensity, measured as R&D investment expenses di-
vided by total value of assets. Our quarterly sample is 1975:Q1–2013:Q4. Newey-West (1987)
standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Depend. Var. Horizon J 1 2 4 8 20
Panel A: Growth forecasts based on DGDP
∆GDP (dj1) −0.006 −0.011∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.039)
R2 0.018 0.025 0.034 0.042 0.055
∆TFP (dj1) −0.004 −0.007∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.029)
R2 0.012 0.020 0.028 0.033 0.061
Panel B: Growth forecasts based on HML-R&D (equal-weighted)
∆GDP (cj1) −0.026 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.037) (0.077) (0.034) (0.213) (0.041)
R2 0.029 0.045 0.086 0.099 0.042
∆TFP (cj1) −0.022 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
R2 0.033 0.057 0.102 0.144 0.148
Panel C: Growth forecasts based on HML-R&D (value-weighted)
∆GDP (cj1) 0.010 −0.002 −0.041∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ 0.006
(0.006) (0.000) (0.140) (0.081) (0.002)
R2 0.003 0.005 0.091 0.045 0.052
∆TFP (cj1) 0.007 0.001 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
R2 0.008 0.003 0.061 0.048 0.029
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has a short position in low-innovation stocks, the cost of capital of firms that are essentially out
of the R&D segment of the economy is not included. Intuitively, it is natural to expect that the
movements in the cost of capital of R&D-intensive firms are reflected in investment decisions,
especially regarding R&D. When investment and innovation shape aggregate growth, variations in
the cost of capital affect growth dynamics. Indeed, Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012) formally
demonstrate that in stochastic models in which growth is endogenously driven by investment in
R&D, there exists a negative link between growth and cost of capital. Panels B and C provide
empirical evidence supportive of this theoretical prediction.
These results are significant at medium and longer horizons. Furthermore, our findings hold
regardless of whether we use equal-weighted or value-weighted results. Using forecasts of equal-
weighted HML-R&D returns leads to substantial gains in explanatory power, especially for mea-
sured TFP.6 These gains corroborate the relevance of our risk-based mechanism.
These patterns linking debt, innovation, and risk premiums motivate us to develop a formal
R&D-based production economy model to link fiscal policy risks and growth and provide a struc-
tural interpretation of our empirical results.
3.3 An asset-pricing model with public debt and innovation
We link public debt and innovation by developing a stochastic endogenous growth model in
which a government finances exogenous expenditures by issuing public debt and taxing firms. Our
baseline framework adds fiscal policy rules in the spirit of Croce et al. 2012 to a stochastic model
of endogenous growth with recursive preferences proposed by Kung and Schmid (2015).
In the model, sustained growth arises endogenously through the accumulation of patented in-
termediate goods (henceforth patents) that facilitate the production of a final consumption good.
New patents are created through innovation requiring investment in research and development and
can be stored. In this model, therefore, patents represent an endogenous stock of intangible capital.
The model also features physical capital and can be used to study a cross section of returns sorted
according to R&D intensity.
6We thank an anonymous referee suggesting this specification.
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We start by introducing the government’s fiscal stance. We proceed by describing in detail the
production sector and the innovation process in our economy, after which we present the household
sector and define the general equilibrium.
3.3.1 Government









gyt = (1− ρG)gy + ρGgyt−1 + εG,t, εG,t ∼ N(0, σ2G). (3.4)
This specification ensures that Gt ∈ (0, GDPt) for all date t, and it enables us to replicate key fea-
tures of the expenditure-to-output ratio observed in the US data. In most of our analysis, we focus
only on the expenditure component of total public liabilities and abstract away from entitlements.
GDPt arises endogenously from the production process, and we describe its components in detail
below.
We assume that the government can finance these expenditures by raising public debt or by
levying distortionary profit taxes on corporations, at a possibly time-varying rate τt. When doing
so, the government is subject to the following budget constraint:
Bt = (1 + rf,t−1)Bt−1 +Gt − Tt, (3.5)
where Tt = τt · tax baset denotes its total tax income. We specify the components of the tax base
below.
The government’s fiscal stance accommodates taxation and deficit financing through simple,
implementable, and plausible fiscal rules, in the spirit of Favero and Monacelli (2005), Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007), Bi and Leeper (2010), and Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010). In this
paper, we focus on a tax rule that allows for tax smoothing and lets the government adjust its fiscal
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stance according to prevailing macroeconomic conditions. We focus on two aspects of tax smooth-
ing, namely the persistence and intensity of swings in the tax rate. We specify the government’s




= (1− ρB)µB + ρB
Bt−1
GDPt−1
+ εBt , (3.6)
εBt = Aωεω,t + AGεG,t + Aφεφ,t, (3.7)
where Aω, AG, and Aφ are constant parameters that determine both the intensity and cyclicality of
the government response to shocks; εω,t is a productivity shock; and εφ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1) is a pure
policy shock. In what follows, we show that policy shocks are relevant in bringing the model closer
to the data. The parameter µB captures the long-run level of debt, and ρB ∈ (0, 1) is a measure
of the speed of repayment of debt: the higher the value of ρB, the slower the repayment of debt
relative to output.
This parsimonious specification has two main advantages. First, the condition ρB < 1 guaran-
tees that the debt-output ratio remains stationary, consistent with the evidence in Bohn (1998). In
the language of Bi and Leeper (2010), our rule in Eq. (3.6) anchors expectations about future debt
and rules out unstable paths. Second, this specification replicates key empirical properties of the
US debt-output ratio.
3.3.2 Production
The production process involves three sectors. The final consumption good is produced in
a competitive sector, namely the final goods sector, using physical capital, labor, and patents.
Stationary shocks drive stochastic fluctuations in the production of the final consumption good.
Patents are produced in the intangible sector, where firms have monopoly power. New patents
are created by means of innovation through R&D in the competitive innovation sector, which
determine the speed of growth.
Regarding taxation, we assume that profits in both the final goods sector and the intangible
sector are taxed at the rate τt. In this setup, taxes distort firms’ investment and innovation decisions,
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and hence the rate and the dynamics of growth.
3.3.2.1 Final goods sector
There is a representative firm that uses capital Kt, labor Lt, and a composite of patents Γt to













and Xi,t is the quantity of patents i ∈ [0, Nt]. Nt is the measure of patents in use at date t, α is the
physical capital share, ξ is the intangible capital share, and the elasticity of substitution between
patents is 1
1−ν with ν < 1. We interpret Nt as the stock of intangible capital.
We introduce uncertainty into the model by means of an exogenous stochastic process Ωt af-
fecting the level of output. Importantly, we assume that Ωt follows a stationary Markov process
by specifying that Ωt = eat , and at = ρat−1 + εω,t, with εω,t ∼ N(0, σ2) and ρ < 1. Because the
forcing process is stationary, sustained growth arises endogenously from the development of new
patents. We describe how new patents are developed by means of innovation below.










where the firm’s dividends are








Here, Mt is the stochastic discount factor, It is investment in physical capital, Wt is the wage
rate, and Pi,t is the price per unit of patent i at time t. Prices Pi,t are set by patent producers in
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the intangible sector, while the stochastic discount factor and the wage rate are determined in the
general equilibrium and are all taken as given by the final goods firm. The final goods firm’s profits
are taxed at the rate τt.
In line with the literature on production-based asset pricing, we assume that investment is
subject to convex capital adjustment costs, so the physical capital stock evolves as






Here, δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital and Λ(·) the capital adjustment cost function. We











+ α2, where 11−ζ represents the elasticity
of the investment rate with respect to Tobin’s Q. The parameters α1 and α2 are set so that there are
no adjustment costs in the deterministic steady state.
3.3.2.2 Intangible sector
Patents are produced in the intangible sector. Patent producers have monopoly power. Given
the demand schedules set by the final good firm, monopolists producing the patents set the prices
Pi,t to maximize their after-tax profits (1− τt)Πi,t. Patent producers transform one unit of the final
good into one unit of their patent. This fixes the marginal cost of producing one patent at unity.
Further, production is “roundabout” in that monopolists take final goods production as given, as
they are tiny themselves.
Thus, monopolists solve the following static profit-maximization problem each period:
max
Pi,t
(1− τt)Πi,t ≡ max
Pi,t
(1− τt)(Pi,t ·Xi,t(Pi,t)−Xi,t(Pi,t)).
The value Vi,t of owning exclusive rights to produce patent i is equal to the present discounted
value of the current and future monopoly net profits,
Vi,t = (1− τt)Πi,t + (1− φ)Et[Mt+1Vi,t+1], (3.12)
where φ is the probability that a patent becomes obsolete. This asset price is important in our
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model, as it provides the payoff for creating new patents by means of innovation. Indeed, thanks
to monopoly power, the associated profits provide the rents required to support innovation.
3.3.2.3 Innovation sector
Innovators develop new patents used in the production of final output. They do so by conduct-
ing research and development, using the final good as input at unit cost. These newly developed
patents can be sold to patent producers. Assuming that this market is competitive, the price of a
new patent will equal its value to the patent producer, namely Vi,t.
We link the evolution of the intangible capital stock Nt, to innovation as follows:
Nt+1 = ϑtSt + (1− φ)Nt, (3.13)
where St denotes R&D expenditures (in terms of the final good), and ϑt represents the productivity
of the R&D sector that is taken as exogenous by the R&D sector. In the spirit of Comin and Gertler







where χ > 0 is a scale parameter, and η ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity of new patents with respect to
R&D. This specification captures the notion that concepts already discovered make it easier to
come up with new ideas, ∂ϑ/∂N > 0, and that R&D investment has decreasing marginal returns,
∂ϑ/∂S < 0.7
3.3.3 Household












7Similarly, this congestion externality can be thought of as giving rise to adjustment costs to investment in intangi-
ble capital, that is, R&D. We will later see that the optimality condition for R&D is 1ϑt = Et[Mt+1Vt+1]. Absent the
congestion externality, this becomes 1 = Et[Mt+1Vt+1], a result analogous to q-theory, in which case the absence of
adjustment cost fixes marginal Q at unity.
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where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ψ ≡ 1
1−θ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. When ψ 6= 1
γ
, the agent cares about news regarding long-run growth prospects. We
assume that ψ > 1
γ
so that the agent has a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and dislikes
shocks to long-run expected growth rates.
The household maximizes utility by participating in financial markets and by supplying labor.
Specifically, the household can take positions Zt in the stock market, which pays an aggregate div-
idendDt, and positionsBt in the bond market. Accordingly, the budget constraint of the household
becomes
Ct +QtZt+1 +Bt+1 = WtLt + (Qt +Dt)Zt + (1 + rf,t)Bt,
whereQt is the stock price, rf,t is the risk-free rate, Wt is the wage, and Lt denotes hours worked.
We assume that stocks are claims to all the production sectors, namely the final goods sector,
the intangible sector, and the R&D sector. Accordingly, we define the aggregate dividend as the
net payout from all production sectors:
Dt = Dt +
∫ Nt
0
(1− τt)Πi,t di− St. (3.16)
3.3.4 Equilibrium and asset prices
An equilibrium is a set of sequences of prices and quantities such that (i) quantities solve
producers’ and the household’s optimization problems, and (ii) prices are such that the markets
clear. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all patent producers are identical. In the
following, we describe the most important equilibrium conditions.
The final good firm’s optimality conditions are mostly standard. Denoting by qt = 1Λ′t the














1 = Et [Mt+1Rt+1] .
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where it takes the price Pi,t as given. The latter is set by the monopolistically competitive producer
of patent i. In a symmetric equilibrium, the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically competitive
characterization of the intangible sector implies




That is, each patent producer charges a markup 1
ν
> 1 over unit marginal cost, so profits are



















. Profits are thus procyclical.
Discounted future profits on patents are the payoff for innovation, so that, since the R&D sector
is competitive, the optimality condition for R&D investment becomes
Et[Mt+1Vt+1](Nt+1 − (1− φ)Nt) = St, (3.20)




This condition is crucial in this model, as it sets the equilibrium amount of R&D investment and
ultimately determines the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. Importantly, R&D investment
inherits the procyclicality of profits.
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where the second term involves continuation utilities and captures concerns about long-run growth
prospects. Optimality implies the following asset pricing conditions:




In equilibrium, the representative agent holds the entire supply of both bonds and equities. The
latter is normalized to be one, that is, Zt = 1 ∀t.
Finally, since the agent has no disutility for labor, she will supply her entire endowment, which
we normalize to unity.
3.3.4.1 Resource constraint
Final output is used for consumption and investment in physical capital and is used as a factor
input in R&D, the production of patents, and government expenditures:
Yt = Ct + It +NtXt + St +Gt
= Ct + It +N
1− 1
ν
t Γt + St +Gt,
where the second equality exploits the optimality conditions, and the term N
1− 1
ν
t Γt captures the
costs of patent production. Given that ν < 1 reflects monopolistic competition, it follows that a
growing intangible capital stock increases the efficiency of patent production, since the costs fall
as Nt grows.
Given the resources used in the production of patents, in our economy measured GDPt is
obtained as follows:
GDPt ≡ Yt −NtXt. (3.23)
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Finally, the tax base is given by taxable profits in both final goods and intangible sectors, so that
tax baset = Yt −WtLt −Ntν−1Xt +NtΠt
= GDPt −WtLt.
3.3.4.2 Stock market and cross section
According to Eq. (3.22), the ex-dividend value of the stock market value,Qt, is the discounted
sum of future net payouts of all production sectors. In our symmetric equilibrium, we have
Dt = (1− τt) [GDPt −WtLt]− St − It.
The existence of two capital stocks, namely those of physical and intangible capital, gives rise
to a cross section of stock returns in our model. For empirical purposes, we associate the return
on tangible (intangible) capital, with the empirical returns of low-R&D (high-R&D) firms. In the
model, the return of intangible capital is
Rrdt =
Vt
Vt−1 − (1− τt)Πt
,
and that of physical capital is defined in Eq. (3.17). While clearly not unique, we view this mapping
as natural and economically meaningful.
3.3.5 Aggregate productivity growth and fiscal policy
The previous paragraphs have outlined a stochastic equilibrium model in which innovation
through firms’ R&D drives long-term growth rates. Let us briefly describe how, in the context of
the model, government debt and fiscal policy affect innovation and thus growth. Following Kung




1−ξ = 1, which
we impose in the following, the model is equivalent to a real business cycle model with a standard
neoclassical production function of the form Yt = ZtKαt L
1−α
t , where
Zt ≡ A(ΩtNt)1−α, (3.24)
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is an endogenous productivity process, with A ≡ (ξν)
ξ
(1−ξ) > 0. In other words, our model
can be seen as a real business cycle model in which productivity is endogenously driven by the
accumulation of intangible capital via innovation. Taxation thus directly affects growth and its
dynamics through its effects on the demand for intangible capital.
Two channels shape the accumulation of intangible capital. First, the final good firm’s de-










νXν−1i,t , depends positively on the capital stock, whose ac-
cumulation itself is affected by taxation. By slowing down capital accumulation, taxation also
depresses innovation and growth. Second, taxation affects the valuation of patents, as the value of
a patent is given by Vi,t = (1 − τt)Πt + (1 − φ)Et[Mt+1Vi,t+1]. Higher taxes thus depress patent
valuations, and this lowers the incentives to engage in innovation, as the value of patents is the
payoff for R&D.
To summarize, in our model with stochastic endogenous growth, higher taxes and the expec-
tation of an elevated tax burden going forward depress firms’ incentives to engage in innovation,
thereby curtailing growth prospects. Since tax rates in our model reflect both the government’s
expenditures and its indebtedness through its budget constraint, we expect the model to generate
predictions regarding the links between debt, growth, and innovation. We examine these predic-
tions quantitatively in the next section.
3.4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model and explore its predictions regarding key links between
debt, innovation, and stock returns in the cross section and the time series. In particular, we show
that the model predicts a reallocation effect across the R&D and non-R&D sectors that is sensitive
to the level of the debt-to-output ratio, which helps interpreting the time-varying HML-R&D spread
shown empirically.
3.4.1 Calibration
We report our baseline quarterly calibration in Table 3.6. The preference parameters are stan-
dard in the literature. The risk aversion (γ) is calibrated to ten in line with reasonable upper bounds
(see Mehra and Prescott 1985, among others). The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ψ) is set
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to 1.2, a choice consistent with the empirical results in the long-run risk literature. The household’s
subjective discount rate is chosen to target the average historical level of the risk-free rate.
In the R&D sector, we set the quarterly survival rate φ of a patent to 0.96, consistent with the
BEA annual depreciation rate for R&D capital of 16%. The elasticity of new intermediate goods
with respect to R&D (η) is set to the value reported in Croce et al. 2012. Furthermore, our choice
of η is within the range of panel and cross-sectional estimates from Griliches (1990). χ is a scale
parameter that is set to match an average annual consumption growth of 2.0%.
As shown in our empirical analysis, low-R&D firms command a lower risk premium than
R&D-intensive firms. To reproduce this fact, we set the elasticity of the adjustment cost function
(ζ) to 13.3. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (ν) is set to capture the fact
that the level of productivity in the final goods sector is increasing. The parameter α determines
the average income share of physical capital. The annualized depreciation rate of physical capital
(δ) is set to 8%.
We target specific moments in the US sample for the post-World War II period 1947:Q1–
2013:Q4. Specifically, we set the volatility of our productivity shocks to match an annual volatility
of consumption growth of about 2%. The persistence of productivity is chosen so as to have a
positive but small autocorrelation in consumption growth. In a similar spirit, the average level, the
volatility, and the persistence of the ratio of government expenditure to output are set to replicate
US quarterly data. Specifically, we transform the US measured government-output ratio according
to Eq. (3.3) and estimate Eq. (3.4), with the following results:
gyt = −1.32
(0.05)





Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Our parameter values are within our empirical confi-
dence intervals.
Turning our attention to the the fiscal policy rule, the average annual debt-to-output ratio is
set to 60%, as in the data.8 In the next section, we also consider a fiscal regime with an average
8The standard error of this estimate is very moderate, 1.51%.
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TABLE 3.6: Benchmark calibration
The table reports our benchmark quarterly calibration. In the bottom portion, we report results
from the following auxiliary regression:
DGDPt = a0 + a1DGDPt−1 + a2ε̂∆TFPt + a3ε̂G,t + ε
DGDP
t ,
where ε̂∆TFPt is the fitted residual from the regression ∆TFPt = b0 + b1∆TFPt−1 + ε∆TFPt , and
ε̂G,t is obtained by estimating Eq. (3.3)–(3.4). Our quarterly sample starts in 1975:Q1 and ends in
2013:Q4. In the model, TFP is measured as in Eq. (3.24).
Parameter Symbol Value
Preferences:
Subjective discount factor β 0.996
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 1.2
Relative risk aversion γ 10.0
Technology:
Labor income subshare α 0.42
Intangible capital income share ξ 0.47
Intangible capital congestion, scale parameter χ 0.45
Intangible capital congestion, elasticity η 0.83
Patent survival rate φ 0.96
Physical capital depreciation δ 0.02
Physical capital adjustment costs, elasticity ζ 13.30
Elasticity of substitution across goods ν−1 1.65
Exogenous processes:
Productivity shock, volatility σω 0.02
Productivity shock, persistence ρ 0.99
Average expenditure-output ratio 1/(1 + e−gy) 0.20
Expenditure shock, volatility σG 0.08
Expenditure shock, persistence ρG 0.98
Policy parameters:
Average quarterly debt-GDP ratio µB 2.40
Persistence of debt-GDP ρB 0.99
Policy response to productivity shock Aω −0.56
Policy response to expenditure shock AG 0.45
Policy response to policy shock Aφ 0.07
Model Data
µB/4 =60% µB/4 =30% Est. Std. err.
a2 −0.13 −0.13 −0.18∗ 0.10
a3 0.16 0.16 0.21
∗∗∗ 0.05
σ(εDGDPt ) 0.02 0.02 0.01
∗∗∗ 0.001
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debt-to-output ratio of 30%. The parameter ρB is set to mimic the well-known high persistence of
the debt-to-output ratio in the US.
The other parameters of the systematic part of our fiscal rule, Aφ and AG, are chosen so that
the government expands its debt financing in response to either negative technology or positive
government spending shocks. Thus, our government implements a countercyclical debt policy in
an attempt to attenuate the tax burden on corporations in downturns.
To have quantitative guidance on these parameters, we project innovations in the US debt-
output ratio on innovations to both TFP growth and government expenditure to output. In the
model, the correct counterpart of measured TFP is obtained by simulating Eq. (3.24). By running
our auxiliary regression in the model exactly as we do in the data, we mitigate concerns about
identification of pure exogenous fiscal shocks. As shown in the bottom portion of Table 3.6,
our calibration is consistent with our auxiliary regression, that is, it captures the right amount
of coutercyclicality.9
Since the standard deviation of the fiscal policy shocks is normalized to one, the parameter
Aφ determines the magnitude of the policy shocks, and it is set to replicate the volatility of the
debt-to-output ratio.
3.4.2 Findings
We start by evaluating the overall fit of the model in regard to stylized facts about economic
growth, cycles, and asset returns, and then we turn to a more detailed discussion of the cross-
sectional and time-series links between debt, innovation, and returns, motivated by our empirical
evidence.
3.4.2.1 Unconditional moments
In Table 3.7 we report basic moments from model simulations, both for quantities and for
returns. We show results from both our benchmark calibration and an alternative calibration in
which the average debt-to-output ratio is set to 30% and compare them to our empirical moments.
9We focus on the post-1975 sample for consistency with our analysis of Compustat data. This choice is not crucial
because the empirical estimates of this auxiliary regression are nearly unchanged when we consider also pre-1975
data.
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TABLE 3.7: Model summary statistics
The table shows annualized model statistics for the scenarios in which the debt-to-GDP ratio is on
average either 60% or 30%. Statistics are obtained from a long-sample simulation. The entries
for the data moments are based on aggregate data provided in the NIPA tables, for the sample
1947:Q1–2013:Q4. Quarterly consumption growth is constructed from real per capita nondurables
and services expenditure. Quarterly physical investment growth (∆I) is constructed from gross
fixed private domestic investment less R&D expenditures. R&D growth (∆S) is constructed from
quarterly R&D expenditures, as reported by the BEA. All investment series are deflated using
the GDP deflator. Government spending-to-GDP (Govt/GDP ) comprises current government
expenditures. GDP is real gross domestic product per the BEA (Series ID: GDPC96). DGDP is
constructed by dividing total public debt by lagged GDP. In the data, Rrd − R refers to the HML-
R&D portfolio return over the sample 1975:Q1–2013:Q4. In the model, we use the excess return
of the R&D sector over that of the physical capital sector in log units levered by a coefficient of
three. The corporate tax rate (τ ) is constructed as in McGrattan and Prescott (2005) by focusing on
nonfinancial corporations over the annual sample (1929–2013). θADGDP represents the estimated
coefficient from the aggregate predicted regression in Table 3.4. Means and standard deciations
have been multiplied by 100.
Model
Data SE 60% 30%
E[∆C] 2.08 0.20 1.95 2.06
ACF (∆C) 0.09 0.16 0.38 0.38
σ(∆C) 1.66 0.14 2.07 2.06
σ(∆I) 11.40 0.70 8.73 8.53
σ(∆S) 3.11 0.34 10.56 10.20
σ(∆GDP ) 1.92 0.14 2.63 2.62
E[Rrd −R] 7.84 3.20 3.32 2.67
σ(Rrd −R) 19.93 2.33 4.03 3.71
E[τ ] 31.95 1.40 35.44 35.98




0.15 0.07 0.05 0.02
Our model is broadly quantitatively consistent with basic patterns of real aggregates, such as
output, consumption, and investment, as well as innovation and endogenous growth. Consump-
tion is realistically smooth with low autocorrelation, implying that our model does not generate
an implausibly high variation in long-run growth, consistent with the data. As in the data, both
investment in R&D and physical capital are more volatile than output. These results are relevant,
because models with innovation-driven endogenous growth face additional challenges in matching
the average growth rate, above and beyond those in a standard real business cycle model.
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Through the government budget constraint, our calibration implies an average tax rate of 35%
and a volatility of about 17%, in line with the estimates in McGrattan and Prescott (2005) after we
include pre-World War II data.
Our model yields a realistic spread between the excess returns on intangible and tangible cap-
ital, that is, the counterpart of our HML-R&D return. As in the data, R&D-intensive firms earn a
positive premium relative to physical capital-intensive firms.
The last entry in Table 3.7 reports the regression coefficient, θADGDP , obtained from projecting
the relative change in investment versus R&D, ∆I − ∆R&D, on current DGDP , analogous to
the empirical specification in Table 3.5, Panel A. As in the data, we confirm that the model gives
rise to θADGDP > 0, indicating that while both aggregate investment and R&D decline upon rises in
DGDP , physical investment drops relatively less. In other words, our model generates a quantita-
tively relevant reallocation effect toward physical investment in response to increases in DGDP .
Furthermore, untabulated simulation results confirm that low (high) It/St episodes are associated
with high (low) expected market excess returns in the model. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence in Lin (2012).
3.4.2.2 Fiscal policy regimes
Inspection of the rightmost panel of Table 3.7 paves the way to interpreting our empirical results
through the lens of our model. Specifically, we explore the sensitivity of our results with respect
to a long-run annual debt-to-output level (µB/4) of 30%. We view this exercise as a comparison
of economies with different fiscal regimes due to different tolerance for long-run public debt.
Equivalently, we can see this counterfactual exercise as a way to assess the economic significance
of the link between public debt and growth.
When we consider the calibration in which average debt is 30% of output, the unconditional
average of HML-R&D decreases by 20%, i.e., 65 annual basis points. Not surprisingly, with a lower
cost of capital for R&D-intensive firms, there is more investment in innovation, and the growth rate
of GDP increases by 23 basis points, i.e., 12% in relative terms. In other words, higher steady state
debt comes with a relatively higher cost of capital for innovative firms and lower growth.
In the next section, we show that our results on the link between expected HML-R&D returns,
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growth, and different levels of steady-state government debt carry over to the timeseries, that is,
persistent increases in DGDP depress future expected growth, much as our empirical results sug-
gest.
3.4.3 Findings: debt and innovation returns
We now examine the evidence linkingDGDP , expected returns to innovative firms and growth,
uncovered in our initial empirical analysis, through the lens of our model. We start by verifying
that our model gives rise to similar timeseries patterns and then proceed to inspect the underlying
model mechanism, along with further empirical tests.
3.4.3.1 Quantifying predictability
Table 3.8 reports the results of predictive regressions of (i) future GDP growth rates (Panel
A) and (ii) future stock returns (Panel B) at various horizons on the current debt-to-GDP ratio.
Consistent with our time-series evidence, rises in DGDP forecast a slowdown in future growth,
accompanied with higher future expected stock returns. This holds both for the aggregate market
return as well as the return on HML-R&D, so the average cost of capital rises, and especially so for
innovative firms. Our model therefore produces endogenous predictability. Even though the extent
of predictability is not identical to that in the data, we consider our results significant, as (i) they
are obtained without assuming any exogenous time-varying volatility process, and (ii) they are not
too far from their empirical counterparts.
In unreported results, we point out that absent fiscal policy shocks, εφ, debt to output has half
of the volatility measured in our baseline model and accordingly, removing these shocks weakens
the quantitative predictability results.
In general, our predictable risk premiums could result from either endogenous time-varying
conditional volatility of the stochastic discount factor, or time-varying exposure of returns, or a
combination of the two. Figure 3.3 sheds light on the mechanism at work in the model. The left-
most panel verifies that expected excess returns on stock portfolios conditional on DGDP indeed
are increasing, as is the spread between high and low R&D portfolios. Moreover, conditional risk
premiums are approximately linear inDGDP , which implies that the overall sensitivity of the cost
of capital of different firms to DGDP , namely ∂Et(Rexi,t+1)/∂DGDPt, is roughly constant.
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TABLE 3.8: Predictive regressions: DGDP
Our quarterly data sample is from the period 1975:Q1–2013:Q4. In Panel B, all variables are stan-
dardized by their respective standard deviations. HML-R&D is measured using equal-weighted
returns from portfolios sorted on R&D-to-assets. We adopt the Stambaugh (1999) OLS bias cor-
rection method for βJDGDP in panel B. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. One,
two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Horizon J 1 2 4 8 20
Panel A: ∆GDPt→t+J = dJ0 + d
J
1 ·DGDPt + wt+J
Data dJ1 −0.003 −0.007 −0.015∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.032)
R2 0.006 0.009 0.014 0.023 0.070
Model dJ1 −0.017 −0.033 −0.065 −0.124 −0.279
R2 0.047 0.074 0.102 0.121 0.126
Panel B: Rt→t+J = β0 + βJDGDPDGDPt + εt+J
HML-R&D
Data βJDGDP 0.10
∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.13)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.43
Model βJDGDP 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.37
R2 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14
Market
Data βJDGDP 0.13
∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.22)
R2 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.35
Model βJDGDP 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Intriguingly, as the rightmost panel of figure 3.3 shows, the movements in conditional expected
returns are only marginally affected by changes in the conditional volatility of the SDF, as this
conditional volatility is roughly flat across DGDP levels. This suggests that our predictability
results are driven by time-varying exposure of returns to DGDP .
3.4.3.2 A conditional three-factor model representation.
The lack of significant heteroskedasticity in the SDF, shown in Fig. 3.3, suggests that the
reduced form of our model corresponds to a conditional three-factor model with nearly constant
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FIG. 3.3. Conditional risk premiums (annualized, %). The figure shows the unlevered conditional
excess returns of the Low-R&D and High-R&D from a long simulation of the model. Conditional
excess returns are sorted into deciles based on their corresponding DGDP and plotted. All pa-
rameters are calibrated as in Table 3.6.
market prices of risk and time-varying betas.10 Excess returns in our model can therefore be














βij,t ≈ β0ij + β1ij DGDPt,
where our J factors refer to government financing shocks, government spending-to-output shocks,
and productivity shocks. We let λj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the implied market prices of risk for our




Consistent with the model, the exposures of the returns to the underlying factors, βij,t, are
allowed to be timevarying. Clearly, conditional betas in the model are affected by DGDP , as
well as by productivity and government expenditures-to-output ratio. Quantitatively, the last two
exogenous state variables play a negligible role once we useDGDP . Hence we abstract away from
them for the sake of parsimony and without loss of generality. The linearity of the conditional risk
premiums with respect to DGDP depicted in the left panel of Fig. 3.3 suggests that conditional
betas are affine in DGDP .
According to the empirical model detailed in the system of Eq. (3.25), the overall sensitivity







is a composite of both the extent of timevariation of the betas, β1ij , and the market price of risk
associated with our factors, λj . The impulse responses of the SDF to negative realizations of our
fundamental shocks give us guidance on the model-implied sign of our three market prices of risk.
Fig. 3.4 shows the results. Consistent with intuition, the model predicts a positive price of risk
for productivity and negative ones for government expenditure and fiscal policy shocks. Indeed, a
sudden reduction in DGDP is a good state for households.
In this setting, movements in expected returns on HML-R&D have to be driven by differential











so a higher debt-to-output ratio increases the spread in the expected returns on intangible and
tangible capital, in line with the leftmost panel of Fig. 3.3.
Under our data-driven calibration, policy shocks, εφ,t, emerge as a critical driver of the condi-
tional exposure coefficients. Intuitively, our way to model political uncertainty in the government
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FIG. 3.4. SDF impulse responses to fundamental shocks. The figure shows the impulse response
of the SDF in our DSGE model with respect to negative shocks. Responses are in quarterly per-
centages and are conditional with respect to the model being in “high DGDP ” states and “low
DGDP ” states. We define ‘High DGDP ’ states as the top 5% ofDGDP values from a simulated
stationary distribution from the model after a burn-in of 100 periods. Equivalently, we define “low
DGDP ” states as the bottom 5% of DGDP values from the same stationary distribution. The
model is then shocked from the respective states (conditional on DGDP ), and impulse responses
are averaged over the respective DGDP bins. All parameters are calibrated as in Table 3.6.
budget process allows for sizeable variation in the debt-to-output ratio independent from produc-
tivity and expenditure shocks. In what follows, we show that fiscal policy shocks give rise to
endogenous tax uncertainty, to which tangible and intangible assets exhibit differential exposure
because of a reallocation motive.
3.4.3.3 Endogenous time-varying tax uncertainty
In Fig. 3.5, we depict the response of variables of interest with respect to a positive debt policy
shock, εφ > 0. This shock is useful to understand the mechanism behind our model because it is
a pure public financing shock that affects neither government expenditures nor R&D productiv-
ity. In the first panel on the left, we show two important features of the tax rate implied by the
government’s budget constraint in equilibrium. First, expansionary fiscal shocks increase tax rate
uncertainty, as measured by the conditional volatility of the tax rate going forward. Second, this
response is more pronounced when the debt-to-output ratio in the economy is above average.
Before proceeding, we confirm and gauge the magnitude of this effect in the data. Specifically,



































FIG. 3.5. Conditional tax risk, investment reallocation, and asset prices. The figure shows the
conditional average impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to εφ,t. σt(τt+1)
is the conditional volatility of the tax rate, I/S is the ratio of tangible capital investment to R&D
investment, and Q/V ex−div is the ex-dividend price ratio of tangible to intangible capital. The
impulse responses are conditional with respect to the model being in “high DGDP ” states and
“low DGDP ” states. We define “high DGDP ” states as the top 5% of DGDP values from
a simulated stationary distribution from the model after a burn-in of 100 periods. Equivalently,
we define “low DGDP ” states as the bottom 5% of DGDP values from the same stationary
distribution. The model is then shocked from the respective states (conditional on DGDP ), and













2 = ω + ατ (στt−1)
2 + βτ (ετt−1)
2.
In the data, we obtain the following results:
(στt )
2 − στ 2 = 0.006
(0.002)
·DGDPt−1 + εσ,τ ,
which are almost exactly replicated by simulated data:
(στt )
2 − στ 2 = 0.005 ·DGDPt−1 + εσ,τ .
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Thus, both in the data and in the model, rises of the debt-to-GDP ratio come with higher tax
uncertainty going forward. Further, the data support the notion that policy shocks are a relevant
driver of the time variation of tax volatility. More precisely, we find that in the data, fiscal policy






· (στt−1)2 + 0.006
(0.003)
· ε̂DGDPt−1 + εσ,τ ,
where ε̂DGDPt−1 is the fitted residuals from the regression
DGDPt = a0 + a1DGDPt−1 + a2 · gyt + a3TFPt + εDGDPt ,
used to calibrate the model. Hence, as in Croce et al. 2012, fiscal uncertainty is an endogenously
time-varying determinant of risk that becomes more relevant as the debt-to-output ratio increases.11
Given this observation, the results depicted in the left panel of figure 3.3 should not appear surpris-
ing: as the debt-to-output ratio increases, uncertainty increases as well, and all capital stocks must
pay a higher expected return.
3.4.3.4 Endogenous time-varying reallocation
The novel insight of our model points to the existence of an important reallocation channel, con-
sistent with that documented empirically in Table 3.4. As already noted previously in the literature
(see, for example, Bocola and Gornemann 2013, and Bianchi and Kung 2014), the present value
of monopoly rents is very sensitive to fundamental shocks. Consistent with the data (as shown,
for example, by Elsaify 2015), in our model, R&D intensive firms charge higher markups. As a
result, the innovation sector is more sensitive to debt policy shocks and is subject to more severe
fluctuations in investment. Equivalently, upon the arrival of an expansionary public debt shock, the
household cuts down total investment but simultaneously increases its share of investment in the
11In Appendix B, we reproduce the Croce et al. 2012 intuition for this result through a simple example that enables
us to have closed-form solutions. Intuitively, in production economies with random productivity, future tax rates are
uncertain because the government faces uncertainty on the future tax base. When debt to output is high, tax-base
uncertainty turns into more pronounced tax rate volatility.
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tangible capital stock (Fig. 3.5, middle panel). As a result, this reallocation aggravates the capital
loss for the R&D sector, whereas it works as a valuable hedge for firms that are tangible-capital
intensive (Fig. 3.5, rightmost panel).
Since this reallocation effect is more pronounced when the debt-to-output ratio is higher, the
hedging motive manifests itself as a more sizable spread across the exposure coefficients of our two
stocks exactly when debt is greater. Consistent with this intuition, the difference in the conditional




To quantify the role played by preferences, we solve our model under a configuration with
CRRA preferences by setting γ = 1/ψ = 10. This calibration confirms a positive link between
expected returns and the debt-to-output ratio, and it also predicts that intangible capital should be
more sensitive to the size of government debt than tangible capital. From a quantitative point of
view, this specification of the model is unsatisfactory. As shown in the middle panel of Fig. 3.3,
the implied spread in the expected excess returns across tangible and intangible capital is modest
and further from the data.
3.4.4.2 No government risks
To quantify the role of fiscal shocks, we solve our model under a calibration that differs from
that reported in Table 3.6 because we impose Aφ = σG = 0. Under this configuration, TFP shocks
are active, whereas all other exogenous fiscal risks are muted. We find that Et[HML − R&D]
declines to 1.45%, implying that in the model about 65% of the total HML-R&D premium is
driven by fiscal shocks. Not surprisingly, the unconditional growth rate increases as well, by about
eight basis points per year.
12A small part of this increase is also due to the larger volatility of the SDF (Fig. 3.3, rightmost panel). The
discount rate channel is expected in general equilibrium, as consumption inherits the time-varying volatility of the tax






becomes nearly null, meaning that the model fails to produce pre-
dictability. This result is consistent with our previous observation: since our exogenous R&D
productivity process does not produce any relevant reallocation motive, the conditional exposures
of our returns are constant with respect to productivity.
3.5 Cross-sectional asset pricing tests
In this section, we provide novel empirical evidence supporting the cross-sectional asset pricing
implications of our model shown in the previous section. These tests are important, as they provide
direct support for our risk-based mechanism underlying the links between government debt and
growth.
3.5.1 Conditional model with time-varying betas.
We estimate the pricing model detailed in the system of Eq. (3.25) in the data using our three
empirical macroeconomic factors, namely, the log difference of government spending to output
(∆GY ), utilization-adjusted productivity (∆TFP ), and debt to GDP ratio (∆DGDP ). We choose
changes in DGDP as empirical proxy for fiscal shocks to confirm that our results are broad and do
not depend on a specific choice of the fiscal policy rule. Untabulated results confirm that our main
findings continue to hold when we work with our filtered policy shocks, ε̂DGDPt , as opposed to
∆DGDP .
We expand our cross section of test assets to keep our inference sharp. Specifically, in addition
to the market and our cross section of R&D-intensity sorted portfolios, we consider the 25 portfo-
lios constructed by Fama and French (FF25) using size and book-to-market, and the entire market.
We also add SMB and HML to study the link between DGDP , size, and book-to-market. We
use GMM to estimate all coefficients simultaneously and report our main results in Table 3.9.13
We are interested in assessing the sensitivity of the cost of capital of different firms to move-
ments in DGDP , ∂Et(Rexi,t+1)/∂DGDPt, as specified in the model in Eq. (3.26). We report our
estimates in the top portion of Table 3.9 together with standard errors computed using the delta
13In an extension, we also expand the set of test assets to financial constraints-adjusted returns. We recover the
results from our baseline estimates. We report these in Table C.16 in the appendix. Across all cases, our GMM uses
only a constant as instrument.
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method. The estimates of the market price of risk are in the middle of the table, followed by the
results for the J-test associated with our GMM.
We have four observations. First of all, this cross-sectional estimation both confirms and sharp-
ens the results obtained through our predictability regressions. The variations that we obtain for
the market and HML-R&D are very similar to those obtained in Table 3.2 over a one-quarter hori-
zon. Furthermore, the adverse effect of public debt on the cost of capital is a very pervasive
phenomenon, as it is also present in the extreme FF25 portfolios.
Intriguingly, SMB and HML exhibit no significant sensitivity to DGDP. The relevance of this
outcome is twofold, as it suggests that (i) our results are not a mere restatement of size or book-to-
market effects, and (ii) our strategy of sorting firms according to their R&D intensity is essential
for the correct assessment of the impact of public debt on the cross section of equity returns.
Second, these results hold regardless of whether we use equal-weighted or value-weighted re-
turns for our R&D-sorted portfolios. We also conduct our estimation using a different measure of
R&D intensity to form our cross-section. Specifically, we sort firms according to their expendi-
tures in R&D relative to capital expenditure, as in Lin (2012), and we obtain very similar results
(see Table C.14). We find it reassuring that our results are robust to different ways of measuring
innovation intensity across firms. In the appendix, we show that our results also hold when we
focus only on positive-R&D firms (see Table C.15).
Third, the estimated signs of the market prices of risk of our three factors are consistent with
the predictions of our DSGE model about the responses of the SDF to our fundamental shocks
depicted in Fig. 3.4. Specifically, the SDF implied by the system of Eq. (3.25) can be written as
mt = m − bFt, in which b = −E(FF ′)−1λ, F comprises our three macroeconomic risk factors,
and λ is the vector of the market prices of risk.
In our data, the implied SDF loadings have an opposite sign with respect to our estimated
market prices of risk. As a result, both in the model and in the data, states with low productivity
are associated to high marginal utility. This is a very common result in production economies.
In contrast, government expenditure has a positive loading in the SDF. In our model, this is true
because government expenditure is wasteful. According to our estimates, shocks that produce
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lower levels of debt to output should decrease marginal utility. This holds in our model as well, as
unexpected reductions of debt result in lower future tax uncertainty and represent good news.
Finally, we note that including DGDP in our estimation reduces the mean absolute pricing
errors (MAE) by roughly 15% for value-weighted returns and 20% for equal-weighted returns. In
both cases, DGDP increases the cross-sectional R2 by about 50%. This observation corroborates
the relevance of accounting for DGDP in cross-sectional asset pricing tests.
3.6 Conclusion
We present novel empirical evidence that government debt, as measured by the debt-to-output
ratio, is a determinant of risk in stock markets. In the time series, the debt-to-output ratio signifi-
cantly predicts higher future aggregate stock returns at longer horizons, even when we control for
standard predictors such as price-dividend ratios and market volatility.
The sensitivity of expected returns to debt to output is higher for R&D intensive firms, implying
that their cost of equity increases more when public debt grows. Simultaneously, we find that high
levels of debt to output forecast both lower tangible and intangible investment, as well as lower
output growth over the medium term.
We interpret our empirical results in the context of an equilibrium production economy in which
endogenous innovation drives long-term growth. Corporate investment and innovation depend on
the fiscal policy stance of the government, which resorts to taxation to ensure a balanced budget
in the long run. Unexpected movements in the government’s debt policy give rise to endogenous
time-varying exposure to macroeconomic shocks priced in the cross-section of returns.
We find that agents require a premium increasing in debt to output in order to hold innovative
stocks as compensation for this time-varying exposure. We test this hypothesis in the cross-section
of equity returns and fail to reject it. High levels of public debt are then associated with slowdowns
in innovation and growth. Both the model and our empirical investigation thus highlight the role
of political and fiscal uncertainty in shaping future aggregate growth. Future work should assess
this link accounting for productive government expenditures, in the spirit of Belo and Yu (2013),
and consumption-enhancing expenditures, in the spirit of Dissanayake (2017). It is also important
to consider endogenous government expenditures, taxes, and debt.
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TABLE 3.9. Conditional macro factors model. The table shows results from our GMM estimation
of the conditional macro factor model detailed in the system of Eq. (3.25). Our macro factors con-
sist of changes to debt-to-output ratio (∆DGDP ), government spending to output (∆GY ), and




j λj, where λj
denotes the market price of risk for factor j. EW (VW) denotes equally-weighted (value-weighted)
returns. The set of test assets includes: our bottom-ten (low-R&D) and top-ten (high-R&D) port-
folios; our “middle” portfolio; a portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks and short in our low-R&D
stocks (HML-R&D); the Fama-French 25 size/book-market-sorted portfolios; the Fama-French
SMB and HML factors; and the full market portfolio. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in
parentheses. Data are from 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q4. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance













Small, low B/M 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Small, high B/M 0.16∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Big, low B/M 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)








Annual MAE 2.41 2.03
Annual MAE (excl. ∆DGDP ) 2.92 2.30
Cross sectional R2 0.47 0.57
Cross sectional R2 (excl. ∆DGDP ) 0.30 0.37
Equal-weighted Value-weighted
∆DGDP ∆TFP ∆GY ∆DGDP ∆TFP ∆GY
Price of risk, λ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
117
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 HHI Portfolio Analysis Details
We use institutional 13-F filings from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database.
This database provides ownership information of institutional investment managers with assets
under management of over $100 million in Section 13(f) securities.
Figure A.1 reports the number of institutional investors for our sample from 1980Q1 to 2014Q4.
We note that the number increases to 3750 in 2014Q4. The plot reaches its peak of 3813 institu-
tions in 2014Q2. During the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a decrease in the number of 13-F
institutions.
FIG. A.1: Quarterly Number of Institutional Investors
With respect to the aggregate dollar holdings appearing in Figure A.2, we observe several
substantial drops in the early 2000s. Quite naturally, this was the case during the global financial
crisis as well. In spite of these instances, the dollar amount held by the 13-F institutions increased
from $321 billion in 1980Q1 to $17.4 trillion in 2014Q4.
A.1.1 Portfolio Construction
The cross-section of stocks is sortable by ownership concentrationHet defined in equation (1.2).
The portfolio formulation strategy is implemented as follows:
(1) sort the securities by HHI in descending order,
(2) find the quintile cutoffs of HHI and correspondingly divide the securities into 5 portfolios,
(3) in a case where more than 20% of the securities have HHI = 1
• adjust by letting HHI* = HHI - e, where e ∼ Uniform(0, c),
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FIG. A.2: Quarterly Institutional Investment Manager Holdings
• c is defined as the difference between 1 and the next largest HHI value.
The 5 portfolios are rebalanced annually. We base the portfolio cutoffs on first quarter HHI values,
thus avoid omitting the securities that enter the filings mid-year. We present the HHI compositions
TABLE A.1: Portfolio HHI Summary Statistics
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.9617 0.6228 0.2830 0.1241 0.0465
Median 1 0.6699 0.2748 0.1171 0.0471
Std. Dev. 0.0510 0.1512 0.0535 0.0261 0.0067
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of HHI by portfolio. Portfolio 1 has the highest average HHI
and consists of stocks only held by a few institutions, whereas portfolio 5 has the lowest average HHI and
includes stocks with a wide owner base. Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
for each portfolio in Table A.1. Portfolio 1 has the highest HHI overall, and typically consists of
niche stocks with a sole holder. Portfolio 5, on the other hand, is mainly comprised of large-cap
stocks that are traded extensively.
A.1.2 HHI Decomposition
We decompose the portfolio HHI into a portion that can be attributed to the top 3/5/10 insti-
tutions and the rest of the shares. The mean values for this decomposition is presented in Table
A.2. The relationship HHI = HHI(k) + HHI(-k) holds for k = 3, 5, and 10. On average, the largest
institutions contribute more to the concentration in low-HHI portfolios.
The descriptive statistics of the 5 HHI portfolios are summarized in Table A.3 - recall that
portfolio 1 is high-HHI, held by a single institutional investor, portfolio 5 is low-HHI comprising
of stocks held by many.
A.1.3 Low-Minus-High (LMH) Portfolio Characteristics
The excess returns are presented in annualized percentages. The descriptive statistics of the
low minus high (LMH) HHI portfolios are summarized Table A.3. These are portfolios that are
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TABLE A.2: Portfolio HHI Decomposition
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.9617 0.6228 0.2830 0.1241 0.0465
HHI(3) 0.0403 0.0307 0.0193 0.0117 0.0067
HHI(-3) 0.9214 0.5921 0.2637 0.1125 0.0399
HHI(5) 0.0492 0.0373 0.0246 0.0153 0.0090
HHI(-5) 0.9125 0.5855 0.2584 0.1088 0.0375
HHI(10) 0.0818 0.0567 0.0377 0.0229 0.0128
HHI(-10) 0.8799 0.5661 0.2453 0.1012 0.0337
Notes: This table shows portfolio averages of HHI, HHI(k), and HHI(-k) for k = 3, 5, and 10. The expression
HHI(k) represents concentration attributed to top-k institution holdings, and HHI(-k) represents concentra-
tion resulting from holdings of all other institutional investors. Portfolio HHI is the sum of these two terms.
Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
long in high ownership breadth stocks and short stocks held by few institutional investors. The
excess returns are presented in annualized percentages. The LMH portfolios delivers on average
a 5.6% annualized excess return, significantly different than 0 at the 1% level. In addition, the
portfolio mean returns display a monotonically increasing return pattern, and we reject the null of
no monotonically increasing pattern (p-value of 1.5%) using the monotonicity test of Patton and
Timmermann (2010). It is also interesting that there is a monotonically decreasing pattern in the
higher moments of the returns. Volatility, skewness, and kurtosis are all monotonically decreasing
from high-HHI to low-HHI portfolios.
TABLE A.3: Annualized Portfolio Returns
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 Low-High (LMH)
Mean -2.5029 -2.3392 -1.3113 0.3528 3.0709 5.5738
Median -2.4784 -1.6840 -1.0845 1.1456 4.6916 7.7628
Std. Dev. 12.6901 8.1875 8.0360 8.0076 7.0789 11.0350
Skewness 2.8848 -0.5091 -0.5142 -0.5311 -0.6122 -5.9918
Kurtosis 24.7858 4.2225 4.1688 4.1508 3.7752 57.3298
25% Perc. -16.0652 -11.1071 -10.4773 -8.5039 -5.5814 -0.7477
75% Perc. 7.8166 7.6248 8.2365 10.9354 11.9620 14.2492
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of annualized portfolio returns in percentages. We report
values for the 5 HHI portfolios as well as the Low-Minus-High (LMH) portfolio. Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
We also calculate a liquidity-risk adjusted excess return (αi + εi,t) extracted from:
Ri,t = αi + βi × liqt + εi,t.
The results appear in the Table A.13. The LMH portfolio returns like quite similar to those reported
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in Table A.3.
TABLE A.4: Liquidity-Risk Adjusted Excess Returns
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 Low-High (LMH)
Mean -2.9739 -2.3017 -1.1975 0.5299 3.2579 6.2318
Median -3.9177 -1.6299 -0.9180 1.2071 4.8309 8.1603
Std. Dev. 12.6064 8.1577 8.0035 7.9703 7.0427 10.9098
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of annualized liquidity-adjusted portfolio returns in percent-
ages. We report values for the 5 HHI portfolios as well as the Low-Minus-High (LMH) portfolio. Quarterly
sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
A.1.4 Equally-Weighted Linear Factor Model Details
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TABLE A.5: Conditional Mean Linear Factor Models
Rm-Rf SMB HML LIQ PC-HHI
FF3 - GMM J-stat p-val 0.00
Betas
1 (High HHI) 0.220 *** 0.460 *** 0.189 *
(0.076) (0.106) (0.109)
2 0.298 *** 0.324 *** 0.057 ***
(0.023) (0.047) (0.019)
3 0.321 *** 0.314 *** 0.055 ***
(0.018) (0.040) (0.016)
4 0.349 *** 0.307 *** 0.064 ***
(0.012) (0.027) (0.009)
5 (Low HHI) 0.343 *** 0.204 *** 0.038 ***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
Price of Risk 0.070 ** -0.107 * 0.145
(0.029) (0.062) (0.114)
FF3+Liquidity - GMM J-stat p-val 0.00
Betas
1 (High HHI) 0.226 *** 0.459 *** 0.190 * 0.113
(0.086) (0.127) (0.108) (0.129)
2 0.280 *** 0.371 *** 0.048 ** 0.018
(0.022) (0.056) (0.022) (0.029)
3 0.314 *** 0.335 *** 0.052 *** 0.013
(0.016) (0.044) (0.015) (0.024)
4 0.366 *** 0.273 *** 0.072 *** 0.012
(0.012) (0.025) (0.011) (0.013)
5 (Low HHI) 0.363 *** 0.155 *** 0.047 *** 0.012 *
(0.006) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007)
Price of Risk 0.044 *** -0.049 ** -0.046 ** 0.134
(0.011) (0.024) (0.021) (0.085)
FF3+Liquidity+HHI - GMM J-stat p-val 0.00
Betas
1 (High HHI) 0.214 ** 0.488 *** 0.185 ** 0.104 0.001
(0.095) (0.157) (0.091) (0.124) (0.019)
2 0.298 *** 0.326 *** 0.053 ** 0.035 -0.002
(0.021) (0.053) (0.025) (0.037) (0.011)
3 0.329 *** 0.303 *** 0.056 *** 0.021 0.004
(0.016) (0.044) (0.017) (0.030) (0.008)
4 0.363 *** 0.276 *** 0.072 *** 0.011 -0.004
(0.012) (0.024) (0.011) (0.015) (0.005)
5 (Low HHI) 0.355 *** 0.176 *** 0.046 *** 0.004 -0.002
(0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003)
Price of Risk 0.056 *** -0.082 ** 0.050 0.104 * 0.206
(0.014) (0.041) (0.061) (0.062) (0.236)
Notes: This table shows GMM estimation results for the system in equation (1.3). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote




We repeat the conditional quantile exercise in Equation 1.6 with data prior to the global fi-
nancial crisis (1980Q1-2007Q2) and report results in Table A.6. Notably the estimates for the
high-HHI portfolio are similar across specification, an indication that our results are not driven by
the recent financial crisis. The low-HHI portfolio estimates continue to display a lack of statistical
significance.
TABLE A.6: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI: Pre-crisis
Constant HHI LIQ SMB R2
1 (high HHI) 0.0500 -0.1478 *** 0.2052
(0.0267) (0.0280)
5 (low HHI) -0.0273 -0.2715 0.0073
(0.0149) (0.3054)
1 (high HHI) 0.0514 -0.1493 *** 0.0054 0.2056
(0.0276) (0.0292) (0.0264)
5 (low HHI) -0.0243 -0.3137 -0.0506 0.0280
(0.0149) (0.3049) (0.0335)
1 (high HHI) 0.0583 * -0.1569 *** 0.0082 0.0398 0.2201
(0.0280) (0.0295) (0.0264) (0.0283)
5 (low HHI) -0.0246 -0.3089 -0.0503 0.0126 0.0291
(0.0150) (0.3065) (0.0337) (0.0368)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.6). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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A.2.2 Downside Risk with Decomposed HHI
We also replicate the regressions in Section 1.3 for the pre-crisis period, and report the outputs
in this section. Table A.7, A.8, and A.9 contain results of dynamic models on a quarterly frequency,
whereas regression outputs of conditional quantiles from the first month of each quarter on HHI are
presented in Table A.10. We reach the conclusion that the effect of HHI on downside risk retains
the same pattern during the sub-sample before the financial crisis.
TABLE A.7: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly HHI - Pre-crisis
Constant RQ HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI -0.0123 -0.2111 -0.0918 *** 0.4157
(0.0105) (0.1685) (0.0074)
Low HHI -0.0423 *** -0.1685 -0.1434 *** 0.0688
(0.0054) (0.1189) (0.0359)
High HHI -0.0129 -0.2191 -0.0912 *** -0.0181 0.4169
(0.0106) (0.1691) (0.0075) (0.0273)
Low HHI -0.0420 *** -0.1860 -0.1444 *** -0.0519 * 0.0868
(0.0054) (0.1183) (0.0357) (0.0252)
High HHI -0.0124 -0.2129 -0.0915 *** -0.0176 0.0121 0.4173
(0.0107) (0.1701) (0.0075) (0.0273) (0.0299)
Low HHI -0.0420 *** -0.1849 -0.1445 *** -0.0518 * 0.0041 0.0869
(0.0054) (0.1188) (0.0358) (0.0252) (0.0276)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.1). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.8: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI 0.0018 -0.1403 ** -0.0918 *** 0.4151 0.2447
(0.0064) (0.0432) (0.0074)
Low HHI -0.0422 *** 1.4495 *** -0.2201 *** 0.1203 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.4091) (0.0406)
High HHI 0.0022 -0.1485 *** -0.0912 *** -0.0245 0.4172 0.1816
(0.0064) (0.0443) (0.0074) (0.0280)
Low HHI -0.0413 *** 1.3713 ** -0.2142 *** -0.0377 0.1297 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.4110) (0.0407) (0.0247)
High HHI 0.0023 -0.1478 ** -0.0916 *** -0.0238 0.0132 0.4177 0.1917
(0.0065) (0.0444) (0.0075) (0.0281) (0.0298)
Low HHI -0.0413 *** 1.3755 ** -0.2143 *** -0.0377 -0.0027 0.1297 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.4141) (0.0408) (0.0248) (0.0271)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant HHI5 HHI−5 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI 0.0021 -0.1399 *** -0.0916 *** 0.4158 0.2043
(0.0064) (0.0394) (0.0074)
Low HHI -0.0480 *** 2.1568 *** -0.3068 *** 0.1689 0∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.4287) (0.0464)
High HHI 0.0025 -0.1479 *** -0.0909 *** -0.0255 0.4181 0.147
(0.0064) (0.0404) (0.0074) (0.0280)
Low HHI -0.0471 *** 2.0849 *** -0.3000 *** -0.0346 0.1768 0∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.4306) (0.0465) (0.0240)
High HHI 0.0026 -0.1467 *** -0.0912 *** -0.0248 0.0114 0.4185 0.1604
(0.0064) (0.0406) (0.0075) (0.0281) (0.0299)
Low HHI -0.0471 *** 2.0865 *** -0.3001 *** -0.0346 -0.0015 0.1768 0∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.4324) (0.0466) (0.0241) (0.0262)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI 0.0024 -0.1404 *** -0.0897 *** 0.4191 0.0932
(0.0062) (0.0304) (0.0073)
Low HHI -0.0477 *** 1.4382 *** -0.3392 *** 0.1246 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.3915) (0.0629)
High HHI 0.0026 -0.1444 *** -0.0888 *** -0.0247 0.4212 0.0701
(0.0062) (0.0308) (0.0074) (0.0275)
Low HHI -0.0466 *** 1.3804 *** -0.3300 *** -0.0404 0.1355 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.3915) (0.0629) (0.0245)
High HHI 0.0026 -0.1435 *** -0.0890 *** -0.0242 0.0065 0.4214 0.0810
(0.0062) (0.0312) (0.0075) (0.0277) (0.0301)
Low HHI -0.0466 *** 1.3786 *** -0.3300 *** -0.0403 0.0040 0.1356 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.3926) (0.0630) (0.0246) (0.0269)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.7). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10.
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TABLE A.9: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI -0.0085 -0.1919 -0.1361 ** -0.0928 *** 0.4186 0.3011
(0.0112) (0.1694) (0.0434) (0.0075)
Low HHI -0.0434 *** -0.0361 1.4060 ** -0.2223 *** 0.1207 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.1216) (0.4354) (0.0414)
High HHI -0.0085 -0.1994 -0.1447 ** -0.0922 *** -0.0260 0.4209 0.2225
(0.0112) (0.1697) (0.0444) (0.0075) (0.0280)
Low HHI -0.0431 *** -0.0584 1.2980 ** -0.2176 *** -0.0391 0.1306 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.1220) (0.4393) (0.0413) (0.0249)
High HHI -0.0082 -0.1943 -0.1442 ** -0.0925 *** -0.0255 0.0103 0.4212 0.2306
(0.0112) (0.1707) (0.0445) (0.0075) (0.0281) (0.0299)
Low HHI -0.0431 *** -0.0588 1.3023 ** -0.2177 *** -0.0391 -0.0032 0.1307 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.1224) (0.4419) (0.0415) (0.0250) (0.0271)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI5 HHI−5 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI -0.0080 -0.1849 -0.1351 *** -0.0926 *** 0.419 0.2682
(0.0112) (0.1700) (0.0397) (0.0074)
Low HHI -0.0481 *** -0.0016 2.1549 *** -0.3069 *** 0.1689 0∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.1172) (0.4519) (0.0467)
High HHI -0.0079 -0.1913 -0.1433 *** -0.0919 *** -0.0267 0.4215 0.1938
(0.0112) (0.1702) (0.0406) (0.0075) (0.0280)
Low HHI -0.0477 *** -0.0203 2.0599 *** -0.3008 *** -0.0351 0.1769 0∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.1176) (0.4555) (0.0468) (0.0242)
High HHI -0.0076 -0.1873 -0.1425 *** -0.0921 *** -0.0261 0.0087 0.4217 0.2053
(0.0113) (0.1711) (0.0408) (0.0075) (0.0281) (0.0300)
Low HHI -0.0477 *** -0.0206 2.0612 *** -0.3009 *** -0.0351 -0.0017 0.177 0∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.1180) (0.4570) (0.0469) (0.0243) (0.0263)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI -0.0046 -0.1228 -0.1331 *** -0.0906 *** 0.4203 0.1911
(0.0121) (0.1812) (0.0323) (0.0074)
Low HHI -0.0483 *** -0.0203 1.4132 *** -0.3387 *** 0.1247 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.1222) (0.4203) (0.0631)
High HHI -0.0045 -0.1235 -0.1371 *** -0.0897 *** -0.0248 0.4225 0.1505
(0.0121) (0.1812) (0.0326) (0.0075) (0.0276)
Low HHI -0.0478 *** -0.0423 1.3268 ** -0.3288 *** -0.0414 0.136 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.1224) (0.4217) (0.0631) (0.0247)
High HHI -0.0044 -0.1224 -0.1363 *** -0.0898 *** -0.0244 0.0058 0.4226 0.1644
(0.0121) (0.1817) (0.0330) (0.0076) (0.0277) (0.0302)
Low HHI -0.0478 *** -0.0415 1.3264 ** -0.3288 *** -0.0413 0.0035 0.1361 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.1229) (0.4227) (0.0633) (0.0248) (0.0269)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.2). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10.
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TABLE A.10: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI - First Month Pre-crisis
Constant RQ HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI -0.0234 * 0.1072 -0.0564 *** 0.2309
(0.0109) (0.1056) (0.0071)
Low HHI -0.1202 * -0.6223 -0.0876 *** 0.0846
(0.0571) (0.7028) (0.0203)
High HHI -0.0231 * 0.1094 -0.0566 *** 0.0041 0.231
(0.0110) (0.1067) (0.0072) (0.0255)
Low HHI -0.1225 * -0.6532 -0.0872 *** -0.0130 0.0875
(0.0572) (0.7043) (0.0203) (0.0158)
High HHI -0.0256 * 0.0897 -0.0548 *** 0.0015 -0.0515 0.2432
(0.0110) (0.1066) (0.0072) (0.0254) (0.0276)
Low HHI -0.1248 * -0.6825 -0.0868 *** -0.0132 -0.0076 0.0883
(0.0576) (0.7088) (0.0204) (0.0158) (0.0174)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.3). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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A.3 Value-Weighted Portfolio
We perform another set of robustness checks by examining the value-weighted HHI portfolios.
All analyses we performed using equal-weighted portfolios are replicated using value-weighted
returns. Overall we find that our main conditional volatility and downside risk results are robust to
the choice of equal- versus value- weighted returns.
TABLE A.11: Annualized HHI Low-High Portfolio Returns - VW
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skew Kurt. 25 % 75 %
0.76 2.23 6.95 -0.57 5.00 -6.35 7.73
Notes: This table shows summary statistics of annualized percentage value-weighted returns from the Low-
Minus-High (LMH) portfolio we constructed. Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
TABLE A.12: Annualized Portfolio Returns – VW
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 Low-High (LMH)
Mean 4.9357 5.3476 4.9978 5.7891 5.6984 0.7627
Median 5.7736 5.7443 5.2192 6.5754 6.8490 2.2278
Std. Dev. 9.4950 6.4525 6.8238 6.4698 5.5405 6.9461
Skewness -0.2660 -0.2718 -0.2938 -0.2484 -0.5094 -0.5659
Kurtosis 4.3092 3.3106 4.1885 4.0530 3.9438 4.9955
25% Perc. -4.2011 -1.1747 -1.8955 -0.6152 0.1144 -6.3473
75% Perc. 14.8857 13.4917 12.1572 12.6247 12.8116 7.7251
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of annualized portfolio returns in percentages. Portfolio returns
are value-weighted. We report values for the 5 HHI portfolios as well as the Low-Minus-High (LMH)
portfolio. Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
TABLE A.13: Liquidity-Risk Adjusted Excess Returns – VW
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 Low-High (LMH)
Mean 4.6978 5.2873 4.9413 5.8094 5.7482 1.0503
Median 5.7149 5.5347 5.2211 6.5067 6.7976 2.1044
Std. Dev. 9.4380 6.4271 6.7974 6.4462 5.5188 6.8756
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of annualized liquidity-adjusted portfolio returns in percent-
ages. We report values for the 5 HHI portfolios as well as the Low-Minus-High (LMH) portfolio. Quarterly
sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4.
Figure A.4 illustrates the 5% quantiles of the high-HHI portfolio and the low-HHI portfolio,
which serves as a comparison to Figure 1.6. The graph clearly suggests that for value-weighted
construction, the high-HHI portfolio is subject to a higher level of tail risk.
We retain negative signs for the HHI coefficient terms when repeating the conditional quantile
exercises, although in some cases the results are less significant than the equal-weighted scenario.
Qualitatively speaking, a higher degree of holding concentration intensifies downside risks even as
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TABLE A.14: Conditional Mean Linear Factor Models - VW
Rm-Rf SMB HML LIQ PC-HHI
FF3 - GMM J-stat p-val 0.00
Betas
1 (High HHI) 0.350 *** 0.179 *** 0.107 ***
(0.027) (0.043) (0.033)
2 0.310 *** 0.073 *** 0.044 *
(0.011) (0.023) (0.026)
3 0.332 *** 0.116 *** 0.012
(0.014) (0.026) (0.030)
4 0.340 *** 0.069 *** 0.004
(0.010) (0.017) (0.031)
5 (Low HHI) 0.305 *** 0.020 ** -0.014
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Price of Risk 0.050 *** -0.036 * 0.013
(0.007) (0.020) (0.016)
FF3+Liquidity - GMM J-stat p-val 0.00
Betas
1 (High HHI) 0.363 *** 0.156 *** 0.112 *** 0.084 **
(0.037) (0.049) (0.032) (0.034)
2 0.311 *** 0.082 *** 0.043 ** 0.042 ***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.016)
3 0.340 *** 0.107 *** 0.016 0.039 **
(0.015) (0.028) (0.027) (0.015)
4 0.320 *** 0.119 *** -0.004 0.025 **
(0.011) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010)
5 (Low HHI) 0.321 *** -0.016 ** -0.008 0.017 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
Price of Risk 0.077 0.029 0.198 -0.503
(0.098) (0.093) (0.697) (1.536)
FF3+Liquidity+HHI - GMM J-stat p-val 0.00
Betas
1 (High HHI) 0.366 *** 0.147 *** 0.110 *** 0.085 ** 0.009
(0.043) (0.057) (0.040) (0.043) (0.015)
2 0.315 *** 0.069 ** 0.044 * 0.030 0.013
(0.019) (0.032) (0.026) (0.020) (0.008)
3 0.342 *** 0.099 *** 0.015 0.035 ** 0.009
(0.015) (0.028) (0.026) (0.016) (0.006)
4 0.321 *** 0.115 *** -0.005 0.023 0.004
(0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.005)
5 (Low HHI) 0.321 *** -0.017 * -0.010 0.019 *** 0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003)
Price of Risk 0.066 0.014 0.116 -0.269 -0.410
(0.043) (0.046) (0.268) (0.539) (0.572)
Notes: This table shows GMM estimation results for the system in equation (1.3). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Portfolio returns are value-weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses.
One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.15: Conditional Volatility Regressions – Quarterly – VW
Constant σ̂2i,t−1 HHI LIQ SMB R
2
1 (high HHI)−0.0005 0.8356∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.7254
(0.0005) (0.0405) (0.0006)
5 (low HHI) 0.0016 0.3459∗∗∗−0.0334 0.1301
(0.0011) (0.0827) (0.0308)
1 (high HHI)−0.0009 0.8306∗∗∗ 0.0014∗ −0.0038 0.7434
(0.0007) (0.0420) (0.0008) (0.0023)
5 (low HHI) 0.0015 0.3583∗∗∗−0.0302 −0.0007 0.1352
(0.0011) (0.1034) (0.0311) (0.0013)
1 (high HHI)−0.0013∗ 0.8504∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ −0.0040∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ 0.7673
(0.0008) (0.0442) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0018)
5 (low HHI) 0.0011 0.4286∗∗∗−0.0195 −0.0010 −0.0036∗∗∗ 0.2054
(0.0010) (0.0972) (0.0284) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Notes: This table shows estimation results for the regressions in (A.4). Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1
and ends in 2014Q4. Returns are value-weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three
asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West standard errors
appear in parentheses.
TABLE A.16: Conditional Volatility Regressions – Monthly – VW
Constant σ̂2i,t−1 HHI LIQ SMB R
2
1 (high HHI)−0.0064 0.3739∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗ 0.1985
(0.0043) (0.1198) (0.0048)
5 (low HHI) 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.1099 −0.0367 0.0195
(0.0018) (0.1063) (0.0366)
1 (high HHI)−0.0071 0.3626∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ −0.0074 0.2013
(0.0052) (0.1154) (0.0058) (0.0159)
5 (low HHI) 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.1028 −0.0343 −0.0057 0.0253
(0.0017) (0.1067) (0.0365) (0.0114)
1 (high HHI)−0.0073 0.3706∗∗∗ 0.0113∗ −0.0065 −0.0144 0.2082
(0.0052) (0.1156) (0.0058) (0.0153) (0.0160)
5 (low HHI) 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.1425 −0.0397 −0.0042 −0.0223 0.0797
(0.0017) (0.0988) (0.0359) (0.0097) (0.0137)
Notes: This table shows estimation results for the regressions in (A.4). Conditional volatilities are produced
for the first mont in each calendar quarter. Quarterly sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Returns
are value-weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West standard errors appear in parentheses.
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FIG. A.3: Conditional Volatility High versus Low HHI Portfolio – VW
we change the portfolio composition methodology. We also present regression outputs for decom-
posed HHI and the pre-crisis period, and note that our previous findings are consistently supported.
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FIG. A.4: Conditional Quantile Estimates HHI Portfolios 5% Left Tail, Value-Weighted
TABLE A.17: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI, Value-Weighted
Constant HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI -0.0109 ** -0.0714 *** 0.3973
(0.0041) (0.0053)
Low HHI -0.0380 *** 0.0214 0.0109
(0.0011) (0.0123)
High HHI -0.0109 ** -0.0715 *** 0.0061 0.3976
(0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0172)
Low HHI -0.0379 *** 0.0217 -0.0060 0.0126
(0.0011) (0.0123) (0.0086)
High HHI -0.0106 * -0.0722 *** 0.0070 0.0305 0.4017
(0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0172) (0.0222)
Low HHI -0.0379 *** 0.0214 -0.0057 0.0100 0.0155
(0.0011) (0.0123) (0.0086) (0.0111)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.6). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.18: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI, Value-Weighted
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI -0.0108 * -0.0753 * -0.0714 *** 0.3973 0.8913
(0.0043) (0.0292) (0.0053)
Low HHI -0.0365 *** -0.2057 0.0314 * 0.0219 0.0792
(0.0014) (0.1295) (0.0135)
High HHI -0.0108 * -0.0753 * -0.0716 *** 0.0061 0.3976 0.8958
(0.0043) (0.0292) (0.0053) (0.0172)
Low HHI -0.0365 *** -0.2000 0.0314 * -0.0049 0.0230 0.0879
(0.0014) (0.1301) (0.0135) (0.0086)
High HHI -0.0104 * -0.0760 ** -0.0723 *** 0.0070 0.0305 0.4017 0.8949
(0.0043) (0.0292) (0.0054) (0.0172) (0.0222)
Low HHI -0.0364 *** -0.2074 0.0313 * -0.0046 0.0110 0.0265 0.0789
(0.0014) (0.1303) (0.0135) (0.0086) (0.0111)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant HHI5 HHI−5 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI -0.0114 ** -0.0626 ** -0.0713 *** 0.3976 0.6969
(0.0042) (0.0231) (0.0053)
Low HHI -0.0370 *** -0.0898 0.0305 * 0.0143 0.3257
(0.0015) (0.1136) (0.0153)
High HHI -0.0114 ** -0.0624 ** -0.0714 *** 0.0064 0.3979 0.6862
(0.0042) (0.0231) (0.0053) (0.0172)
Low HHI -0.0370 *** -0.0859 0.0305 * -0.0056 0.0158 0.3428
(0.0015) (0.1139) (0.0153) (0.0086)
High HHI -0.0111 ** -0.0607 ** -0.0721 *** 0.0074 0.0313 0.4022 0.6108
(0.0042) (0.0231) (0.0053) (0.0172) (0.0223)
Low HHI -0.0369 *** -0.0973 0.0310 * -0.0053 0.0111 0.0194 0.2981
(0.0015) (0.1145) (0.0154) (0.0086) (0.0111)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI -0.0116 ** -0.0605 *** -0.0715 *** 0.3982 0.5166
(0.0042) (0.0175) (0.0053)
Low HHI -0.0366 *** -0.0924 0.0390 * 0.0172 0.184
(0.0015) (0.0863) (0.0180)
High HHI -0.0115 ** -0.0606 *** -0.0717 *** 0.0062 0.3985 0.5152
(0.0042) (0.0175) (0.0053) (0.0172)
Low HHI -0.0366 *** -0.0905 0.0391 * -0.0056 0.0187 0.191
(0.0015) (0.0865) (0.0180) (0.0086)
High HHI -0.0112 ** -0.0610 *** -0.0724 *** 0.0071 0.0307 0.4026 0.5014
(0.0042) (0.0175) (0.0053) (0.0172) (0.0222)
Low HHI -0.0365 *** -0.0961 0.0395 * -0.0054 0.0109 0.0221 0.1721
(0.0015) (0.0867) (0.0180) (0.0086) (0.0111)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.7). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10.
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TABLE A.19: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI: Pre-crisis, Value-Weighted
Constant HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI -0.0190 *** -0.0613 *** 0.3973
(0.0039) (0.0051)
Low HHI -0.0383 *** 0.0220 0.0146
(0.0011) (0.0123)
High HHI -0.0189 *** -0.0618 *** 0.0154 0.3991
(0.0039) (0.0052) (0.01884)
Low HHI -0.0380 *** 0.0225 -0.0162 0.0260
(0.0011) (0.0122) (0.0102)
High HHI -0.0185 *** -0.0627 *** 0.0165 0.0264 0.4037
(0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0188) (0.0206)
Low HHI -0.0381 *** 0.0221 -0.0159 0.0115 0.0308
(0.0011) (0.0122) (0.0102) (0.0111)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.6). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE A.20: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly HHI - Pre-crisis,
Value-Weighted
Constant RQ HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI -0.0062 0.4163 *** -0.0512 *** 0.4421
(0.0048) (0.0996) (0.0055)
Low HHI -0.0449 *** -0.2888 *** -0.0116 0.0713
(0.0021) (0.0793) (0.0151)
High HHI -0.0062 0.4119 *** -0.0516 *** 0.0077 0.4426
(0.0049) (0.1004) (0.0056) (0.0183)
Low HHI -0.0447 *** -0.2925 *** -0.0115 -0.0172 0.0842
(0.0021) (0.0789) (0.0150) (0.0099)
High HHI -0.0060 0.4087 *** -0.0525 *** 0.0088 0.0243 0.4464
(0.0049) (0.1003) (0.0056) (0.0183) (0.0199)
Low HHI -0.0447 *** -0.2905 *** -0.0117 -0.0169 0.0104 0.0881
(0.0021) (0.0790) (0.0150) (0.0099) (0.0108)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.1). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
134
TABLE A.21. Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis, Value-
Weighted
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI -0.0162 *** -0.1391 *** -0.0621 *** 0.4081 0.0478∗
(0.0041) (0.0394) (0.0051)
Low HHI -0.0388 *** 0.1063 0.0178 0.0163 0.5369
(0.0014) (0.1369) (0.0141)
High HHI -0.0162 *** -0.1364 *** -0.0624 *** 0.0104 0.4089 0.0601
(0.0041) (0.0398) (0.0051) (0.0189)
Low HHI -0.0386 *** 0.1171 0.0178 -0.0165 0.0282 0.4876
(0.0014) (0.1365) (0.0140) (0.0102)
High HHI -0.0159 *** -0.1361 *** -0.0632 *** 0.0115 0.0255 0.4131 0.0639
(0.0041) (0.0398) (0.0052) (0.0189) (0.0205)
Low HHI -0.0386 *** 0.1101 0.0177 -0.0162 0.0111 0.0326 0.5188
(0.0014) (0.1367) (0.0140) (0.0102) (0.0112)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant HHI5 HHI−5 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI -0.0183 *** -0.0810 ** -0.0611 *** 0.3990 0.4282
(0.0040) (0.0253) (0.0051)
Low HHI -0.0385 *** 0.0477 0.0197 0.0148 0.8216
(0.0014) (0.1143) (0.0159)
High HHI -0.0183 *** -0.0788 ** -0.0616 *** 0.0135 0.4004 0.4972
(0.0040) (0.0255) (0.0052) (0.0191)
Low HHI -0.0383 *** 0.0590 0.0193 -0.0164 0.0264 0.7479
(0.0014) (0.1141) (0.0158) (0.0102)
High HHI -0.0180 *** -0.0758 ** -0.0624 *** 0.0149 0.0250 0.4044 0.6024
(0.0040) (0.0256) (0.0052) (0.0191) (0.0208)
Low HHI -0.0383 *** 0.0481 0.0198 -0.0160 0.0112 0.0310 0.8195
(0.0014) (0.1147) (0.0158) (0.0102) (0.0112)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI -0.0189 *** -0.0649 *** -0.0611 *** 0.3974 0.8318
(0.0039) (0.0180) (0.0052)
Low HHI -0.0382 *** 0.0154 0.0231 0.0146 0.942
(0.0015) (0.0921) (0.0192)
High HHI -0.0188 *** -0.0640 *** -0.0617 *** 0.0151 0.3992 0.9023
(0.0040) (0.0180) (0.0053) (0.0190)
Low HHI -0.0380 *** 0.0228 0.0225 -0.0162 0.0260 0.9976
(0.0015) (0.0919) (0.0191) (0.0102)
High HHI -0.0185 *** -0.0636 *** -0.0626 *** 0.0163 0.0264 0.4037 0.9545
(0.0040) (0.0180) (0.0053) (0.0190) (0.0207)
Low HHI -0.0380 *** 0.0168 0.0230 -0.0159 0.0115 0.0308 0.9535
(0.0015) (0.0921) (0.0191) (0.0102) (0.0112)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (1.7). Quarterly sample starts in
1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10.
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TABLE A.22. Regression of Conditional Quantile on Quarterly Decomposed HHI - Pre-crisis,
Value-Weighted
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI -0.0038 0.4081 *** -0.1225 ** -0.0522 *** 0.4511 0.0615
(0.0050) (0.0992) (0.0383) (0.0055)
Low HHI -0.0448 *** -0.3120 *** -0.1204 -0.0090 0.0737 0.4573
(0.0021) (0.0853) (0.1469) (0.0155)
High HHI -0.0039 0.4065 *** -0.1217 ** -0.0523 *** 0.0031 0.4512 0.0680
(0.0050) (0.0999) (0.0386) (0.0056) (0.0184)
Low HHI -0.0446 *** -0.3135 *** -0.1106 -0.0092 -0.0169 0.0861 0.4969
(0.0021) (0.0849) (0.1463) (0.0154) (0.0099)
High HHI -0.0036 0.4034 *** -0.1215 ** -0.0531 *** 0.0042 0.0235 0.4548 0.0719
(0.0050) (0.0998) (0.0386) (0.0056) (0.0184) (0.0198)
Low HHI -0.0446 *** -0.3127 *** -0.1168 -0.0092 -0.0166 0.0108 0.0903 0.4716
(0.0021) (0.0849) (0.1465) (0.0154) (0.0099) (0.0108)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI5 HHI−5 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI -0.0049 0.4242 *** -0.0779 ** -0.0508 *** 0.4454 0.2627
(0.0050) (0.0998) (0.0244) (0.0055)
Low HHI -0.0448 *** -0.3409 *** -0.1910 -0.0024 0.0800 0.1546
(0.0021) (0.0871) (0.1264) (0.0164)
High HHI -0.0050 0.4213 *** -0.0772 ** -0.0511 *** 0.0046 0.4455 0.2868
(0.0050) (0.1007) (0.0246) (0.0056) (0.0185)
Low HHI -0.0446 *** -0.3413 *** -0.1798 -0.0028 -0.0165 0.0918 0.1804
(0.0021) (0.0868) (0.1261) (0.0163) (0.0099)
High HHI -0.0049 0.4172 *** -0.0745 ** -0.0519 *** 0.0060 0.0219 0.4486 0.3602
(0.0050) (0.1007) (0.0247) (0.0056) (0.0185) (0.0201)
Low HHI -0.0446 *** -0.3425 *** -0.1921 -0.0024 -0.0161 0.0118 0.0968 0.1525
(0.0021) (0.0867) (0.1265) (0.0163) (0.0099) (0.0108)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI -0.0057 0.4202 *** -0.0600 *** -0.0506 *** 0.4429 0.5948
(0.0049) (0.1001) (0.0173) (0.0056)
Low HHI -0.0446 *** -0.3543 *** -0.1930 0.0087 0.0848 0.0755
(0.0021) (0.0870) (0.1026) (0.0189)
High HHI -0.0058 0.4162 *** -0.0596 *** -0.0510 *** 0.0067 0.4432 0.6283
(0.0050) (0.1009) (0.0174) (0.0057) (0.0185)
Low HHI -0.0444 *** -0.3554 *** -0.1861 0.0081 -0.0165 0.0967 0.086
(0.0021) (0.0867) (0.1023) (0.0188) (0.0098)
High HHI -0.0056 0.4125 *** -0.0594 *** -0.0519 *** 0.0078 0.0238 0.4469 0.675
(0.0050) (0.1009) (0.0174) (0.0058) (0.0185) (0.0200)
Low HHI -0.0444 *** -0.3553 *** -0.1920 0.0086 -0.0162 0.0114 0.1014 0.0766
(0.0021) (0.0866) (0.1024) (0.0188) (0.0098) (0.0108)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.2). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2007Q2. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10.
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A.4 Top Players - Dynamic Specifications
To complement the analysis in Section 1.3 we also consider another set of dynamic models,
namely Equation (A.1) and equation (A.2),
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,t−1 + bi,2HHIi,t−1 + vi,t (A.1)
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,t−1 + bi,2HHIi,t−1 + bi,3Liqt−1 + vi,t
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,t−1 + bi,2HHIi,t−1 + bi,3Liqt−1 + bi,4SMBt−1 + vi,t
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,t−1 + bi,2HHI(k)i,t−1 + bi,3HHI(−k)i,t−1 + vi,t (A.2)
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,t−1 + bi,2HHI(k)i,t−1 + bi,3HHI(−k)i,t−1
+ bi,4Liqt−1 + vi,t
qi,t(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,t−1 + bi,2HHI(k)i,t−1 + bi,3HHI(−k)i,t−1
+ bi,4Liqt−1 + bi,5SMBt−1 + vi,t
where k = 3, 5, 10. Aside from HHI and the other control variables, we add 5% realized quantiles
of the return series to the equations. We use realized quantiles - as this will also be the model
used for the individual firm panel regressions. Estimating dynamic panel quantile regressions
is a daunting task, whereas using lagged realized quantiles significantly simplify the estimation
procedures involved.
TABLE A.23: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI - Quarterly
Constant RQ HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI 0.0028 -0.0060 -0.0962 *** 0.3489
(0.0088) (0.1294) (0.0083)
Low HHI -0.0412 *** -0.0640 -0.1181 *** 0.0411
(0.0050) (0.0953) (0.0347)
High HHI 0.0031 0.0011 -0.0956 *** -0.0219 0.3507
(0.0088) (0.1297) (0.0083) (0.0249)
Low HHI -0.0408 *** -0.0624 -0.1164 *** -0.0249 0.0457
(0.0050) (0.0953) (0.0347) (0.0217)
High HHI 0.0036 0.0051 -0.0961 *** -0.0212 0.0273 0.3524
(0.0088) (0.1298) (0.0083) (0.0249) (0.0322)
Low HHI -0.0408 *** -0.0621 -0.1165 *** -0.0249 0.0022 0.0457
(0.0050) (0.0955) (0.0348) (0.0217) (0.0280)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.1). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The quarterly results are reported in Table A.23 and A.24. Qualitatively, the negative impact of
a more concentrated portfolio on market downside risk still holds. The realized quantiles do not add
much explanatory power to the regressions, since the quantiles are extracted from quarterly returns
that are shorter in length and none of the coefficients are significant. For the low-HHI portfolio,
interestingly enough, we see that concentration in the top institutions have a significant positive
effect on the quantile level of the next period. In contrast, concentration in other institutions will
exacerbate the downside risk.
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TABLE A.24: Regression of Conditional Quantile on Decomposed HHI - Quarterly
Panel A: Top 3 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI3 = HHI−3
High HHI 0.0077 0.0340 -0.1405 ** -0.0973 *** 0.351 0.3517
(0.0102) (0.1363) (-0.0482) (0.0084)
Low HHI -0.0442 *** 0.0518 1.4110 ** -0.1837 *** 0.0811 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0994) (0.4425) (0.0390)
High HHI 0.0089 0.0496 -0.1476 ** -0.0967 *** -0.0262 0.3535 0.2789
(0.0103) (0.1371) (0.0487) (0.0084) (0.0252)
Low HHI -0.0439 *** 0.0503 1.3704 ** -0.1809 *** -0.0158 0.0829 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0995) (0.4462) (0.0392) (0.0215)
High HHI 0.0092 0.0526 -0.1471 ** -0.0972 *** -0.0255 0.0264 0.3551 0.2885
(0.0103) (0.1372) (0.0487) (0.0084) (0.0253) (0.0322)
Low HHI -0.0439 *** 0.0503 1.3832 ** -0.1812 *** -0.0159 -0.0074 0.0829 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0996) (0.4495) (0.0393) (0.0215) (0.0277)
Panel B: Top 5 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI3 HHI−3 LIQ SMB R2 HHI5 = HHI−5
High HHI 0.0082 0.0424 -0.1378 *** -0.0971 0.3511 0.335
(0.0104) (0.1388) (0.0439) (0.0083)
Low HHI -0.0467 *** 0.1724 2.0122 *** -0.2311 *** 0.1225 0∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.1027) (0.4224) (0.0401)
High HHI 0.0095 0.0595 -0.1443 ** -0.0965 *** -0.0264 0.3537 0.2634
(0.0105) (0.1397) (0.0443) (0.0083) (0.0252)
Low HHI -0.0465 *** 0.1702 1.9848 *** -0.2290 *** -0.0091 0.1231 0∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.1030) (0.4278) (0.0404) (0.0211)
High HHI 0.0097 0.0610 -0.1429 ** -0.0969 *** -0.0256 0.0253 0.3551 0.2838
(0.0105) (0.1398) (0.0444) (0.0084) (0.0253) (0.0322)
Low HHI -0.0465 *** 0.1700 1.9895 *** -0.2291 *** -0.0092 -0.0052 0.1232 0∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.1031) (0.4292) (0.0405) (0.0211) (0.0270)
Panel C: Top 10 Insitutions
Constant RQ HHI10 HHI−10 LIQ SMB R2 HHI10 = HHI−10
High HHI 0.0117 0.1035 -0.1382 *** -0.0953 *** 0.3524 0.221
(0.0114) (0.1571) (0.0352) (0.0083)
Low HHI -0.0478 *** 0.1148 1.3690 *** -0.2778 *** 0.0889 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.1044) (0.3925) (0.0540)
High HHI 0.0129 0.1223 -0.1415 *** -0.0944 *** -0.0257 0.3549 0.1827
(0.0114) (0.1581) (0.0354) (0.0083) (0.0251)
Low HHI -0.0474 *** 0.1125 1.3372 *** -0.2731 *** -0.0163 0.0908 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.1045) (0.3949) (0.0543) (0.0213)
High HHI 0.0127 0.1187 -0.1393 *** -0.0949 *** -0.0249 0.0229 0.3561 0.2124
(0.0114) (0.1584) (0.0356) (0.0084) (0.0251) (0.0323)
Low HHI -0.0474 *** 0.1124 1.3380 *** -0.2731 *** -0.0163 -0.0015 0.0908 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.1047) (0.3960) (0.0544) (0.0214) (0.0274)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.2). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last column records p-values from testing
whether coefficients HHIk = HHI−k, k = 3, 5, 10.
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We repeat the regressions in equation (A.1), using the conditional quantile in the first month
of each quarter, i.e. January, April, July, and October, as the dependent variable. Our intention is
to evaluate the effect of HHI on downside risk in the more immediate future, without imposing
the explicit assumption of monthly portfolio turnover. The modified dynamic models for the first
quarter, for example, take the form
qi,Apr(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,Mar + bi,2HHIi,Q1 + vi,Apr (A.3)
qi,Apr(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,Mar + bi,2HHIi,Q1 + bi,3LiqQ1 + vi,Apr
qi,Apr(.05) = bi,0 + bi,1RQ(.05)i,Mar + bi,2HHIi,Q1 + bi,3LiqQ1 + bi,4SMBQ1 + vi,Apr
We also study the equations with the liquidity and SMB factors from the last quarter as controls,
and report the results in Table A.25.
We observe that the realized quantiles of the high-HHI portfolios now have a slightly more
prominent positive effect on the downside risk in the next period, which fits our expectation. With
the new dynamics, we reach the same conclusion that a higher degree of concentration can be
linked to more serious downside risk. The HHI coefficient values suggest that the low-HHI port-
folio is more heavily influenced than the high-HHI portfolio when the portfolio holdings are more
concentrated in nature. This is consistent with our findings on a quarterly time horizon, and also
subject to the caveat that the stocks in question tend to have a more diverse owner base.
TABLE A.25: Regression of Conditional Quantile on HHI - First Month
Constant RQ HHI LIQ SMB R2
High HHI -0.0085 0.2522 * -0.0655 *** 0.2611
(0.0104) (0.1027) (0.0066)
Low HHI -0.0836 -0.1716 -0.0912 *** 0.0819
(0.0463) (0.5692) (0.0184)
High HHI -0.0079 0.2587 * -0.0662 *** 0.0231 0.2645
(0.0105) (0.1028) (0.0066) (0.0205)
Low HHI -0.0835 -0.1706 -0.0908 *** -0.0076 0.0831
(0.0464) (0.5698) (0.0184) (0.0123)
High HHI -0.0089 0.2509 * -0.0655 *** 0.0223 -0.0260 0.2671
(0.0105) (0.1032) (0.0067) (0.0205) (0.0265)
Low HHI -0.0846 -0.1840 -0.0906 *** -0.0078 -0.0039 0.0833
(0.0466) (0.5734) (0.0185) (0.0123) (0.0160)
Notes: This table shows results for the estimated regressions in equation (A.3). Quarterly sample starts
in 1980Q1 and ends in 2014Q4. Standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE A.26: Composition of HHI Portfolios by Investor Characteristics
Label High Low Description
By Type
BNK 50.31% 99.96% Bank Trust
INV 43.26% 0.02% Investment Company
PPS 3.44% 0.00% Public Pension Fund
CPS 1.69% 0.02% Corporate (Private) Pension Fund
IIA 1.14% 0.00% Independent Investment Advisor
INS 0.11% 0.00% Insurance Company
UFE 0.04% 0.00% University And Foundation Endowments
MSC 0.01% 0.00% Miscellaneous
By Classification
DED 43.96% 69.02% Dedicated
QIX 34.12% 30.98% Quasi-Indexer
TRA 21.92% 0.00% Transient
Notes: This table shows the time-series average of the percentage of stocks for each legal type and investor classifica-
tion in the low and high HHI portfolios.
A.5 HHI Decomposed By Investor Characteristics
We use Brian Bushee’s institutional investor classification data to add institutional type and
classification at the by-stock/by-year level.1 We specifically focus on two of his manager-level
variables: type (legal type of the institutional investor) and classification (transient, quasi-indexer,
and dedicated). The composition of stocks in the high and low HHI portfolios by these two investor
characteristics is in Table A.26. The low HHI portfolio is almost entirely comprised of bank trust
investors, whereas the high HHI portfolio is dominated by bank trust and investment company
investors. The low HHI portfolio is made up of dedicated and quasi-index investors only, while the
high HHI portfolio has a more even distribution across classifications. We present the conditional
volatility results using HHI decomposed according to investor type and classification below in
Tables A.27 and A.28. The models for HHI decomposed by classification are as below (analogous
for investor type):





bi,classHHI(class)i,t + vi,t (A.4)





bi,classHHI(class)i,t + bi,3Liqt + vi,t





bi,classHHI(class)i,t + bi,3Liqt + bi,4SMBt + vi,t
As we noted before, the impact of decomposed HHI along the investor type and classification is
not statistically significant, both for the conditional volatility results as well as for additional risk
measures.
1Data located at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html
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TABLE A.27: Conditional Volatility by HHI Decomposition by Investor Type
Cons. σ̂2i,t−1 BNK INS INV IIA CPS PPS UFE MSC LIQ SMB R
2
High −0.01 0.12 0.01 −0.03 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.13 0.70 0.04
[−0.30] [1.34] [0.89] [−0.50] [0.79] [−0.97] [0.20] [0.89] [−1.13] [0.19]
Low 0.01 0.45 0.01 −110.61 −1.43 0.52 −718.67 0.22
[1.42] [7.22] [0.06] [−3.32] [−2.68] [2.88] [−3.49]
High −0.01 0.14 0.01 −0.04 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.10 0.50 0.01 0.05
[−0.06] [1.53] [0.62] [−0.60] [0.51] [−1.09] [−0.02] [0.57] [−1.19] [0.13] [0.69]
Low 0.01 0.48 0.01 −85.88 −1.17 0.50 −864.86 0.01 0.26
[0.73] [5.56] [0.19] [−0.30] [−0.55] [0.70] [−0.45] [2.54]
High −0.01 0.14 0.01 −0.04 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.10 0.53 0.01 0.01 0.05
[−0.03] [1.30] [0.57] [−0.55] [0.47] [−1.09] [−0.02] [0.52] [−1.24] [0.14] [0.66] [0.28]
Low 0.01 0.44 0.01 −185.57 −0.85 0.60 −388.35 0.01 0.01 0.29
[0.72] [4.90] [0.28] [−0.66] [−0.41] [0.86] [−0.20] [2.46] [2.05]
Notes: This table shows the time-series average of the percentage of stocks for each legal type and investor classifica-
tion in the low and high HHI portfolios. Results are in estimate and t-statistic row pairs, where t-statsitics are formed
using Newey and West (1987a) standard errors. Certain type categories were dropped from the low HHI models due
to an insufficient number of stocks in that category.
TABLE A.28: Conditional Volatility by HHI Decomposition by Investor Classification
Cons. CV(-1) DED QIX TRA LIQ SMB R2
High 0.01 0.09 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.03
[1.82] [1.14] [−1.43] [−1.18] [−1.06]
Low 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.01 −40.03 0.21
[2.03] [7] [0.86] [1.17] [−2.45]
High 0.01 0.11 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.04
[2.2] [1.12] [−1.76] [−1.5] [−1.54] [0.67]
Low 0.00 0.52 0.01 0.01 −38.55 0.00 0.26
[0.89] [6.68] [0.98] [1.09] [−1.37] [1.51]
High 0.01 0.10 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
[2.16] [1.04] [−1.75] [−1.5] [−1.51] [0.67] [0.41]
Low 0.00 0.47 0.01 0.01 −20.21 0.00 0.00 0.29
[1.06] [5.07] [1.27] [1.34] [−0.95] [1.62] [1.57]
Notes: This table shows the time-series average of the percentage of stocks for each investor classification in the low
and high HHI portfolios. Results are in estimate and t-statistic row pairs, where t-statsitics are formed using Newey
and West (1987a) standard errors.
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A.6 Reduced Form Model Details
We use the following algorithm to solve for the sequence of market clearing prices Pt(n):
• Begin at t = 1 and fix a constant exogenous initial condition for HHI0(n) = HHIo. This
initial condition will become irrelevant for large T (sufficient burn-in period)
• Fix starting guesses for Pt(n)j , n = 1, 2, for iteration j = 0
• Construct the investor weights as functions of the log-prices and HHI0
• Update the price for each asset according to a modified Newton’s method similar to KY:
Pt(n)
j , j = 1.
• Iterate on price until ||Pt(n)j − Pt(n)j−1|| < tol for both n = 1, 2. Each iteration involves
re-creating the investor weights.
• Once prices converge for period t, generate HHIt(n)
• Advance to period t+ 1 and iterate on prices at period t+ 1 until convergence
• Repeat for all t
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Optimal(Roll-Lin-Quart) vs. Realized By-Investor Mean Returns
(a) ROLLING M/V
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Optimal(ML-Lin-Quart) vs. Realized By-Investor Mean Returns
(b) ML/ROLLING V
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Optimal(ML-NL-Quart) vs. Realized By-Investor Mean Returns
(c) ML/NONLINEAR
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Optimal(Roll-Lin-Quart) vs. Realized By-Investor Return Volatility
(d) ROLLING M/V
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Optimal(ML-Lin-Quart) vs. Realized By-Investor Return Volatility
(e) ML/ROLLING V
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Optimal(ML-NL-Quart) vs. Realized By-Investor Return Volatility
(f) ML/NONLINEAR
FIG. B.1. Top panel: scatter plots of investor realized returns (X-axis) versus corresponding AI Alter Egos realized
returns (Y-axis). The gray cones correspond to AI improvements, above 45 degree line and fourth quadrant. Bottom
panel: scatter plots of investor return variances (X-axis) versus corresponding AI Alter Egos variance (Y-axis). The
gray cones corresponds to AI improvements, below 45 degree line.
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B.1 Data - details
Our primary data set comes from a large Belgian online brokerage firm and consists of the
trading accounts of 22,972 individual investors. This unique data spans about 10 years from Jan-
uary 2003 to March 2012, which includes the 2008 financial crisis. We have detailed information
about each trade, i.e. the ISIN code of the instrument, the time-stamp, the trade direction, the
executed quantity, the trade price, and the explicit transaction costs.1 For the purpose of this re-
search, we focus on common stocks and ETFs investments and exclude other financial instruments.
Over the sample period, 6,741 investors also traded options and warrants for an aggregate number
of 602,833 trades and 6,665 investors traded mutual funds for an aggregate number of 260,120
trades. Only a few investors (i.e. 1,813) traded bonds for an aggregate number of 5,999 trades.
Overall, the individual investors trade across 12,818 different stocks but we count for most of the
stocks only a few trades. We therefore filter the trades and keep the 683 stocks that are most traded
over the sample period. This universe covers 71.5% of all the investors’ trading activity on stocks.
We end up with a sample of 1,590,199 trades on stocks (and 13,015,509,557 traded volume in
euros) over the 111-month period. In addition to stocks, 4,693 investors (i.e. 20.45%) also trade
ETF. Over the whole sample period, those ETF investments correspond to 60,344 trades on 393
different ETFs for a total monetary volume of 898,496,821 in euros.
Types of Assets in the Data Base and Prevalence of Trading
Income Risk aversion Education
High Low High Low High Low
%investors
Stocks 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ETFs 30% 18% 21% 22% 22% 14%
Mutual funds 37% 26% 28% 29% 31% 18%
Options 13% 8% 9% 13% 11% 4%
Warrants 27% 18% 20% 22% 20% 13%
Bonds 9% 7% 8% 7% 9% 4%
TABLE B.1. The table shows the types of assets in our database as well as the proportion of active investors -
low/high income, risk aversion and education.
Table B.1 shows the types of assets in our database as well as the proportion of active investors
per type of investors - low/high income, risk aversion and education. We note that all investors
trade equities. Trading of ETFs, mutual funds, options and warrants is more prevalent with high
income/education investors. Trading of bonds is overall insignificant. Because we examine robo-
advisors which are mean-variance investors we focus exclusively on stocks and ETFs which best
fit the portfolio allocation model. For high income/education investors in particular this means we
leave out to a certain degree other assets which we have available.
B.1.1 Portfolios and Individual Investor Characteristics
Using the trades data, we build end-of-month portfolios for each investor and use historical
market data to compute monthly portfolio market values. We also compute both monthly and daily
1We also know the currency in which the trade is executed, which allows us to compute monetary volumes in euros
using historical exchange rates from the European Central Bank and Bloomberg.
144
asset returns.2 Combining end-of-month portfolio market values with the corresponding monthly
aggregate cash-flows, we calculate for each investor 110 monthly portfolio gross and net returns,
i.e. from February 2003 to March 2012. To calculate portfolio returns, we opt for an approximation
of the Modified Dietz Method, aiming at delivering a return close to the money-weighted rate of
return (e.g., Shestopaloff and Shestopaloff (2007)). Specifically, we compute portfolio returns per
investor and month assuming that all the purchases (sales) executed in a given month take place
on the first (last) day of the month. Mathematically, it gives: Rt = (EMVt − EMVt−1 − Pt +
St)/(EMVt−1 + Pt) where Rt is the portfolio gross return for month t, EMVt is the end-of-
month portfolio value at month t, EMVt−1 is the end-of-month portfolio value at month t − 1,
Pt and St are the aggregate monetary value of all purchases and sales executed during month t.
When calculating net returns, we subtract from the numerator the aggregate monetary value paid
on transaction costs during month t.
Robo-investors can hold cash. It is therefore of interest to comment on how investor cash
holdings - which we do not observe - affect our return calculations. To that end, let us consider
an illustrative example. Suppose an investor has 10 euros (units don’t matter) at end of t - 1 with
5 invested in stock 1 and 5 in stock 2. To further simplify the example assume that this investor
did not hold any other stocks in the past. The robo-investor decides the allocation between stock
1 and 2 - buying and holding the shares. Furthermore, the investor cashes out 5 euros in stock 1
shortly thereafter (assuming stock 1 does not appreciate). At time t investor only has stock 2 and
holds a portfolio worth 5 euros. The robo-investor can buy stock 1 and 2 for a value of portfolio
up to 5 euros but suppose expected returns are negative for stock 1 so only holds stock 2. In
the end investor and shadow Alter Ego both hold the same portfolio. In this example, the time t
+ 1 returns from the robo-investor’s strategy are going to be independent of the actions that the
investor takes with respect to their non-negative (could be 0) allocation between stocks 1 and 2
at time t. The robo-investor only sees that the investment opportunity set has remained the same.
Table B.2 provides a few scenarios - including the aforementioned one - which show that the return
calculations are relatively robust to various cash inflow and outflow calculations.
t-1 Trading t t-1 Trading t t-1 Trading t
Stock 1 5 -5 0 5 -5 0 5 0 5
Stock 2 5 0 5 5 5 10 5 5 10
EMV 10 5 10 10 10 15
Cash-in 0 5 5
Cash-out 5 5
Return 0% 0% 0%
TABLE B.2: Illustrative Examples of Cash Flows and Return Computations
Two final additional filters were applied on the resulting portfolio gross returns (prior to trans-
action costs). First, we drop any investors if they had more than 106 missing values in their return
series (i.e. at least 4 months of returns are needed to keep an investor). Second, because of some
outliers, we disregard investors for whom we observe at least one month where the absolute value
2Historical price data come from both Eurofidai and Bloomberg.
145
of their return is greater than 100. These two filters decrease the sample from 22,972 to 20,622
investors.
In addition to the above information about trading activity, we have an extensive set of indi-
vidual investor characteristics, including age, gender, education, but also risk aversion, annual net
income, and amount invested in financial markets. Some of the individual characteristics are based
on surveys and pertain to gauging attitudes towards risk, i.e. measure risk aversion. These survey-
based individual investor measures of risk aversion are collected by the brokerage firm within
the context of the MiFID regulation for all EU member states that came into effect in November
2007.3 European regulation has made it compulsory for brokerage firms to collect specific infor-
mation about their retail clients’ needs and preferences. Accordingly, investment firms operating
in the EU are obliged to submit questionnaires (referred to as “MiFID tests”) to their clients in
order to determine their level of knowledge and experience, their investment objectives as well as
their financial literacy. MiFID tests can be viewed as regulated Investment Policy Statements (IPS)
required when any retail investor asks for financial advice and/or portfolio management services.
It is worth noting that the MiFID regulation does not impose standardized questionnaires. Each
brokerage firm is free to devise and organize its own questionnaire(s) provided it abides by some
general guidelines.4
B.1.2 Sample of stocks and ETFs
Table B.3 shows that the 683 stocks retained in our sample are international assets. Although
we work with Belgian individual investors, most of their trading activities concern foreign stocks
(mainly US and neighboring countries) despite the well-known home bias.5 This feature of our
data is mainly due to the small size of the Belgian stock market. About 150 stocks are listed on
the Euronext Brussels Stock Exchange in comparison to respectively, 1,791 and 2,545 domestic
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq (WFE Annual Statistics Guide
2017). Industry sectors are listed in Table B.4. The top 3 consist of technology (16.93%), financial
(15.91%), and industrial stocks (14.01%).
Table B.5 provides summary information about the ETFs in our sample. Most of them are
equities or commodities-linked. Although the majority of ETFs are passive (344 out of 393, i.e.
87%), some use a multiplier different from one. In particular, such leveraged and/or inverse ETFs
display the highest number of trades (i.e. 24,624) in the equities category. This is consistent
with the top 5 provided in Table B.6. Among the five most traded ETF, four are equities-linked,
and, more importantly, three of them are either leveraged, inverse or even leveraged-inverse. Our
sample period, which covers the 2008 financial crisis, probably explains why such non-passive
ETFs attracted some investors. Among the 4,693 investors who traded ETF, 3,225 focused only
on passive ETF; the others (i.e. 30%) traded non-passive ETFs (most of the time, in addition to
passive ETF). Table B.6 also reveals that the trading activity on ETFs is mainly concentrated on
some ETF, since the top 5 accounts for about 39% of the whole activity on ETFs (in number of
3MiFID stands for the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. MiFID I (2004/39/EC) is known as the
first version of this Directive while a review of it was recently implemented in January 2018 (known as Mi-
FID II (2014/65/UE)). For more details, please visit the European Commission website (http://ec.eurosopa.eu/
internal market/securities/isd/mifid2/index en.htm).
4For more details on the MiFID tests, please refer to Bellofatto, DHondt, and De Winne (2018).
5Investors’ nationality is not available in the data set but we can reasonably assume that most of the investors are
Belgian or based in Belgium.
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TABLE B.3. Trades cover 12,818 different stocks. Those with few trades are discarded and we keep 683 stocks,
which cover 71.5% of all the investors’ trading activity on stocks. The table shows the main countries where the 683
stocks in our sample originate.









Oil and Gas 8.46
Utilities 3.50
Telecommunications 1.89
TABLE B.4. Trades cover 12,818 different stocks. Those with few trades are discarded and we keep 683 stocks,
which cover 71.5% of all the investors’ trading activity on stocks. The table reports the proportion of stocks across
sectors based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry classification taxonomy. This information is
available for 680 stocks in our sample.
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Statistics about ETFs underlying asset (or basket of assets)
Underlying Multiplier=1 Multiplier 6= 1





Real Estate 6 0





Real Estate 205 0
TABLE B.5. Our sample is made of 393 different ETFs for a total number of 60,344 trades. The table reports
aggregate statistics per type of underlying asset (or basket of assets). For each category, we distinguish ETFs based on
their multiplier. When the multiplier is equal to one, the ETF simply tracks the underlying asset (or basket of assets).
When the multiplier differs from one, the ETF can be leveraged, inverse, or even leveraged-inverse depending on the
multiplier value. Panel A gives the number of ETFs while the corresponding number of trades are provided in Panel
B.
trades or in euros).
ETFs Top 5
Name # trades euros
Lyxor CAC 40 Daily (-2x) Inverse 10,098 (17%) 177,819,698 (20%)
Gold Bullion Securities ETC 4,080 (7%) 62,324,680 (7%)
Lyxor CAC 40 Daily (2x) Leveraged 3,583 (6%) 61,342,462 (7%)
Lyxor Euro Stoxx 50 Daily (-1x) Inverse 2,987 (5%) 28,499,711 (3%)
Lyxor BEL 20 ETFs 2,866 (5%) 17,453,004 (2%)
TABLE B.6. The table lists the five most traded ETFs in our sample. For each one, we report the aggregate number
of trades and the monetary value in euros. Corresponding percentages as a fraction of the whole trading activity on
the 393 ETFs are provided in brackets.
Table B.7 provides cross-sectional statistics about asset prices, monthly returns and risk factors.
The latter are estimated only for stocks using daily prices and Fama-French data available online.
Prices and market cap are in euros whereas returns are monthly. On average, the stocks in our
sample have a one percent monthly return and 11 percent volatility. They are slightly right skewed
and not surprisingly feature fat tails. For ETF, the average monthly return is 3.23% with an average
volatility of 37.84%.
B.1.3 Sample of investors
Table B.8 shows that 10.11% of investors are female. Moreover, our sample is mainly com-
posed of highly educated investors since 73.59% of them have a university degree or equivalent.
As for risk aversion, the majority of investors seem to be risk tolerant since 65.33% of them are
classified as medium risk averse and 27.88% of them even featuring low risk aversion. When
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Cross-sectional statistics for asset prices, monthly returns and risk factors
Mean Q3 Median Q1
Panel A : Stocks
Price (euros) 39.74 34.41 19.49 9.92
Market Cap (euros) 14,485.74 13,112.77 2,601.70 591.39
Return (%) 1.01 1.68 0.88 0.32
Volatility (%) 11.02 13.52 10.52 7.79
Skewness 0.1956 0.5368 0.1348 -0.2125
Kurtosis 2.3082 2.9150 1.3910 0.6234
Market 0.3923 0.5817 0.4183 0.2083
SMB -0.3823 0.1498 -0.3426 -0.8722
HML 0.2931 0.5454 0.2690 -0.0138
RMW -0.0569 0.1744 -0.1136 -0.5022
CMA -0.3884 -0.1029 -0.3365 -0.6760
Momentum 0.1449 0.3312 0.1243 -0.0724
Panel B : ETF
Price (euros) 74.57 88.82 35.75 19.25
Return (%) 3.23 0.95 0.35 -0.08
Volatility (%) 37.84 8.73 6.26 4.83
Skewness -0.1216 0.1963 -0.1839 -0.4933
Kurtosis 1.5899 1.6593 0.6270 0.0904
TABLE B.7. The table reports the cross-sectional mean, median, lower and upper quartiles for asset prices and
monthly returns. Panel A refers to stocks while Panel B refers to ETF. Price is expressed in euros. Market Cap
is expressed in millions of euros and is based on the monthly number of shares outstanding available for the stocks
in our sample. Return is the monthly price return expressed in %. V olatility is the standard deviation of monthly
returns expressed in %. Skewness and Kurtosis computed on monthly returns are also provided. Market, SMB,
HML, RMW and CMA refer to the estimated Fama-French 5 factors for stocks. These factors summarize the
excess return on the market (Market), the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (SMB, Small Minus
Big), the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (HML, High Minus Low), the performance of robust
stocks relative to weak stocks (RMW , Robust Minus Weak), and the performance of conservative stocks relative to
aggressive stocks (CMA, Conservative Minus Aggressive). Momentum, which is the average return on the two
high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios, is also estimated using
Fama-French available data.
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considering the annual net income over the entire sample, we observe that about 70% of the in-
vestors declare an income between 20,000 and 75,000 euros. Only a minority (3.36%) earn more
than 150,000 euros per year. The income measure reported in our data is recorded once, when
the investor completed the MiFID tests. Hence, the classification may therefore be noisy over the
10-year sample period, particularly for the early entries. However, when looking at risk aversion
and income together, the income range 20,000-75,000 euros features the most investors with a low
or medium aversion while high risk averse investors tend to have lower incomes.
Investor Characteristics Joint Percentages
Gender Female Male Total
RA Income // Educ No HS Univ No HS Univ Total
Low <20,000 0.05 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.82 1.49 2.90 13.86
20,000-40,000 0.08 0.22 0.54 0.54 2.40 6.06 9.85 36.89
40,000-75,000 0.06 0.16 0.62 0.45 1.56 6.42 9.28 33.02
75,000-150,000 0.01 0.04 0.32 0.13 0.45 3.54 4.49 12.89
>150,000 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.14 1.01 1.37 27.88 3.36
Mid <20,000 0.14 0.41 0.66 0.74 2.06 4.01 8.01
20,000-40,000 0.22 0.74 1.72 1.56 5.10 15.66 25.01
40,000-75,000 0.14 0.30 1.45 1.20 2.90 16.53 22.52
75,000-150,000 0.07 0.07 0.54 0.34 0.45 6.45 7.94
>150,000 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.11 1.46 1.85 65.33
High <20,000 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.63 1.62 2.95
20,000-40,000 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.45 1.18 2.03
40,000-75,000 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.90 1.23
75,000-150,000 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.38 0.47
>150,000 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.13 6.80
Total 0.92 2.39 6.81 5.84 17.27 66.79
Total 10.11 89.90
6.76 19.66 73.59
TABLE B.8. The table reports investor characteristics joint percentages computed on survey data. For education
(Educ), ’No’ refers to investors without any degree, ’HS’ to investors with a secondary/high school degree, and ’Univ’
to investors with an university degree or equivalent. For risk aversion (RA), ’High’ refers to investors who state a high
risk aversion (i.e. they do not want to take any risks and prefer safe investments), ’Mid’ refers to investors who state
a medium risk aversion, and ’Low’ to investors who state a low risk aversion (i.e. they would invest even more when
facing a sharp loss of 20% to reduce their average purchase prices). For annual net income (Income), five categories
are available: lower than 20,000 euros, 20,000-40,000 euros, 40,000-75,000 euros, 75,000-150,000 euros, and larger
than 150,000 euros.
Table B.9 provides cross-sectional statistics for investors’ age, monthly trading activity and
portfolio. The average investor is about 48 years old. When focusing on stocks only (Panel A), the
average investor executes monthly 2.76 trades across 2.05 different stocks for a volume of 18,237
euros. Consistent with the literature, investors in our sample are under-diversified: the average
(median) investor holds a five-stock (three-stock) portfolio. The average end-of-month portfolio
value is about 28,003 euros (with a median value of about 7,552 euros). For comparison, Kumar
and Lee (2006) and Korniotis and Kumar (2013) document that a typical investor at a major U.S.
discount brokerage house over the period 1991-1996 holds a four-stock portfolio (with a median
of three) with an average size of 35,629 USD (with a median of 13,869 USD). Using a more recent
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sample, Leal, Loureiro, and Armada (2017) find that a typical investor at a Portuguese brokerage
holds 2.34 different stocks over the period 2003-2007. As a proxy of experience, we look at
Cross-sectional statistics for investors’ age, monthly trading activity and portfolio
Mean Q3 Median Q1
Age 48.57 58 48 38
Panel A : Stocks only
# trades 2.76 3 2 1.4
Volume (euros) 18,237.29 13,278.06 5,584.25 2,488.75
# ISIN 2.05 2.36 1.68 1.25
# assets 4.43 5.66 2.75 1.27
Portfolio value (euros) 28,003.08 22,350.32 7,552.07 2,484.01
# months 54.12 81 50 27
Return (%) 0.28 0.79 0.03 -0.70
Volatility (%) 10.63 11.66 8.02 5.89
Panel B : Stocks and ETF
# trades 3.88 4.22 2.66 1.88
Volume (euros) 29,211.35 20,936.43 9,115.29 4,430.90
# ISIN 2.73 3.15 2.18 1.6
# assets 6.68 9.17 4.5 2
Portfolio value (euros) 49,961.58 41,461.24 14,696.78 4,925.21
# months 57.47 88 59 29
Return (%) 0.42 0.72 0.13 -0.42
Volatility (%) 10.04 9.38 6.72 5.35
TABLE B.9. The table reports the cross-sectional mean, median, lower and upper quartiles for investors’ age as
well as trade-based and portfolio-based variables. Panel A refers to stocks only and Panel B refers to both stocks and
ETF. Consequently, statistics in Panel A are computed across the entire sample (i.e. 22,972 investors) while those
reported in Panel B are computed across the subsample of investors who traded ETFs in addition to stocks (i.e. 4,693
investors). Age is computed as the difference between 2012 and the investor’s year of birth. # trades is the monthly
number of trades executed. V olume is the corresponding monthly monetary volume in euros. # ISIN is the monthly
number of different assets traded. # assets is the monthly average number of assets held portfolio computed over
the holding period. Portfolio value is the corresponding monthly average market portfolio value in euros (without
cash holdings). # months refers to the portfolio holding period. Return is the monthly average gross portfolio
return expressed in % (without cash holdings). V olatility is the standard deviation of monthly gross portfolio returns
expressed in %.
the investor stock portfolio holding period (# months): our average investor holds stocks for
54.12 months out of 111. However, this average hides different holding patterns: 21,865 investors
(i.e. 95%) hold stocks at some point over the sample period. In particular, 1.9% of them hold
throughout, 1.5% hold then leave at some point, 81.5% enter and hold throughout and 15.1% enter
and exit.
In terms of performance, our average investor earns a monthly gross return of 0.28% on stocks,
with a volatility of 10.63%. This relatively high average volatility of individual stock portfolio
gross returns is not surprising given our sample period that includes market ups and downs.
Panel B of Table B.9 reports similar cross-sectional statistics for the subsample of investors
who traded both stocks and ETF. Not surprisingly, these investors exhibit a higher monthly trading
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Statistics for ETFs usage
ETFs users non-ETFs users
Age 51.40*** 47.85

















TABLE B.10. The table reports the mean age and characteristics percentages computed on survey data for investors
who traded ETFs (’ETF users’) versus those who did not (’non-ETF users’). ’Age’ is defined as the difference between
2012 and the investor’s year of birth. For the level of education (’Education’), ’No’ refers to investors without any
degree, ’HS’ to investors with a secondary/high school degree, and ’Univ’ to investors with an university degree or
equivalent. For the level of risk aversion (’Risk aversion’), ’High’ refers to investors who state a high risk aversion
(i.e. they do not want to take any risks and prefer safe investments), ’Mid’ refers to investors who state a medium risk
aversion, and ’Low’ to investors who state a low risk aversion (i.e. they would invest even more when facing a sharp
loss of 20% to reduce their average purchase prices). For annual net income (’Income’), ’High’ refers to investors
who report they earn more than 150,000 euros, ’Mid’ to investors who earn between 20,000-150,000 euros, and
’Low’ to investors who state earning less than 20,000 euros. For the amount invested in financial markets (’Amount
invested’), ’High’ refers to investors who report they invest more than 250,000 euros, ’Mid’ to investors who invest
between 50,000-250,000 euros, and ’Low’ to investors who invest less than 50,000 euros. *, **, *** indicate whether
percentages (or means) differ between ETF users and non-ETF users at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
activity, either in number of trades or in euros. Combining stocks and ETF, these investors hold
more diversified and wealthy portfolios: the typical investor holds a six-asset portfolio (with a
median of 4.5) with an average size of 49,961 euros (with a median of 14,696 euros). This better
diversification appears profitable since the average investor earns a monthly gross return of 0.42%,
with a volatility of 10.04%.
We should point out that almost all the variables in Table B.9 are positively skewed and dis-
play a large heterogeneity. This is consistent with usual tremendous variations in behavior and
in outcomes across individual investors (Barber and Odean (2013)). Finally, Table B.10 provides
statistics on ETF usage in our sample. They show that ETF users are somewhat older and that they
are more educated, report lower risk aversion, have higher income, invest more money in financial
markets. In addition, they are more active investors on stocks (based on both the number of trades
or the monetary volume traded).
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TABLE B.11: Summary Statistics Disposition Effect
Mean SD Median Obs
Global 8.60 23.83 3.35 20,622
Education
Low 7.36 15.76 2.81 1,374
High 8.49 25.60 3.24 15,149
Low-High pval 0.0467
Risk Aversion
Low 10.33 20.75 4.22 5,858
High 10.07 22.60 3.78 1,423
Low-High pval 0.7210
Income
Low 8.30 18.01 3.14 2,849
High 13.94 47.50 5.24 696
Low-High pval 0.0021
Notes: Summary statistics for the disposition effect – selling winners too soon, holding losers too long – as in Odean
(1998) for each investor. Entries to the table are the average disposition effect, their standard deviations, median and
sample sizes. The p-values (pval) of the differences in mean between high and low tests within education, risk aversion
and income investors are reported.
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B.1.4 Behavioral Biases
The investors in our sample feature the typical behavioral biases. We start with disposition
effect (DE) - selling winners too soon, holding on to losers too long - as in Odean (1998) for
each investor. The DE is a difference of proportions: Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) minus
Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR), where PGR = 100*Number of realized gains / (Number of
realized gains + Number of Paper Gains), the same reasoning for losses. Some summary statistics
of the disposition effect as observed for different sub-populations appear in Table B.11. Entries
to the table are the average disposition effect, their standard deviations, median and sample sizes.
Higher values imply large DE, meaning investors sell winners too soon and hold on to loosers
too long. We also report significance between means tests for the various sub-populations. For
all classifications there are important differences. Low minus high level of education result in
significant large DE for the former. Same for low minus high risk aversion and for low minus high
incomes. The results in Table B.11 indicate that less educated investors feature large DE effects
compared to their highly educated peers. Similarly, low income investors have large DE effects
than high income ones. Finally, high risk aversion also results in large DE compared to the less
averse investors.
TABLE B.12: Summary Statistics Monthly Trading Frequency Stocks and ETFs
Mean SD Median Obs
Global 2.80 3.22 2 22,972
Education
Low 2.80 3.25 2 1,563
High 2.76 3.28 2 16,868
Low-High pval 0.5760
Risk Aversion
Low 3.13 3.33 2.23 6,430
High 3.18 3.43 2.16 1,594
Low-High pval 0.6060
Income
Low 2.79 2.83 2 3,246
High 3.52 5.49 2.35 769
Low-High pval 0.0004
Notes: Summary statistics for trading frequency, defined as the average number of monthly trades, for each investor.
Entries to the table are the averages, standard deviations, median and sample sizes. The p-values (pval) of the differ-
ences in mean between high and low tests within education, risk aversion and income investors are reported.
Table B.12 tells us something about trading frequencies. The median investor trades two assets
a month, with a slightly higher mean of 2.8. There is very little variation in the median across
the various cross-sectional sample splits. The means of trading frequencies are also relatively flat
across the various sub-populations, with the exception perhaps for income, where high income
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investors trade more often.
B.1.5 Individual investor returns adjusted for cash holding
Our robo-investors have the option to hold cash. When anticipating a bear market, they can
reduce (or even avoid) market risk exposure by holding (only) cash. Our retail investors are also
allowed to hold cash but, unfortunately, cash holdings are not available in our dataset. Although our
monthly portfolio returns are relatively robust to various cash inflows and outflows (see Subsection
B.1.1), they are computed assuming that the weight of the cash account is zero. This can negatively
(positively) affect individual investor returns during bear (bull) market periods, which can lead to
some unfair comparisons with Alter-Egos that may benefit from the opportunity to invest in a risk-
free asset. In order to overcome this hurdle, we decide to estimate a proxy for the cash holding














FIG. B.2. This figure provides monthly realized returns with/without the cash adjustment for the median portfolio
over the sample period.
of each investor. This estimation relies on the following assumptions. (1) The cash account of
any investor is empty at the beginning of our sample period. (2) The cash account depends on the
investor’s trading activity: it increases by the monetary value of each sale and decreases by the
monetary value of each purchase. (3) Cash holdings cannot be negative, so that the cash account is
automatically fed for any purchase whose monetary value is exceeding the cash available. (4) The
cash account is not rewarded (return is 0%) as it is for our robo-advisors. Using our estimation
of the cash holdings at the end of each month, we are then able to compute the weight of cash
(wCash) in the investor end-of-month portfolio and calculate the monthly return adjusted for cash
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by multiplying the portfolio return by (1− wCash).6
Figure B.2 compares monthly individual investor returns with/without the cash adjustment for
the median portfolio over the sample period. As expected, taking into account investor cash hold-
ings reduces the range of returns. This reduction is especially substantial during the 2008 financial
crisis, indicating that some investors reduce their exposure to market risk.
FIG. B.3. Performance cumulative returns Global ETF versus its constituents, which are (a) US index - S&P 500
SPDR ETF (SPY), (b) Belgium index - iShares MSCI Belgium ETF (EWK) and (c) European index - iShares MSCI
Eurozone ETF (EZU).
6Of course, one could argue that a large amount of cash could be used by an investor to invest in real estate or
whatever. It is true that our proxy will not capture this kind of decision as it will not capture a cash contribution that
is slow to be invested in the portfolio. However it seems more reasonable to use this proxy than to assume a zero cash
account.
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TABLE B.13: Returns Monthly Rebalancing
Equities Equities & ETFs
Mean Median 25% 75% Mean Median 25% 75%
MV - Rolling Means/Linear Covariances
Mean -0.46 0.00 -4.71 3.44 0.17 0.00 -4.05 4.00
SD 12.52 12.63 8.45 16.51 12.09 12.07 8.47 15.78
Sharpe Ratio -0.03 -0.05 -0.43 0.33 0.01 0.01 -0.38 0.38
Max Draw 0.2105 0.0838 0.3315 0.2016 0.0841 0.3131
MV - ML Means/Linear Covariances
Mean -0.18 0.00 -5.90 5.48 0.60 0.32 -4.80 6.06
SD 18.11 18.31 12.60 23.58 17.72 17.79 12.57 22.72
Sharpe Ratio -0.01 0.00 -0.35 0.35 0.07 0.05 -0.30 0.39
Max Draw 0.2698 0.1120 0.4248 0.2686 0.1120 0.4156
MV - ML Means/Non-Linear Covariances
Mean 0.12 0.00 -5.52 5.57 0.19 0.02 -5.29 5.76
SD 17.79 18.05 12.24 23.27 17.41 17.42 12.04 22.66
Sharpe Ratio 0.02 0.02 -0.35 0.36 0.01 0.03 -0.33 0.38
Max Draw 0.2643 0.1060 0.4196 0.2610 0.1081 0.4143
Equal-Weighted
Mean -2.03 -1.32 -8.49 4.37 -1.79 -1.10 -8.04 4.60
SD 19.59 19.41 14.17 24.87 19.38 19.15 14.05 24.46
Sharpe Ratio -0.01 -0.09 -0.41 0.29 0.02 -0.08 -0.39 0.30
Max Draw 0.3591 0.1439 0.5735 0.3605 0.1473 0.5699
Notes: Entries are mean, median, first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles of the cross-sectional distributions of AI Alter Ego
returns for three Mean Variance (MV) types of robo-investors and one equally weighted (EW) considering only equity
holdings (left panel) or the entire universe of 683 stocks and 393 ETFs (right panel). The AI Alter Ego schemes are:
(a) MV with Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance, (b) Machine Learning (ML) Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods
displayed in Table 2.1, (c) ML Mean/Nonlinear Smoothed Variance, and finally the equally weighted portfolio scheme.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE B.17: AI Spreads Monthly Rebalancing
Equities Equities & ETFs
Mean Median 25% 75% Mean Median 25% 75%
MV - Rolling Means/Linear Covariances
Mean -43.44 -0.20 -13.73 12.67 -40.27 0.40 -13.01 12.86
SD 476.02 35.29 26.25 53.25 485.10 35.12 26.00 53.20
Sharpe Ratio -0.06 -0.00 -0.37 0.33 -0.05 0.01 -0.35 0.34
Max Draw 0.5357 0.3201 0.7452 0.5333 0.3165 0.7429
MV - ML/Linear Covariances
Mean -43.17 0.01 -14.07 13.37 -39.83 0.64 -12.87 13.73
SD 477.63 37.39 28.44 54.34 486.62 37.17 28.12 54.10
Sharpe Ratio -0.08 0.00 -0.36 0.33 -0.05 0.02 -0.33 0.34
Max Draw 0.5263 0.3184 0.7365 0.5182 0.3173 0.7295
MV - Rolling Means/Non-Linear Covariances
Mean -42.86 0.23 -13.78 13.44 -40.24 0.20 -13.47 13.41
SD 477.51 37.21 28.30 54.12 486.63 37.19 28.11 54.14
Sharpe Ratio -0.05 0.01 -0.35 0.34 -0.07 0.01 -0.35 0.34
Max Draw 0.5269 0.3171 0.7358 0.5300 0.3191 0.7401
Equal-Weighted
Mean -45.02 -1.88 -15.22 10.70 -42.23 -1.75 -15.03 10.71
SD 477.13 37.00 28.15 53.61 486.29 36.91 28.07 53.71
Sharpe Ratio -0.14 -0.05 -0.39 0.27 -0.12 -0.05 -0.38 0.27
Max Draw 0.5140 0.3097 0.7231 0.5162 0.3106 0.7295
Notes: Entries are mean, median, first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles of the cross-sectional distributions of the spreads
between AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns, rsi,t = r
ae
i,t - ri,t, for three Mean Variance (MV) types of robo-
investors and one equally weighted (EW) considering only equity holdings (left panel) or the entire universe of 683
stocks and 393 ETFs (right panel). The AI Alter Ego schemes are: (a) MV with Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance, (b)
Machine Learning (ML) Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods displayed in Table 2.1, (c) ML Mean/Nonlinear























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE B.21: Returns Quarterly Rebalancing
Equities Equities & ETFs
Mean Median 25% 75% Mean Median 25% 75%
MV - Rolling Means/Linear Covariances
Mean -0.25 0.00 -4.31 3.53 0.38 0.00 -3.43 4.16
SD 12.62 12.73 8.61 16.61 12.29 12.28 8.67 15.93
Sharpe Ratio 0.05 -0.03 -0.39 0.34 -0.18 0.03 -0.33 0.39
Max Draw 0.2022 0.0848 0.3259 0.1964 0.0840 0.3116
MV - ML Means/Linear Covariances
Mean 3.42 1.94 -2.92 9.14 3.84 2.56 -2.26 9.17
SD 17.80 17.96 11.80 23.58 17.22 17.32 11.77 22.47
Sharpe Ratio 0.15 0.17 -0.21 0.52 0.22 0.20 -0.16 0.54
Max Draw 0.2239 0.0916 0.3734 0.2248 0.0912 0.3725
MV - ML Means/Non-Linear Covariances
Mean 3.31 1.75 -2.85 8.89 3.62 2.11 -2.58 9.11
SD 17.55 17.75 11.49 23.39 17.13 17.01 11.32 22.66
Sharpe Ratio 0.07 0.16 -0.21 0.51 0.20 0.19 -0.19 0.54
Max Draw 0.2213 0.0891 0.3716 0.2192 0.0880 0.3675
Equal-Weighted
Mean -0.74 -0.34 -6.83 5.23 -0.51 -0.11 -6.40 5.45
SD 19.30 19.11 14.04 24.34 19.09 18.90 13.91 23.96
Sharpe Ratio -0.01 -0.04 -0.35 0.33 0.01 -0.02 -0.33 0.35
Max Draw 0.3449 0.1411 0.5387 0.3437 0.1440 0.5338
Notes: Entries are mean, median, first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles of the cross-sectional distributions of AI Alter Ego
returns for three Mean Variance (MV) types of robo-investors and one equally weighted (EW) considering only equity
holdings (left panel) or the entire universe of 683 stocks and 393 ETFs (right panel). The AI Alter Ego schemes are:
(a) MV with Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance, (b) Machine Learning (ML) Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods
displayed in Table 2.1, (c) ML Mean/Nonlinear Smoothed Variance, and finally the equally weighted portfolio scheme.
The spreads are in percentage per year.
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TABLE B.22: AI Spreads Quarterly Rebalancing
Equities Equities & ETFs
Mean Median 25% 75% Mean Median 25% 75%
MV - Rolling Means/Linear Covariances
Mean -43.23 -0.08 -13.60 12.84 -40.06 0.58 -12.72 13.16
SD 476.19 35.53 26.42 53.34 485.30 35.38 26.25 53.34
Sharpe Ratio -0.02 -0.00 -0.37 0.33 -0.03 0.02 -0.34 0.34
Max Draw 0.5363 0.3167 0.7476 0.5344 0.3150 0.7461
MV - ML/Linear Covariances
Mean -39.57 2.93 -10.66 17.41 -36.60 3.37 -10.19 17.20
SD 477.89 37.77 28.56 54.90 486.80 37.41 28.16 54.65
Sharpe Ratio 0.02 0.08 -0.28 0.41 0.05 0.10 -0.27 0.41
Max Draw 0.5029 0.3017 0.7224 0.4994 0.3001 0.7213
MV - Rolling Means/Non-Linear Covariances
Mean -39.67 2.78 -10.72 17.13 -36.82 2.96 -10.49 17.09
SD 477.80 37.60 28.43 54.91 486.88 37.52 28.25 54.89
Sharpe Ratio 0.05 0.08 -0.28 0.41 0.01 0.08 -0.28 0.41
Max Draw 0.5041 0.3022 0.7220 0.5080 0.3036 0.7279
Equal-Weighted
Mean -43.73 -0.67 -13.88 11.96 -40.95 -0.54 -13.68 11.98
SD 477.24 37.03 28.11 53.76 486.39 36.94 28.04 53.81
Sharpe Ratio -0.13 -0.02 -0.36 0.30 -0.21 -0.01 -0.35 0.30
Max Draw 0.5003 0.3063 0.7073 0.5032 0.3065 0.7143
Notes: Entries are mean, median, first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles of the cross-sectional distributions of the spreads
between AI Alter Ego and individual investor returns, rsi,t = r
ae
i,t - ri,t, for three Mean Variance (MV) types of robo-
investors and one equally weighted (EW) considering only equity holdings (left panel) or the entire universe of 683
stocks and 393 ETFs (right panel). The AI Alter Ego schemes are: (a) MV with Rolling Mean/Rolling Variance, (b)
Machine Learning (ML) Mean/Rolling Variance - using the methods displayed in Table 2.1, (c) ML Mean/Nonlinear


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE B.33: Disposition Effect and Alter Ego Spreads - Quantile Regressions
5% 10% 20% 50% 80% 90% 95%
Disposition Effect 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.011 0.023 -0.002 -0.089
Trading freq. 2nd quartile -0.386** -0.367 -0.839** -1.167* -2.620 -7.759 -10.388
Trading freq. 3rd quartile -0.276* -0.432 -1.021*** -1.760*** -5.180*** -10.000* -8.060
Trading freq. 4th quartile -0.408** -0.535 -0.836** -2.597*** -4.411** -5.201 8.533
Male -0.090 -0.326 -0.023 1.493*** 3.397* 7.608 21.233**
Educ. HS -0.078 0.160 -0.251 -0.767 -0.410 8.156 -15.957
Educ. University 0.019 0.348 -0.073 -0.917 -1.827 -0.182 -26.987
Aversion - Medium 0.164 -0.023 0.138 -0.161 1.345 6.485** 9.052
Aversion - High 0.022 -0.263 -0.319 -0.569 3.010 11.655 33.829
Income: 20k-40k 0.119 0.017 -0.191 0.666 0.540 -3.548 19.814
Income: 40k-75k 0.405** 0.304 0.266 0.652 1.344 1.427 21.032
Income: 75k-150k 0.172 0.129 0.453 2.265*** 1.030 -7.159 9.198
Income: > 150k 0.454** -0.074 0.656 3.986** 11.372** 16.875 73.250
Funds invested: 20k-50k 0.082 0.141 -0.022 -0.990* -2.422 0.058 7.729
Funds invested: 50k-250k 0.096 0.071 -0.141 -1.212** -2.912* -5.473 -7.889
Funds invested: 250k-1MM -0.082 -0.101 -0.276 -1.914*** -3.900** -1.577 -4.796
Funds invested: > 1 MM 0.189 0.844 -0.137 -2.645*** -5.885* -2.518 -21.711
ETFs 0.042 0.084 0.177 0.599 2.300 5.698 8.129
Levered ETFs 0.076 -0.094 -0.692 -0.867 -4.786 -13.864* -4.731
Constant 1.394*** 2.783*** 6.068*** 15.659*** 37.703*** 61.315*** 104.718**
Notes: Cross-sectional Regressions Alter Ego Spreads on DE with MV ML/Rolling, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 and ***
p<0.01.
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TABLE B.34. Disposition Effect and Alter Ego Spreads vis-à-vis S&P 500 ETF - Quantile Regres-
sions
5% 10% 20% 50% 80% 90% 95%
Disposition Effect -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.005** 0.002 -0.002 -0.011**
Trading freq. 2nd quartile -0.185 0.198 0.482*** 0.770*** 0.639*** 0.628** 0.358
Trading freq. 3rd quartile -0.164 0.219 0.716*** 1.245*** 1.254*** 1.140*** 1.182**
Trading freq. 4th quartile -0.436* -0.114 0.649*** 1.321*** 1.402*** 1.478*** 1.226**
Male -0.234 -0.163 -0.168 0.089 0.226 0.054 0.526*
Educ. HS -0.070 -0.415 -0.268 -0.061 0.237 0.564** 0.740**
Educ. University 0.198 -0.355 0.001 0.198 0.211 0.575** 0.832***
Aversion - Medium 0.198 0.146 0.226** 0.085 -0.040 -0.034 -0.028
Aversion - High 0.361 0.555** 0.286 -0.316 -0.449* -0.713** -0.799*
Income: 20k-40k 0.003 -0.017 0.039 -0.039 0.089 -0.006 -0.114
Income: 40k-75k -0.025 0.178 0.150 -0.083 0.148 0.072 0.122
Income: 75k-150k 0.630** 0.723*** 0.584*** 0.190 0.381 0.197 0.674
Income: > 150k 0.334 0.885** 0.519 0.561 0.443 1.385* 1.068
Funds invested: 20k-50k 0.246 0.072 0.084 -0.347** -0.259 -0.149 0.020
Funds invested: 50k-250k -0.232 -0.339* -0.170 -0.305** -0.339** 0.061 0.275
Funds invested: 250k-1MM -0.100 -0.454** -0.205 -0.626*** -0.619*** -0.040 -0.220
Funds invested: > 1 MM -0.204 -0.676** -0.695** -0.382 -0.806*** -0.698 0.570
ETFs -0.150 -0.029 0.036 -0.167 -0.226 -0.241 -0.269
Levered ETFs -0.089 0.069 -0.378 -0.305 -0.170 -0.073 -0.872**
Constant -11.909*** -9.812*** -8.439*** -4.112*** 1.053** 3.631*** 5.740***




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE B.36: Monthly trading activity and portfolio depending on investor income
High Mid Low
Panel A : Stocks only
# trades 2.3 2 2
Volume (euros) 14,495.05 6,283.50 4,828.43
# ISIN 2 1.71 1.66
# assets 3.66 2.92 2.55
Portfolio value (euros) 24,166.58 9,197.40 5,948.34
# months 62 53 46
Return (%) 0.16 0.08 -0.02
Volatility (%) 7.14 7.83 8.28
Panel B : Stocks and ETF
# trades 3.27 2.67 2.62
Volume (euros) 21,717.59 9,756.52 7,829.03
# ISIN 2.56 2.19 2.12
# assets 6.96 4.89 4.08
Portfolio value (euros) 43,983.19 17,435.81 11,276.56
# months 69 62 55
Return (%) 0.22 0.16 0.08
Volatility (%) 6.08 6.68 6.89
Notes: The table reports the cross-sectional median for trade-based and portfolio-based variables depending on in-
vestor income. Panel A refers to stocks only and Panel B refers to both stocks and ETF. Consequently, statistics in
Panel A are computed across the entire sample (i.e. 22,972 investors) while those reported in Panel B are computed
across the subsample of investors who traded ETF in addition to stocks (i.e. 4,693 investors). # trades is the monthly
number of trades executed. V olume is the corresponding monthly monetary volume in euros. # ISIN is the monthly
number of different assets traded. # assets is the monthly average number of assets held portfolio computed over the
holding period. Portfolio value is the corresponding monthly average market portfolio value in euros. # months
refers to the portfolio holding period. Return is the monthly average gross portfolio return expressed in %. V olatility
is the standard deviation of monthly gross portfolio returns expressed in %. For annual net income (’income’), ’High’
refers to investors who report they earn more than 150,000 euros, ’Mid’ to investors who earn between 40,000-150,000
euros, and ’Low’ to investors who state earning less than 40,000 euros.
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TABLE B.37: Monthly trading activity and portfolio depending on investor risk aversion
High Mid Low
Panel A : Stocks only
# trades 2.14 1.92 2.2
Volume (euros) 6,341.79 5,142.82 6,711.00
# ISIN 1.75 1.65 1.79
# assets 2.19 2.75 2.87
Portfolio value (euros) 6,208.07 7,150.70 9,263.56
# months 49 50 50
Return (%) 0.03 0.03 0.04
Volatility (%) 7.93 7.92 8.30
Panel B : Stocks and ETF
# trades 2.99 2.5 2.91
Volume (euros) 11,189.66 8,558.09 9,928.17
# ISIN 2.29 2.1 2.3
# assets 3.12 4.48 4.98
Portfolio value (euros) 10,128.04 14,261.04 16,703.92
# months 56 59 60
Return (%) 0.14 0.12 0.16
Volatility (%) 6.82 6.56 7.15
Notes: The table reports the cross-sectional median for trade-based and portfolio-based variables depending on in-
vestor risk aversion. Panel A refers to stocks only and Panel B refers to both stocks and ETF. Consequently, statistics
in Panel A are computed across the entire sample (i.e. 22,972 investors) while those reported in Panel B are com-
puted across the subsample of investors who traded ETF in addition to stocks (i.e. 4,693 investors). # trades is the
monthly number of trades executed. V olume is the corresponding monthly monetary volume in euros. # ISIN is the
monthly number of different assets traded. # assets is the monthly average number of assets held portfolio computed
over the holding period. Portfolio value is the corresponding monthly average market portfolio value in euros. #
months refers to the portfolio holding period. Return is the monthly average gross portfolio return expressed in %.
V olatility is the standard deviation of monthly gross portfolio returns expressed in %. For the level of risk aversion
(’risk aversion’), ’High’ refers to investors who state a high risk aversion (i.e. they do not want to take any risks and
prefer safe investments), ’Mid’ refers to investors who state a medium risk aversion, and ’Low’ to investors who state
a low risk aversion (i.e. they would invest even more when facing a sharp loss of 20% to reduce their average purchase
prices).
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TABLE B.38: Monthly trading activity and portfolio depending on investor education
Univ HS No
Panel A : Stocks only
# trades 2 2.12 2
Volume (euros) 5,525.23 6,048.64 5,208.12
# ISIN 1.67 1.75 1.67
# assets 2.84 2.59 2.39
Portfolio value (euros) 7,760.13 7,369.06 6,145.48
# months 51 51 44
Return (%) 0.06 -0.06 -0.04
Volatility (%) 7.85 8.42 8.76
Panel B : Stocks and ETF
# trades 2.61 2.90 2.70
Volume (euros) 8,815.49 10,182.63 9,582.28
# ISIN 2.15 2.34 2.24
# assets 4.54 4.43 3.58
Portfolio value (euros) 15,033.30 14,801.56 9,906.08
# months 59 61.5 53
Return (%) 0.14 0.07 0.00
Volatility (%) 6.67 6.86 7.37
Notes: The table reports the cross-sectional median for trade-based and portfolio-based variables depending on in-
vestor education. Panel A refers to stocks only and Panel B refers to both stocks and ETF. Consequently, statistics
in Panel A are computed across the entire sample (i.e. 22,972 investors) while those reported in Panel B are com-
puted across the subsample of investors who traded ETF in addition to stocks (i.e. 4,693 investors). # trades is the
monthly number of trades executed. V olume is the corresponding monthly monetary volume in euros. # ISIN is the
monthly number of different assets traded. # assets is the monthly average number of assets held portfolio computed
over the holding period. Portfolio value is the corresponding monthly average market portfolio value in euros. #
months refers to the portfolio holding period. Return is the monthly average gross portfolio return expressed in %.
V olatility is the standard deviation of monthly gross portfolio returns expressed in %. For the level of education
(’education’), ’No’ refers to investors without any degree, ’HS’ to investors with a secondary/high school degree, and
’Univ’ to investors with an university degree or equivalent.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Additional statistics and tests
In table C.1, we provide the most frequent industries in both our high and low R&D-intensity
sorted portfolios.
TABLE C.1: Top 10 Industries in R&D Intensity Sorted Portfolio
Panel A: All Firms
Low-R&D High-R&D
Category % Count Category % Count
Eating Places 9.9 Prepackaged Software 12.9
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gs 3.6 Pharmaceutical Preparations 11.5
Grocery Stores 3.5 Biological Pds, Ex Diagnstics 10.2
Misc Amusement and Rec Service 3.0 Semiconductor,Related Device 6.8
Variety Stores 2.6 Electromedical Apparatus 3.7
Hotels and Motels 2.5 In Vitro,In Vivo Diagnostics 3.4
Women’s Clothing Stores 2.5 Cmp Integrated Sys Design 3.3
Real Estate Investment Trust 2.2 Computer Communications Equip 3.3
Department Stores 2.0 Radio, TV Broadcast, Comm Eq 3.0
Computers and Software-Whsl 1.8 Tele and Telegraph Apparatus 2.9
Total 33.4 Total 61.2
Panel B: Positive R&D Firms
Low-R&D High-R&D
Category % Count Category % Count
Petroleum Refining 5.4 Prepackaged Software 12.8
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gs 3.3 Pharmaceutical Preparations 11.6
Steel Works and Blast Furnaces 3.1 Biological Pds, Ex Diagnstics 10.4
Phone Comm Ex Radiotelephone 2.8 Semiconductor,Related Device 6.7
Mng, Quarry Nonmtl Minerals 1.8 Electromedical Apparatus 3.7
Metal Mining 1.8 In Vitro,In Vivo Diagnostics 3.5
Indl Inorganic Chemicals 1.6 Computer Communications Equip 3.3
Radiotelephone Communication 1.4 Cmp Integrated Sys Design 3.3
Paper Mills 1.3 Radio, TV Broadcast, Comm Eq 3.0
Paperboard Mills 1.2 Tele and Telegraph Apparatus 2.9
Total 23.7 Total 61.3
Notes: This table shows the top-10 industries in our baseline high and low R&D-sorted portfolios. We
count SIC codes across time and firms in each portfolio and report the most frequent industries within each
portfolio. In Panel A, we include all firm. In Panel B, we only consider firms with positive R&D expense.
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In table C.2, we provide predictability regressions based on five portfolios sorted on R&D
intensity. Each portfolio comprises an equal number of firms.
TABLE C.2: DGDP and Predictability of Returns to Innovation (II)
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20
HML-R&D (EW) 0.06 0.11 0.26∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.70)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.48
HML-R&D (VW) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (1.16)
R2 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.33
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regression:
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return and DGDP is the debt-to-
output ratio. We report results for the portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks and short in our low-R&D
stocks (HML-R&D), where returns are either equal-weighted (EW) or value-weighted (VW). The underlying
portfolios are constructed by sorting firms based on innovation intensity into five portfolios, each with an
equal number of firms. Innovation intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Our
quarterly sample is 1975:Q1–2013:Q4. Estimated coefficients have been adjusted with the Stambaugh bias
correction. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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In table C.3, we report basic statistics on a restricted sample, in which we consider only firms
with positive R&D expenditures.
TABLE C.3: Data Summary Statistics – Positive R&D Firms
Low Middle High HML-R&D
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Portfolio Returns
Mean 13.97∗∗∗ 16.07∗∗∗ 23.81∗∗∗ 10.39∗∗∗
(3.74) (3.56) (4.51) (3.19)
Standard Deviation 25.81 24.57 31.15 22.04
Sample Size 191 191 191 191
Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolio Returns
Mean 5.65∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗ 9.41∗∗∗
(2.87) (2.66) (3.67) (3.08)
Standard Deviation 19.80 18.37 25.33 21.31
Sample Size 191 191 191 191
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for three R&D-sorted portfolios and the implied HML-R&D
portfolio. We only include firms with positive R&D expense in our cross section. Equal-weighted returns
are presented in Panel A and value-weighted returns are presented in Panel B. All returns are presented in
annualized percentages. Our quarterly sample starts in 1966:Q2 and ends in 2013:Q4. Standard errors are in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.4 shows summary statistics for both equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns.
TABLE C.4: Portfolio Summary Statistics – Allocated by Number of Firms
Low High HML-R&D
Equally-Weighted Returns
Mean 22.95∗∗∗ 36.55∗∗∗ 13.61∗∗∗
(3.96) (5.98) (4.52)
Standard Deviation 24.75 37.36 28.26
Sample Size (number of quarters) 156 156 156
Value-Weighted Returns
Mean 17.81∗∗∗ 35.33∗∗∗ 17.52∗∗∗
(4.12) (6.09) (5.45)
Standard Deviation 25.75 38.04 34.03
Sample Size (number of quarters) 156 156 156
Portfolio Characteristics
Market Capital Share 6.59 1.49 8.08
R&D/Assets 0.01 32.07 16.04
Sales/Assets 0.59 0.02 0.31
Leverage 60 45 53
Average Number of Firms 205 205
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for two R&D-sorted portfolios and the implied HML-R&D
portfolio. We present results for returns in annualized percentages that are both equal-weighted and value-
weighted. The average market capital share, R&D/Assets, Sales/Assets, and Leverage are presented in
percentages. R&D/Assets is defined as annual research & development expenses divided by total assets and
is used as our benchmark measure of R&D intensity. Our two extreme portfolios cover at least 10% of the
number of firms. Sales/Assets is defined as annual net sales divided by total assets. Book leverage is defined
as 1 - Tot. Equity/Tot. Assets. Our quarterly sample starts in 1975:Q1 and ends in 2013:Q4. Standard
errors are in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table C.5 shows sensitivity of our baseline estimates with respect to the lag chosen in the
Newey-West estimator.
TABLE C.5: Tstat by Newey-West Lags – HML R&D Returns
Lag (quarters)
Point estimate 2 4 6 8 24
2.76 5.19 4.29 3.92 3.76 4.09
Notes: This table shows sensitivity results from varying the lags for computing Newey-West (1987) standard
errors in our univariate predictive return regressions. The estimate is performed without adjusting for the
Stambaugh bias correction (in table 3.2, the adjusted estimate is 2.31). We report results from the HML-R&D
equal-weighted returns for the predictive regression at 20 quarters horizon using our baseline portfolios.
Data are from 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q4.
Table C.6 documents sensitivity of our baseline estimates with respect to additional return
predictors. Table C.7 presents results from predictive regressions based on characteristic-adjusted
returns.
TABLE C.6: Predictive Regression for HML-R&D – Additional Factors
βJDGDP t-stat
First 2 principle components 2.96 2.44
First 3 principle components 2.94 2.39
First 2 principle components plus PD and MV 1.99 2.00
First 3 principle components plus PD and MV 1.99 2.00
Notes: This table shows predictive return regressions using principle components from the panel of regres-
sors used in Welch and Goyal (2008) (WG). We report results for our equal-weighted R&D-HML portfolio
at a horizon of 20 quarters by estimating Rt→t+J = β0 + βJDGDPDGDPt + β
′J
WWGt + εt+J , where WGt
represents either the first two or three principle components from a panel of the Goyal and Welch regressors.
We also control for integrated market returns volatility (MV ) and price-dividends (PD) ratio.
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TABLE C.7: Predictive Regressions - HML-R&D Adjusted Returns
Univariate–βDGDP Multivariate–βDGDP
Horizon J 1 2 4 8 20 1 2 4 8 20
Asset/Book Equity 0.13 0.15 0.19∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20) (0.03) (0.06) (0.11) (0.21) (0.57)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.53 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.52
Asset/Market Equity 0.10 0.11 0.16∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.33∗ 2.21∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.20) (0.62)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.48 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.40
KZ Index 0.13 0.15 0.19∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.14∗ 0.29∗ 0.73∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.04) (0.08) (0.17) (0.37) (0.55)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.55 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.63
SA Index 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.16∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.32 2.73∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.21) (0.04) (0.07) (0.14) (0.29) (0.82)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.39 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.40
Notes: This table predictive return regressions with characteristic adjusted equal-weighted returns for the
HML-R&D portfolio. We separately adjust for asset/book equity, asset/market equity, KZ index, and SA
index. The KZ index is constructed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and the SA index is constructed
following Hadlock and Pierce (2010). We follow the methods in Titman et al. (2004) to form characteristic
adjusted returns. Univariate refers to the following regressionRt→t+J = β0+βJDGDPDGDPt+εt+J . In the
multivariate regressions, we control for integrated market volatility (MV ) and the aggregate price-dividends
(PD) ratio.
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In Table C.8 we use the growth rate of the debt-to-output ratio, ∆DGDP , as a return predictor.
Panel A shows that our model predicts that ∆DGDP has no predictive power for the HML-R&D
portfolio and for market excess returns, and panel B verifies that this prediction is true in our data
sample.
TABLE C.8: DGDP and Predictability of Returns to Innovation
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20
Panel A: Model
Using DGDP as Predictor
HML-R&D 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.37
R2 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14
Market 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Using ∆DGDP as Predictor
HML-R&D −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Market −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Data
Using ∆DGDP as Predictor
HML-R&D −0.46 −0.17 −0.42 0.48 4.78
(1.10) (2.03) (3.81) (6.26) (10.13)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Market 0.98 2.15 3.68 6.74 14.93∗∗
(0.80) (1.38) (2.29) (3.85) (5.92)
R2 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.14
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regressions:
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J ,
and
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
∆DGDP∆DGDPt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return and DGDP denotes the debt-
to-output ratio. In Panel A, all results are based on a long sample simulation of our benchmark model. In
panel B, we run the regressions described in table 2 using ∆DGDP as predictor, as opposed to DGDP .
Estimated coefficients have been adjusted with the Stambaugh bias correction. Bootstrap standard errors are
in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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In tables C.9 and C.10, we show that even when we restrict our sample to firms with positive
R&D expenditures, high levels of government debt forecast higher expected returns for our HML-
R&D portfolio. In this case, returns are equal-weighted. Tables C.11–C.12 are based on value-
weighted results.
TABLE C.9: DGDP and Predictability of Returns to Innovation
(Positive R&D Firms-EW)
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20
βJDGDP
Low-R&D 0.13∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 1.26
(0.04) (0.08) (0.16) (0.35) (0.94)
R2 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.13
High-R&D 0.16∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.11) (0.21) (0.41) (1.20)
R2 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.33
HML-R&D 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.28 1.86∗∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.14) (0.25) (0.77)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.35
Market 0.11∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.21) (0.52)
R2 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.33 0.47
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regression:






MVMVt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return, PD denotes the aggregate
price-dividend ratio, and MV refers to market integrated volatility. We report results for our bottom-10 (Low-
R&D) and top-10 (High-R&D) portfolios, the full market portfolio, and a portfolio long in our high-R&D
stocks and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-R&D). Returns are equal-weighted. Innovation intensity is
measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. We only include firms with positive R&D expense
in our cross-section. Our quarterly sample is 1966:Q2–2013:Q4. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE C.10: PD, MV and Predictability of Returns to Innovation
(Pos. R&D Firms-EW)
Horizon J 1 2 4 8 20
βJPD
Low-R&D −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗ −0.0077∗
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0046)
High-R&D −0.0005 −0.0008 −0.0014 −0.0008 −0.0022
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0043)
HML-R&D 0.0007 0.0013 0.0026 0.0056 0.0055
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0041)
Market −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0147∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0040)
βJMV
Low-R&D 1.00∗ 2.03∗∗∗ 2.86∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 4.17∗∗
(0.58) (0.60) (0.92) (1.19) (1.72)
High-R&D 0.83∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗ 6.29∗∗
(0.45) (0.43) (0.90) (1.53) (2.60)
HML-R&D −0.16 0.05 0.74 1.27 2.12∗
(0.35) (0.45) (0.68) (0.97) (1.09)
Market 0.31 0.88∗ 1.12∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 1.71
(0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.62) (1.08)
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regression:






MVMVt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative return, PD denotes the aggregate price-
dividend ratio, and MV refers to market integrated volatility. We report results for both our bottom-10 (Low-
R&D) and top-10 (High-R&D) portfolios, the full market portfolio, and a portfolio long in our high-R&D
stocks and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-R&D). Returns are equal-weighted. Innovation intensity is
measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. We only include firms with positive R&D expense
in our cross-section. Our quarterly sample is 1966:Q2–2013:Q4. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE C.11: DGDP and Predictability of Returns to Innovation
(Positive R&D Firms-VW)
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20
βJDGDP
Low-R&D 0.13∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.14) (0.28) (0.60)
R2 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.28 0.29
High-R&D 0.21∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.13) (0.23) (0.58)
R2 0.08 0.13 0.23 0.38 0.58
HML-R&D 0.08∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.31)
R2 0.08 0.13 0.23 0.38 0.58
Market 0.11∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.21) (0.52)
R2 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.33 0.47
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regression:






MVMVt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return, PD denotes the aggregate
price-dividend ratio, and MV refers to market integrated volatility. We report results for our bottom-10 (Low-
R&D) and top-10 (High-R&D) portfolios, the full market portfolio, and a portfolio long in our high-R&D
stocks and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-R&D). Returns are value-weighted. Innovation intensity is
measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. We only include firms with positive R&D expense
in our cross-section. Our quarterly sample is 1966:Q2–2013:Q4. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE C.12: PD, MV and Predictability of Returns to Innovation
(Pos. R&D Firms-VW)
Horizon J 1 2 4 8 20
βJPD
Low-R&D −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0040)
High-R&D −0.0010∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0034)
HML-R&D 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0021∗ 0.0034∗
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0019)
Market −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0147∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0040)
βJMV
Low-R&D 0.15 0.64 1.00 1.87 2.13
(0.31) (0.49) (0.81) (1.31) (1.33)
High-R&D 0.53∗ 1.08∗∗ 1.70∗∗ 2.50∗∗ 3.20∗∗
(0.29) (0.49) (0.78) (1.27) (1.31)
HML-R&D 0.38∗∗ 0.45 0.70 0.63 1.07∗
(0.18) (0.35) (0.55) (0.77) (0.57)
Market 0.31 0.88∗ 1.12∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 1.71
(0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.62) (1.08)
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regression:






MVMVt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative return, PD denotes the aggregate price-
dividend ratio, and MV refers to market integrated volatility. We report results for both our bottom-10 (Low-
R&D) and top-10 (High-R&D) portfolios, the full market portfolio, and a portfolio long in our high-R&D
stocks and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-R&D). Returns are value-weighted. Innovation intensity is
measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. We only include firms with positive R&D expense
in our cross-section. Our quarterly sample is 1966:Q2–2013:Q4. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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In table C.13 we form equally weighted portfolios and compute their returns assuming that
no further rebalancing of the holdings takes place for the next four quarters. For the sake of
completeness, we consider both the case in which dividends are reinvested and the case in which
dividends are not reinvested. The latter case corresponds to keeping fixed the number of shares in
our portfolios throughout the year. Our main predictability results hold also in these settings over
the 2-year and 5-year horizons.
TABLE C.13: DGDP and Predictability with Annual Re-balance
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20
With Quarterly Dividends Reinvestment
HML-R&D 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.54∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.12) (0.14) (0.21) (0.95)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.33
No Dividends Reinvestment
HML-R&D 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.50∗∗ 2.59∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.98)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.29
Notes: This table shows results from the following predictive regression:
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return and DGDP denotes the debt-
to-output ratio. We report results for a portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks and short in our low-R&D
stocks (HML-R&D). Innovation intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Returns
are from a buy-and-hold strategy of portfolios formed once a year with equal weights. We consider both the
case with and without dividends reinvestment. Our quarterly sample is 1975:Q1–2013:Q4. Estimated coeffi-
cients have been adjusted with the Stambaugh bias correction. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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In table C.14 we sort portfolios according to the Lin (2012) measure of innovation intensity,
i.e., the ratio of R&D and capital expenditure. As in the analysis presented in the main text, we
find that DGDP predicts higher HML-R&D.













Small–Low B/M 0.15∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Small–High B/M 0.14∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Big–Low B/M 0.12∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Big–High B/M 0.07∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
EV VW
∆DGDP ∆TFP ∆GY ∆DGDP ∆TFP ∆GY
Price of risk, λ −0.002 0.008∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
J-Test 8.54 8.54
p-value 1.00 1.00
Notes: This table shows results from our GMM estimation of the conditional macro factor model de-
tailed in the system of equations (3.25). Our macro factors consist of changes to debt-to-output ratio







j λj , where λj denotes the market price of risk for factor j. EW (VW)
denotes equal-weighted (value-weighted) returns. Our portfolio are sorted on R&D-to-capital expenditure
(capx) as in Lin (2012). The set of test assets includes: our bottom-10 (Low-R&D) and top-10 (High-R&D)
portfolios; our ‘Middle’ portfolio; a portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks and short in our low-R&D
stocks (HML-R&D); the Fama-French 25 size/book-market-sorted portfolios; and the full market portfolio.
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. Data are from 1966:Q2 to 2013:Q4. One, two, and
three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Our J-Test is based on 27
degrees of freedom.
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In table C.15, we confirm that our predictability results also hold when we focus only on
positive-R&D firms.













Small–Low B/M 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Small–High B/M 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Big–Low B/M 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)







∆DGDP ∆TFP ∆GY ∆DGDP ∆TFP ∆GY
Price of risk, λ −0.006∗ 0.008∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
J-Test 31.80 38.80
p-value 1.00 0.99
Notes: This table shows results from our GMM estimation of the conditional macro factor model de-
tailed in the system of equations (3.25). Our macro factors consist of changes to debt-to-output ratio







j λj , where λj denotes the market price of risk for factor j. EW (VW)
denotes equal-weighted (value-weighted) returns. The set of test assets includes: our bottom-10 (Low-
R&D) and top-10 (High-R&D) portfolios; our ‘Middle’ portfolio; a portfolio long in our high-R&D stocks
and short in our low-R&D stocks (HML-R&D); the Fama-French 25 size/book-market-sorted portfolios; and
the full market portfolio. We only include firms with positive R&D expense in our cross-section. Newey-
West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. Data are from 1966:Q2 to 2013:Q4. One, two, and three
asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Our J-Test is based on 29 degrees
of freedom.
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Table C.16 uses financial constraints adjusted returns to evaluate the conditional 3-factor macro
model.
TABLE C.16: Conditional Macro Factors Model – Financially Constrained Adjusted
Returns
KZ Index SA Index
Price of risk, λ Price of risk, λ
TWX OLS TWX OLS
Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
DGDP −0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.013∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.011∗∗∗ 0.002
TFP 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001






Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
HML-R&D 0.070∗∗ 0.034 0.073∗∗ 0.031 0.069∗∗∗ 0.024 0.072∗∗∗ 0.019
Notes: This table shows the main macro model when we use financially constrained adjusted returns in
our R&D portfolios. The model is estimated using characteristic adjusted returns from Titman et al. (2004)
(TWX) as well as residuals (OLS) from returns regressed contemporaneously on the financial constraint
indices. The KZ index is constructed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and the SA index is constructed
following Hadlock and Pierce (2010). We present Newey-West (1987) standard errors. One, two, and
three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Data are from 1975:Q1 to
2013:Q4.
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C.2 Tax rate dependence on the debt-to-output ratio
Let BYt = BtYt denote the debt-to-output ratio in the economy at time t, and assume that author-
ities are planning to bring this ratio from an initial level of BY0 to BY0 − δ in T periods. Assume
that output grows at a constant average rate of g, Yt = Y0(1 + g)t.
Given an initial level of debt B0, the law of motion for the debt level is
Bt = Bt−1(1 + r)− τYt−1, t ≥ 1,
where τ is the average tax rate over T periods and r is the constant interest rate on the government’s
debt. We abstract away from additional expenditures without loss of generality. Iterating this
equation forward, we obtain





(1 + r)i(1 + g)(t−1)−i
]
. (C.1)






i=0 (1 + r)
i(1 + g)(T−1)−i
] , (C.2)
















which imply that higher levels of the debt-to-output ratio increase the volatility of the tax rate under
uncertainty about the growth rate of the economy. Below we report the change in average tax rate
when growth ranges from −3% to +3% for both a high (50%) and a low (20%) initial ratio of debt
to output with a targeted reduction δ of 20%. The range of the implied τ captures the extent of tax
rate volatility.
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TABLE C.1: Avg. Tax Rate in High and Low Debt/GDP Environments
Target Debt/GDP
50%–30% 20%–0%
−3% Growth 3.18% 2.28%
3% Growth 0.84% 1.75%
Tax Rate Range 2.34% 0.54%
Change in Range 1.80%
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C.3 Empirical specifications
C.3.1 Parameterized β regressions
We decompose the coefficient βJDGDP defined in the following regressions,
Ri,t→t+J = βi,0 + β
J
i,DGDPDGDPt + εi,t+J , (C.3)
as follows
βJi,DGDP = β(J)[1 + γ(rdi − r̄d)], (C.4)
where rdi is the time-series average of the R&D intensity of portfolio i; r̄d is the overall av-
erage of R&D intensity; and β(J) is a horizon-specific coefficient. We then jointly estimate
θ = (β(1), β(2), β(4), β(8), β(20), γ) in a GMM setting with the appropriate orthogonality re-
strictions implied by equation (C.3).1
The multivariate case is analogous, where Xi,J is now the OLS design matrix related to Equa-
tion (C.5).






MVMVt + εt+J . (C.5)
C.3.2 TFP construction
We use the following Solow residual method to create the TFP series used in the predictive
regressions for TFP growth:
∆TFPt = ∆GDPt − α∆Lt − (1− α)∆Kt. (C.6)
Labor growth is the log difference of the FRED series “Average Weekly Hours of Production
and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing”. We use real physical investment excluding
R&D expenditures (I = Inv − R&D) to create our physical capital series. Nominal series are
transformed to real using the GDP deflator. Physical capital evolves using the law of motion
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + I , where δ is the quarterly capital depreciation rate. We initialize the capital
series in 1975:Q1 using the perpetuity formulaK1975:Q1 =
I1975:Q1
δ
. We set the parameters δ = 0.02
and α = 0.58 as in our calibration.
C.3.3 Look-ahead bias correction





DGDP ·DGDPt + βJPD · PDt + βJMV ·MVt + εt+J . (C.7)







−1(X ′i,JRi,J)− β(J)[1 + γ(rdi − r̄d)]]2,
where Xi,J is the OLS design matrix related to Equation (C.3) and Ri,J is the stacked cumulative returns, both for
portfolio i and horizon J . We define ι2 to be a conformable zeros column vector with a one in the 2nd position.
200









= β̂J0 + β̂
J








This method guarantees that only information up to time t was used to construct fitted values














+ cJ2 · ε̂t+J + vt+J . (C.10)
C.3.4 Stambaugh bias correction
We follow the methods in Stambaugh (1999) and use the sample counterpart of his equation
(18) to correct for bias in our univariate predictive return regressions. The method is also explained
in Stambaugh (1986), equation 11. We report bootstrapped standard errors for this procedure, and
use a block bootstrap with a block size of T/4.
C.3.5 Characteristic-adjusted returns
We follow Titman et al. (2004) in constructing returns adjusted for the impact of both financial
constraints and financial leverage (secondary sorting characteristic).
Each year, we first sort firms by their secondary sorting characteristic into three portfolios
whereby both the low and high portfolios are guaranteed to contain firms totaling 10% of the
overall market capitalization. These portfolios are re-formed each year. Quarterly stock returns
are then adjusted by taking each firm’s quarterly return and subtracting the cross-sectional average
quarterly returns of the secondary sorting characteristic portfolio that the firm is a member of.
Firms are then sorted according to our baseline procedure based on R&D intensity.
C.3.6 Monte Carlo evidence
To assess the potential for spurious inference in our predictive regressions with a highly per-
sistent regressor, namely DGDP , we perform a Monte Carlo analysis with simulated data under
the null of no predictability. Since our benchmark sample spans 156 quarters, we simulate 10,000
samples with 156 observations of the following system of equations:
DGDPt = (1− ρDGDP )µDGDP + ρDGDPDGDPt−1 + εDGDP,t (C.11)













In each repetition, consistent with our empirical methodology, we adopt a Stambaugh bias
correction and estimate the following regression
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J , (C.15)
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return. By doing so, we
recover the short-sample distribution of both βJDGDP and its own t−stat under then null hypothesis
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TABLE C.2: Montecarlo Results for βJDGDP
ρr = 0 ρr = 0.35
Horizon (J) 1 2 4 8 20 1 2 4 8 20
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.02
95% 0.12 0.22 0.44 0.86 2.11 0.17 0.33 0.67 1.32 3.25
5% −0.11 −0.22 −0.43 −0.85 −2.06 −0.18 −0.35 −0.68 −1.33 −3.21
t− stat 1.00 1.00 2.10 3.06 3.79 1.00 1.00 2.10 3.06 3.79
prob(x > t− stat) 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.02
Notes: This table shows the average, the 95th, and the 5th percentile of βJDGDP , as defined by the following
predictive regression
Rt→t+J = β0 + β
J
DGDPDGDPt + εt+J ,
where Rt→t+J :=
∑J
j=1 rt+j is the J-quarter-ahead cumulative excess return and DGDP denotes the debt-
to-output ratio. All results are based on 10,000 Montecarlo simulations of the system of equations (C.11)–
(C.14) under the null hypothesis thatDGDP does not predict returns. The row t−stat reports the t-statistics
obtained from our real data for equally-weighted returns. The last row reports the percentage of repetitions
that generated t-statistics greater than those obtained from real data.
thatDGDP has no forecasting power for future excess returns. The t−stats are computed exactly
as in the empirical section, that is, in each sample we compute the standard error of the corrected
βJDGDP with a block-bootstrap procedure.
To be consistent with our quarterly data for public debt (1975:Q1-2013:Q4), we set ρDGDP =
0.98, µDGDP = 0.56, and σDGDP = 0.97%. Focusing on returns, we set µr = 1.96%, and
σr = 0.10. In our benchmark specification, we set ρr = 0 so that under the null returns are i.i.d..
Since in the data the point estimate of this coefficient is 0.35, we also show results for the case in
which we consider persistence in excess returns. Finally, we set β = 0, as in the data we recover
an insignificant value of -6%.2
We report summary results across repetitions in Table C.2. Even though the distribution of
βJDGDP has slightly fatter tails than the one used in the empirical investigation, we continue to
reject the null of no predictability for horizons longer than two quarters.
2On the basis of tabulated sensitivity analysis, β plays no major role.
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